POSSIBILITIES OF THE LARGE AIRSHIP.

I.

A DISPOSITION has existed in this country to look upon the large airship as a failure. There are those who had written it off, for the remainder of the present war at any rate, as a weapon of any military value. These statements are put thus, in the past tense, for the reason that views, official and otherwise, in this country, on this question, at this moment, are in a state of flux. There are signs, feeble perhaps, but there, that at length it is realised in high quarters that the possibilities of the large airship may not have been properly appreciated here in recent years.

The view of the Zeppelin airship as a failure is admirably set out, in a sense at once popular and technical, in the September issue of this journal, by Messrs. C. Graham-White and Harry Harper. It does not in any way detract from the merits of that article to suggest that a certain bias on the part of the writers against the large airship is not unnatural. It is easy to understand how this view of the airship as a failure has appealed to the popular mind, though, possibly, it has been largely a case of the wish being father to the thought. The British public have seen little or nothing of the large airship (if we take no account of the German raiders), though they have read much of the disasters which, even before the war, befell the Zeppelins. Certainly, up to the present, these great German aircraft, fortunately for us, have neither realised the expectations formed in regard to them in Germany, nor justified the fears entertained in other quarters. Nevertheless, what they have done has indicated, emphatically, certain possibilities; and it would be a most serious mistake to turn down the idea of the large airship as not worth further consideration. It may be noted that in his interesting letter which, not long ago, appeared in the public prints, Mr. Balfour took no such line. While distinctly caustic as to the achievements of the Zeppelins in this country, he was careful not to commit himself to any condemnation of the large airship as a military weapon; his mind remained open on that point. In passing, it may be remarked that certain later utterances of Mr. Balfour on this question do not, perhaps, display an equal caution. When he recently appealed for consideration in the House of Commons on the ground that aerial warfare had taken

on developments that had not been anticipated, he was not strictly If he had said, not anticipated in certain quarters, he would, doubtless, have been right. All that has happened so far in aerial warfare had been anticipated by those whose business it was, or who had made it their business, to study this question, including responsible officials of the great Service over which Mr. Balfour himself now presides. Indeed, much was anticipated that has not yet occurred; there is more to come.

The extraordinary character of the situation in this country at this moment in regard to aircraft was vividly illustrated only the other day, when Mr. Balfour, from his place in the House of Commons, gave expression to the surprise with which he had found that he became responsible for aircraft when he took charge of the Admiralty. The arrangements under which the Admiralty became responsible for large aircraft were initiated by the Imperial Defence Committee, a body which the country owes to Mr. Balfour himself and of which he is still a member. The position in regard to large aircraft is, indeed, so remarkable that it will well repay a brief historical review.

II.

The history of the airship in this country may be said to have begun with the appointment, in 1909, by the Imperial Defence Authorities of an Advisory Committee to guide the Services in the construction of aircraft. This Committee, with Lord Rayleigh as Chairman, was a very learned body, and appeared, also, to be of an eminently practical character. In due course, the Admiralty, who had been specially charged with the construction of large airships, arranged with one of our great "armament houses" to build such an airship at their works on the west coast of England. The airship was designed, built, launched, and made trial trips, amidst mutual congratulations. Unfortunately, one morning, as the great vessel was being drawn out of its shed, it broke in two pieces-perhaps one of the most unlucky accidents that ever happened in either of our combative Services.

Again, about the time when the Imperial Defence Committee came to the conclusion that it was desirable to provide the country with large airships, a powerful London morning newspaper initiated a public subscription to buy an airship in France and to present it to the nation. The airship, of the semi-rigid type, was duly built; it made a record flight across to this country, and was justly regarded as a chef d'œuvre of its class. Someone, however, had made a mistake in connection with the shed intended

to receive the airship; it was too small, and in trying to get the airship in, the vessel was ripped up.

After these untoward incidents, Government discovered that what we really wanted was not large airships at all, but small vessels of the non-rigid type, which could be folded up, packed in a portmanteau, as one might say, and sent to any part of the world where we might need them. The large airship was dropped. The result appears to be that we have neither any large airships in commission, nor any adequate non-rigids available for service abroad. There we stand at the moment, though "something" is being done at last.

It is nothing but simple justice to add here that during all these recent years there have been those in the Admiralty itself who have kept the lamp at least alive, who have never lost faith in the large airship notwithstanding the unfortunate experiences of the past, and who believe in it to-day as a military weapon of immense possibilities. As a matter of fact, while the present writing does not pretend to have any official authority whatever, and has not been prepared with any collaboration, direct or indirect, on the part of any Government official, or with the knowledge of any such official, nevertheless it can be said that no claim is made in it on behalf of the large airship which will not be endorsed and emphasised by those who, from their high official positions, their daily studies, their knowledge and experience, must be looked upon as our most competent authorities on this great question. How it comes, therefore, that we have not a single large airship available at this moment is one of those mysteries of our national service which it may be worth while investigating-at some future time. The result will be an interesting and surprising chapter in the "secret history" of to-day.

