though the Russians would pour through the passes of the Carpathians into the plains of Hungary. Now the whole situation is changed-we hope temporarily, but it is of no use ignoring the facts of the case. In the absence of munitions and faced by an enemy who can use his shells with prodigal wastefulness, the Russians are thrown back on their second and third lines of defence, Lemberg, as well as Warsaw, being definitely threatened. The appearance of Italy among the Allies represents the bright spot in the somewhat gloomy panorama of the East; for if the Austrians are forced to defend their southern boundaries they must divert some of their troops from Galicia.

The influence of sea power introduces other considerations which must not be neglected. In all probability the influence of sea power will become more and not less as the campaign proceeds. Germany has lost the whole of her sea-borne commerce, her ships of war are compelled to remain inactive; and when she wants a German envoy to be transferred from Washington to Berlin, she is compelled to ask for a safe conduct from Great Britain. It is becoming increasingly difficult for her to import any of those materials which she needs. Italy, as an enemy country, still further limits her supplies. We do not for a moment believe some of the pictures which have been drawn for our edification of the internal straits of Germany. At present she is suffering very little more than we are; probably she has no particular lack of copper; there is nothing approaching to a famine in her land; while, unfortunately, the one thing of which she was getting short, petrol, will now once more become available owing to the Austrian recapture of her Galician oilfields. But the stress of war must tell upon her in the long run much more than it is likely to do on the Allies. The process, however, must inevitably be slow, and at present it is not wise to base very hopeful calculations on the economic elements of the situation.

§ 2.

Let us ask ourselves how the war is to end, and for what reasons and let us take the worst supposition first. We will suppose then that, because the antagonistic forces are too nearly equal for either of them to prevail, there will come a time when they cease from fighting through sheer exhaustion. That would be the worst possible solution of our problem, because nothing would be settled. All the bitterness and rancour which have

grown out of this war would be added to the harsh disagreements in policy and spirit out of which the war originally sprang; they would survive in full intensity even during the period of exhaustion, and no sooner did one nation feel that it had in any measure recuperated its energies, than it would spurn the agreements due to sheer fatigue and begin the dreadful conflict all over again. Besides, nothing being settled by the issue of the war, all the prodigal waste of blood and treasure would have been squandered in vain; and the world with diminished resources would still be arming itself in a passionate desire to reach an ultimate settlement. It is true, of course, that a still more terrible conclusion would be the plenary victory of Germany; but that is an alternative which need not be discussed, because so far as we can judge from the present tendencies of the campaign it seems very improbable, and is, at all events, quite inconceivable to any of the Allies. Next to so appalling a disaster for Europe, and, indeed, for all mankind, as is involved in a complete Teutonic triumph, the most deplorable consummation would be a stalemate on both fronts and a cessation of hostilities because both the combatants had fought themselves to a standstill. All the hellish ingredients would still be simmering in the witches' cauldron. The world would still run imminent risks of being asphyxiated.

Short of that calamity, what are we to expect? That Germany will be overcome. But how? We can discuss it in various ways. Our present method of warfare is one of slow attrition, especially, of course, on the Western front. The policy of General Joffre throughout has been to hold the enemy more or less stationary until the time when the possession of larger forces and a much reinforced artillery enabled him to take a deliberate offensive. During the intervening period, which has now lasted several months, the process has been what General Joffre has himself described as "nibbling"-a gradual, steady, progressive wearing out of the enemy's troops by constant engagements in detail. It is clear, however, that, except on the assumption that Germany's losses are always greater than our own, such a procedure is not only bound to be slow and tedious in the extreme, but, relatively speaking, ineffective. The real drawback of all methods of attrition is that they result in almost equal losses to both sides, and if this be so it becomes a costly and a futile method. In the case before us we believe it to have been largely successful. It would seem true that German losses have been greater than our own; but then our own have been so heavy as to make us wonder sometimes whether it is worth while. Our own casualty lists, especially during the recent weeks, have been

so enormous that we are almost bound to ask whether the sacrifice does not exceed the advantage.

One thing, at all events, is clear-that no process of attrition by itself will end the war. That can only be secured by a decisive preponderance of strength on the side of the Allies, resulting in the general retirement of the Germans from the positions which they at present occupy. As we review, however, the chances for and against such a consummation, we must not lay stress on conditions which may or may not be realised, and which still remain doubtful. Economic pressure, for instance, which has already been referred to, is not likely to manifest itself for some time to come. We must not argue on the assumption that Germany's resources are giving out. Of that there is at present no sign. Nor ought undue stress to be laid on the progressive diminution of Germany's armed strength in fighting men. There are, indeed, some reasons for thinking that the German troops on the West front are not as good as they were, and that perhaps some of her recent drafts of men from her reserves represent a shrinkage in military efficiency. But we ought not to trust to this possible failure of men as though it were a realised certainty. It is clear that there is no actual shortage at present, and that Germany's resources in men, as well as in munitions and in food, still represent a formidable and as yet unexhausted total. Of course, we might have urged a few weeks ago that the Russians in Poland and Galicia would not only materially assist the projects of the Allies, but help to shorten the war. That is an argument from which we are now precluded. Russia may not have sustained such a reverse as the German and Austrian official communiqués would like us to believe, but at the same time the change in the Eastern situation is so marked that we have to put off any hope derived from a great Russian offensive for at least two or three months to come. Thus everything seems to point to one central and indisputable fact that unless the British and French forces gain a substantial success owing to their increased numbers and the weight of their artillery, there is nothing else which seems in any way likely to bring this terrible campaign within sight of a conclusion. For us, at all events, Flanders is the main theatre of the war, together with that long French line which reaches down through the Champagne district to the Vosges. Here, if anywhere, must occur the critical events which are to determine the ultimate issue. Everything seems to turn on the chances of a serious Anglo-French initiative, so thoroughly equipped and organised as to beat down the sturdy and obstinate resistance of the enemy. And even when he is back in Germany he will be equally formidable.

