THE CONQUEST OF GERMAN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA.

GENERAL BOTHA's campaign in German South-west Africa will in future history undoubtedly be regarded as one of the remarkable features of the great war in which we are now involved. It is difficult to convey to the inhabitants of England, a country of verdant fields and ever-flowing water, the difficulties of making war in one of the thirstiest, most desert, and most inhospitable regions of all Africa; but to those who understand and appreciate the risks and dangers of a campaign in such a region as Great Namaqualand and Damaraland, General Botha's advance to Windhoek, and the capture of the German colonial capital, must stand out as one of the most striking feats in the annals of our Colonial and Indian wars.

The Germans, who first established themselves in South-west Africa in the year 1884, have for many years past been preparing steadily for the Day with which we have been so long threatened. They have created with extreme care a strong force of picked soldiers, colonists who have been trained and armed for the purpose of aggression against British South Africa when the time should arrive. These have been stiffened by a force of regular troops. They have built strategic railways, one of them through hopeless desert country, such as the southern parts of Great Namaqualand, solely with a view to attacking Cape Colony. A great wireless station was erected at Windhoek, the capital, by means of which steady communication was maintained with Togoland. After Togoland was seized by the British, communication was directed by wireless between Windhoek and German East Africa, whence messages with Europe could be transmitted. Considerable batteries of field guns were maintained at Keetmanshoep and other places, and a prodigal supply of machine guns was provided at suitable stations in different parts of the German colony. Blockhouses, manned by ex-artillerymen, were erected in many places and armed with machine guns. Several aeroplanes were imported and fitted up; with these, in the early stages of the war, German airmen flitted about the country, showing themselves on the outskirts of Cape Colony and penetrating occasionally even as far south as the neighbourhood of Cape Town, manifestly with the idea of terrorising the Colonial Dutch and impressing upon their minds the far-reaching arm of Germany. The number of the German forces in South-west Africa have been variously estimated at from 7,000 to 15,000 men of European

blood. Probably from 8,000 to 10,000 would represent the true figures. These were plentifully supplied with arms, ammunition, accoutrements, and horses, after the approved and thorough German fashion. In addition to these supplies very large quantities of rifles and ammunition were collected for the purpose of arming the Boers of British South Africa, who, it was confidently expected, would rise at the German invitation when the fateful moment arrived. It was intended to bring over large numbers of German reservists from South America, but that scheme was rendered useless by the speedy attainment of the British command of the high seas.

At the outbreak of the war General Botha, although considerably taken by surprise, had begun to plan not only the defence of Cape Colony from German invasion, but an attack upon one or both of the German ports, Lüderitz Bay and Swakopmund. His attention was diverted for a time by the assaults of the renegade Maritz, operating from German territory and by the rebellion of Beyers and De Wet in the Transvaal and Orange Free State. Maritz was quickly driven back after some attempts on Upington and the extreme north-west of the Old Colony, and his attack, a feeble one at best, never had any real chance of success against the small but determined Union Forces which were able to oppose him.

The Beyers-De Wet rebellion, also largely fomented by German intrigue, was a much more serious matter, and General Botha had to put forth considerable strength and call up large bodies of men in order to deal successfully with the situation. A brief but masterly campaign closed this dangerous episode; to the disgust and astonishment of Germans in Africa and Europe, it became apparent that the generous policy of the British after the Boer War had had its effect, and that the Dutch of South Africa were, as General Botha had always predicted, as a whole loyal to the great Power which had intrusted them with complete selfgovernment, and had created the Union of British and Dutch South Africa. Beyers was drowned during a skirmish. De Wet was rounded up and captured, and once more the Union saw peace established within its immense borders.

General Botha was now able to turn his individual attention to the campaign in German South-west Africa. He had long recognised the difficulties of making war in that country; but he took his time, made his preparations with due care and without haste and assembled a considerable force, the actual numbers of which have been wisely concealed, but which have probably reached a total of more than 10,000 men. As early as September 18th last the port of Lüderitz Bay was first seized and occupied by the

Union Forces. After this there came a long pause, until the Beyers-De Wet rebellion had been completely crushed. While this consummation was being effected the Union Forces at Walfisch Bay-always, it will be remembered, a tiny British outpost in German South-west Africa-and at Lüderitz Bay were content to hold their own against the Teuton efforts.

By January General Botha was dispatching an expeditionary force to Swakopmund, the principal German port, a little north of the British enclave at Walfisch Bay. This was occupied without much difficulty, the Germans retiring into the interior, after resorting to the dastardly device, hitherto unknown in warfare between European nations, of poisoning the wells. Immense supplies had to be forwarded thither for the northern advance on Windhoek, including thousands of gallons of water, condensed from the sea, upon which our troops had very largely to depend during their advance for the supply of this priceless element. More than two months elapsed before the various columns were ready.