Nothing is further from the purpose of the present writing than anything in the way of recrimination; but it is profitable, at times, to look at the might-have-been, if only to emphasise the conditions of the present and the needs of the immediate future. At the moment of writing, among the news from the East, where the tragedy of Serbia and the perfidy of the rulers of Bulgaria and (apparently) of Greece are rapidly developing, comes the intimation that the Germans are sending a Zeppelin to Sofia. Twelve months ago, before a shot had been fired in the Dardanelles, the great part which the large airship could play for the Entente in that region was formally pointed out to the authorities; while, at the same time, it was explained that such airships, of a certain class, could be built in this country, sent out in sections, and re-erected on sites convenient to the Straits. Had the suggestion thus put forward been promptly

adopted, it is possible that we should have been in Constantinople by this, in which event it is certain that the Balkan situation would have presented an aspect very different from that which it wears at this moment. The immense moral effect which the appearance of large airships flying the flags of the Allies would have had in those regions was also emphasised.

III.

The view which regards the large airship as a failure appears to rest partly on the paucity and inconsequence of the achievements of the Zeppelins, and partly on the losses which the latter have sustained. Undoubtedly those losses have been very heavy, again fortunately for us. It is to be noted, however, that by far the greater number of those losses have been due to causes other than military action; there does not appear to be any authentic record of a large airship having been brought down in enemy lines directly by gunfire.

As to the military achievements of the Zeppelins, so far these have not been brilliant or momentous; they represent little or nothing of military value, if we exclude reconnaissance. It is possible, however, that this state of things has been due, to some extent, to deliberate restraint as well as to technical failure. It is not difficult to find reasons which seem adequate to explain how it is that the enemy has done so little with his great aircraft up to the present time.

The limitations of the large airship are fully admitted by its most enthusiastic supporters. Among the causes from which those limitations arise is the weather. The large airship can only operate, at present, when meteorological conditions are favourable. Not long after the war came the autumnal equinox; the winter months followed. It is not necessary for the large airship to remain dormant during the winter, as we shall probably find by experience presently, but its operations during that season, in the west of Europe, cannot be carried on with that freedom which is possible at some other periods. Again, the moment war was declared, the authorities in this country stopped the publication of the Greenwich daily weather reports, and, notwithstanding their possession of a very complete meteorological station at Heligoland, the Germans were put at a considerable disadvantage by the want of the Greenwich bulletins, in so far as any extended operations on the part of their large airships were concerned. Hence it was almost impossible for the Zeppelins to attempt any important programme for some time after the war had commenced.

Then, even before the war, it had been recognised that the large airship might be very vulnerable to attack from above by the more active aeroplane; and Count Zeppelin and his assistants were busily studying the possibility of providing the large airship with some special means of defence against such attacks. It still remains to be seen whether any means of defence likely to be adequate will not constitute a new source of danger to the airship itself; but, whether any solution has been found or not, it is easy to see that the German authorities may have deliberately preferred to keep their fleet of large airships in hand, as far as possible, until this question could be determined. A fleet of large airships containing even only one or two members provided with means of defence against overhead attack will clearly be a very different proposition from a fleet without any such means of defence, however powerful in other respects.

Again, the large airship, while it may be usefully employed in military operations whenever the weather will permit, is not a weapon for any casual duty. It is a weapon which, under a wise policy, will be husbanded for particular duties and special occasions, when, say, in conjunction with important military operations on land or with a great fleet at sea, it may be used in the hope of achieving some decisive result. We have abundant evidence that the German military authorities have always intended their large airships for a great adventure. Here the naïve and egregious von Bernhardi comes to our assistance. In an illuminating passage which has not, perhaps, received the attention it deserves, he remarks:

'Last, but not least, we must devote ourselves more energetically to the development of aviation for naval purposes. If our airships could only be so largely developed that they, on their side, could undertake an attack and carry fear and destruction to the English coasts, they would lend still more effective aid to our fleet when fighting against the superior forces of the enemy. It can hardly be doubted that technical improvements will, before long [this was in 1911], make it possible to perform such services. A pronounced superiority of our air fleet over the English would contribute largely to equalise the difference in strength of the two navies more and more during the course of the war. It should be the more possible to gain a superiority in this field because our assumed enemies have not any start on us, and we can compete for the palm of victory on equal terms."

There we have it, in a nutshell. Moreover, anyone who has come much in touch with German technical and professional classes during recent years is aware that the suggestion of the passage which has just been quoted was far from being a mere notion of the military; it had become a root idea in the country, the idea on which the glories of "The Day" were based.

It is no purpose of the present writing to discuss the question