§ 3.

Although we believe this to be a capital truth in reference to the war, there are other considerations which must be taken into due account. Their importance is uncontested. The only difficulty about them is that they are problematical, and we, like wise men, must not lay too much stress upon them. It is quite clear that the issue in this war depends very largely upon conditions in the Near East of Europe. We must remember that it began over a dispute between Austria and Serbia, and that one of its main motives, as far as the Teutonic Empires are concerned, dealt with the extension of Teutonic influence throughout the Balkan States. Both Germany and Austria have ambitions as to the ultimate disposition of affairs on their Eastern borders which bring them into friendliness or antagonism with the various members of the Balkan Confederation and Turkey. The mere fact that Berlin induced Constantinople to espouse its cause widened the whole area of the present conflict, and when, in furtherance of the same designs, Turkey was encouraged to attack Great Britain in Egypt, it became practically inevitable that the Entente Powers should push their operations eastward. Now the general situation in the Near East is one of extraordinary complexity and of the very deepest interest. Serbia, as we know, was forced to enter the contest at an early date, and if she has been quiescent lately, it is mainly because her enemy is occupied elsewhere. But the Balkan States generally have by no means got over the results of the second Balkan War. Old animosities remain unextinguished and new ones have been engendered by the various diplomatic activities of the different States. They do not exactly love one another in the Near East, and they are all equally greedy for extensions of territory. Naturally, the Entente Powers wish such States as Roumania, Bulgaria, and Greece, as well as Serbia, to join their cause and fight the arrogant despotism of Germany. But the Balkan States, taken generally, have their own private desires and cupidities, and, perhaps not unnaturally, they wish to make the best bargain they can for themselves.

Take the case of Greece, to begin with. A short time ago it looked as if M. Venizelos had persuaded the Hellenic community to join the Entente Powers. Then, as we know, King Constantine, backed up by some of the military party in Athens, manifested so decided a reluctance that M. Venizelos felt it necessary to resign his post. At the present moment the action of Greece is doubtful. Now that M. Venizelos has returned to power, he will in all probability be able to persuade his countrymen to accept the

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policy which he has himself marked out as profitable. But Greece wants to be sure of her position. According to a rumour rife at Sofia, she has asked the Entente Powers for a ten years' guarantee of her territorial integrity. What other claims she has put forward we do not know, but it is clear that she is somewhat jealous of Italy's influence in the Ægean, and shows a good deal of anxiety as to the possession of some of the Egean Isles and the coast-line of Asia Minor. Serbia acts more or less in agreement with Greece, because she too has some extensions of territory on which her heart is set, and, above all, she desires an outlet to the sea. The crux of the position, however, is reached when we deal with Bulgaria and Roumania, especially the first of these. It is said we know not with what truth-that recently an understanding has been arrived at between Sofia and Bucharest. In other words, it has been agreed between the two nations what precise arrangements of their respective boundaries will suit the two nationalities. But both alike are aware that the ultimate decision of questions of this sort lies in the hands of Russia. If Roumania could "redeem" her kinsmen in Transylvania, and if Bulgaria could be sure that she should be allowed control over certain portions of Macedonia, both might consider the advisability of joining the Entente Powers. Roumania is, of course, in intimate relations with Italy, and the entrance of Rome into the quarrel has without doubt exercised a considerable influence in Bucharest. But if both Roumania and Bulgaria could get what they want and yet remain neutral, it might serve their interests still better. At all events, by insisting on their neutrality they can press their demands on Russia, France, and Great Britain from a position of great advantage. It is of no little importance to us that both Roumania and Bulgaria should side with us, partly because this would check Austrian activities in Galicia, partly because Bulgaria at all events would be of the greatest assistance to us in an attack on Constantinople. If Sofia could send her troops to attack the Chatalja lines, the pressure would be relieved in Gallipoli. It is clear, however, from this very brief consideration of the case, how intricate and complex the relations are. We cannot be sure whether we are to receive assistance from the Balkan States. We must proceed on our way as though that assistance might very likely be denied us. The one substantial advantage which belongs no longer to the region of uncertainty, but represents a great and indisputable fact, is Italy's declaration of war against Austria. More and more the value of that alliance will be felt, for Austria cannot afford to neglect her Italian boundary, already menaced by Cadorna's gallant troops.