The advance at length began from three points, from Swakopmund and Walfisch Bay in the north, and from the port of Lüderitz Bay in the south; the force from the latter place seizing the diamond fields east of that port, and thence thrusting their way to Warmbad—in the old maps often marked Nisbet's Bath. From Warmbad the southern force, under General Sir Duncan Mackenzie, made its way due north with the object of destroying German power in that region and joining hands ultimately with General Botha, who commanded the northern force, at Windhoek. Both columns met at times with strong opposition. At Gibeon in the south, after a preliminary skirmish, the Germans were caught, attacked, and defeated while entraining their forces for a retreat upon Windhoek. In this engagement, fought on April 28th, the Germans lost their field guns and maxims, some 200 officers and men, and a large number of cattle. On the northern advance, two days previous to the Gibeon fight, Botha's troops were attacked, fifty miles east of Swakopmund, by a German force of about 1,000 men, well supported with a number of field guns. The Germans were defeated and driven back, and thenceforward the chief difficulties of the advance lay in the parched and difficult nature of the country to be traversed by the Union troops. In this arduous march, especially that of the southern column, great tracts of utterly waterless country had to be traversed, and the British forces had to carry with them not only provision for men and beasts, but water. The Germans had destroyed, filled up, or poisoned the wells and waterholes in their retreat, and the problem not only of feeding, but also watering,

the Union columns on their advance was an extraordinarily complex one. To the late Sir George Farrar, who unhappily lost his life in the very moment of the triumphant capture of Windhoek, fell, as Assistant-Quartermaster-General of the British forces, the tremendous task of providing for the advance through such a country. Sir George, a veteran of the South African War, accomplished this labour of Hercules to the complete satisfaction of General Botha, and in the conquest of German South-west Africa his name will always be remembered as the organiser of what most men who know their Africa must regard as something very like a miracle. The Germans destroyed also in their retreat large stretches of the railway line, occasionally tearing up and carrying away with them as many as 11,000 rails; these had to be replaced or repaired; meanwhile, it is to be remembered, every drop of water used by the troops had to be carried by train from the sea to the scene of action.

Great Namaqualand, through which the worst of the advance took place, is one of the most drought-stricken regions of all Africa, not excepting even that sea of barren sand, the Sahara itself. In some parts of the country no drop of rain falls for as much as six or seven years on end. Over vast stretches the sand is nearly white, and the glare and irritation from the burning expanse so great that the men had to march with their faces covered with green veils. Sand-storms occasionally occurred to add to the hideous nature of the march; the sun heat was enormous, and in the shade of tents the temperature at times ran up to as much as 126° Fahrenheit.

To travel in such a region is bad enough, but to fight and conquer a rusé, unscrupulous, and determined foe in the sunsmitten deserts of Great Namaqualand demands assuredly qualities of a very high order. The mixed British and Boer force operating under General Botha, fired by the evil tale of the treachery of Maritz, Beyers, and De Wet, and of their German backers, were not to be denied. They overcame every difficulty, fought with the utmost dash and bravery, and everywhere drove their Teutonic adversaries before them. On May 12th, General Botha, travelling by motor-car, with a small escort, in advance of his northern column, arrived at Windhoek, the capital of German South-west Africa. On the previous day he had been able to arrange terms of surrender with the Germans left in the town, which had been completely abandoned by the military forces of the enemy. Thus, without a final battle, the place fell into the hands of the Union Forces. Some 3,000 Europeans and 12,000 natives are reported to have been included in the surrender of the town, as well as a quantity of rolling stock. Food was

not too plentiful, the Union Forces having captured the railway lines from the coast and thus blocked supplies. The country is bounded on the east by the great Kalahari Desert, an inaccessible and waterless region, whence no supplies of food can possibly come through. The bulk of the provisions remaining in the capital had, as might have been expected of Hun warriors, been carried off by the German fighting force.

The first Union troops to enter the place were a wing of the Third Mounted Brigade, under Brigadier-General Myburgh and Colonel Mentz. Not many hours later Colonel Alberts, with the Second Mounted Brigade, followed. General Botha hoisted the Union Jack, proclaimed martial law, and then proceeded to emphasise the great responsibility resting on his officers and men in the care of the German women and children left behind in Windhoek. How different a proceeding from the savage brutality with which the German troops have taken possession of Belgian and French cities in the European campaign!

The capture of Windhoek, as was declared by General Botha on his arrival at that place, means without doubt the complete and permanent possession by the Union of South Africa of the whole territory, including Ovampoland, the Kaoko Veldt, Damaraland, and Great Namaqualand. A few days after the surrender of Windhoek a force of Germans was met with and again defeated somewhat to the east of the town. The remaining troops are said to have retired to Grootfontein, in the southern portion of the Ovampo country, and there have been rumours that they meant to retreat still further north into the Portuguese territory of Angola, where it may be imagined they can scarcely look to be received with open arms. Be this as it may, it is certain that the defeated and depressed remnant of the Teutonic forces remaining under arms will not very long hence be rounded up and accounted for. So assured has General Botha been of his conquest that he has at once disbanded a portion of his force, and already burghers of the Transvaal, Bechuanaland, and Orange Free State have reached their quiet homes and recounted to their families and friends the stirring and wonderful tale of the conquest of German South-west Africa.

That conquest, accomplished with a smoothness and speed that are marvellous if we remember the tremendous difficulties of the campaign, is, in truth, a very complete and wonderful performance. Our generals of the South African War, including Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener, have borne cheerful testimony to the great qualities of General Louis Botha, that selftaught genius of the veldt, as a soldier and a tactician. His brief but masterly movement against Maritz, Beyers, and De Wet in