all the Balkan nations, are by far the most tolerant. The Mahometan subjects of Bulgaria enjoy all the rights of citizenship accorded to their Christian fellow-citizens, whilst the Roman Catholic Church has doubled its membership within twenty-five years. Greece is, on the whole, tolerant to alien faiths and races, if they call themselves good Hellenes, but there has been a large efflux of Mahometans from Greek Macedonia and Crete. The Serbs and Montenegrins have only one method of treatment of subject races. They must become Serbs and Orthodox, or leave the country, and they stay on at their peril! The treatment accorded to Arnauts, Greeks, and Bulgars is identical. The outrages on Mussulman and Macedonian women are, alas! of daily occurrence, and executions for purely political offences are not becoming, unfortunately, less frequent in the new territories of Serbia. Therefore, in drawing a map of the new Macedonia, doubtful territories should be handed over to the tolerant State, rather than to the intolerant one, in the interest of the inhabitants.

Perhaps the hardest task of all is that of the amateur mapdrawer. His judgments are sure to be criticised on all sides, and cogent reasons will be found why this or that plan is impossible. He must avoid all suspicion of partiality, or his deliberations will have a mercenary flavour, which will ill-accord with the lofty sentiments expressed in his decisions. He must consult authorities and read text-books, and even then his knowledge of the problems will be insufficient, for all questions of ethnography and geography and military considerations have to be taken into account. The present boundary, for instance, between Greece and Bulgaria was drawn up entirely by the Greek General Staff to avoid an attack from Bulgaria, and a change can hardly be made with the goodwill of both parties until their mutual relations have been ameliorated.

Each of the Balkan nations is far too chauvinistic, and, until they can moderate their extreme pretensions, little peace can be hoped for. The Carnegie inquiry published a map of the Balkan Peninsula, in which the ambitions of each State were clearly stated. Greece laid claim to all territory south of the AdrianopleDjoumaia-Veles and Durazzo line; a clearly impossible demand, as it excluded Bulgaria from the Ægean, and included districts where there were no Greeks at all. Bulgaria claimed Pirot in Old Serbia, and lands as far south as Verria and Koritza, but not Salonika nor Chalcidice. Serbia claimed part of Old Bulgarian territory, such as Widdin and Slivnitza, all northern Albania as far south as Dratch, and Austro-Hungarian territory as far as Agram and Fiume. All these ambitions were excessive; but

there seems now a reasonable chance of Serbia acquiring Bosnia, Herzegovina, and an outlet to the Adriatic, possibly Metkovic or Spalatro. The Malissori districts of northern Albania, including Scutari, might go to Montenegro, as the modern Albanian State seems incapable of working out its own destinies unhampered by foreign intervention. Serbia, being satisfied in the Serbianspeaking districts of the Dual Monarchy, ought to liberate Mace. donia and restore it to the Power which possesses the sympathy of its inhabitants-Bulgaria. The new frontier between Serbia and Bulgaria should be the Palanka-Veles-Shah Dagh line as designed in the original Serbo-Bulgarian treaty, leaving the district of Monastir to arbitration, though Bulgaria has the best claim to it. The future of Monastir, which is divided between Bulgarophones, Grecophones, Vlachs, and Albanians, could be arranged according to the decision of the arbitrators, much depending on whether sufficient compensation could be handed to Greece elsewhere, to make her submit to such an augmentation of Bulgarian territory in this quarter. The Cazas of Kafadan, Veles, Tetovo, Gostivar, Kratovo, Koçana, Istip, Radovitch, Pechovo, and Krichevo should be restored to Bulgaria in their entirety. But the Dibra-Florina and Bitolia triangle requires some adjustment, though as soon as Bulgaria could give some clear proofs of her friendly feelings towards Greece and Serbia, it should by rights be given to her.

The Greco-Bulgarian frontier is an even more complicated question. Apart from the Mesta valley the present frontier, according to Greek opinion, is the irreducible minimum necessary for the safety of Greece against a Bulgarian attack. The suggested cession either of the Edessa-Yenidjeh or the Drama-Kavalla districts finds no favour in Hellenic circles, which, while boasting of Greek invincibility, regard Bulgaria as the wolf in the fable, and hold that Bulgaria will not be content with Kavalla, but will want Salonika also. Greece might be willing to give up DramaKavalla if Bulgaria were to renounce her claims to Salonika and Seres. It is impossible for an outsider to decide the question offhand, though the compromise which would be most justifiable would be to leave an identical number of Bulgars under Greek rule in Macedonia with the number of Greeks under Bulgarian rule in Thrace; since the eventual occupation of the Enos-Midia line by Bulgaria would appear to be certain. On the question of Kavalla a great number of heart-burnings are bound to occur, but, as Greece will still hold a large amount of "Bulgarophone" territory in south-western Macedonia, she can afford to give up Kavalla to Bulgaria, whose only port on the Egean is now Dedeagatch. This will not improve Bulgaria's outlet from her new provinces to

the sea to any great extent, and the Struma would undoubtedly prove a better geographical frontier than the watershed between Seres and Drama. But such a cession of territory, except as the result of a disastrous war, could never be procured from the Athenian Government, unless Monastir, Avlona, Ionia, Cyprus, the Troad and the Dodekanese could be offered to Greece as a quid pro quo-a suggestion which would find no favour at the Quirinal, though more in accordance with the claims of nationality. In exchange for the cession of the Kazas of Drama, Kavalla, and Sarichaban, Greece should obtain the DoiranGhevgeli enclave, as a strategic precaution.

In putting forward this division of Macedonia, I am painfully conscious that it is open to many objections, and will not be welcomed with delight in any quarter. In the main, however, the claims of nationality and a give-and-take principle have been followed out, and I am convinced that somehow on these lines the future peace of the Balkans will be permanently secured, if such a thing be possible.

The present intransigeance of the Balkan Powers, their incapacity to accept the principle "do ut des," renders the task of the diplomatist no easy one. When one remembers that M. Venizelos is said to have fallen from office because he saw the necessity of ceding Kavalla to Bulgaria in exchange for the Vilayet of Smyrna, we can scarcely hope that MM. Pasitch or Radoslavoff will be any more successful, if they abate one jot of the national aspirations of their patriots. In Balkan circles the military party is paramount, and soldiers are not notorious in the way of moderation. The whole problem can scarcely be solved until the States trust one another, a consummation about as likely, if they were left to themselves, as the Greek Kalends. All Balkan authorities agree in stating that pressure must come from outside. But who is to exert that pressure? Of the Entente Powers, Russia and France are suspected by Bulgaria as being too partial to Serbia and Greece. Only Great Britain can act as arbitrator, though her policy in the Balkans has been timid enough in the past. Russia could coerce Serbia into evacuating Macedonia, and the allied fleet could easily instil reason into the megalomaniacs of the Athenian cafés. But would the Enos-Midia line, and the possession of half Macedonia, satisfy the Bulgarian extremists, and reconcile them to the loss of Edessa, Demirhissar, Vodena, Koukoush, Dibra, Uskub, and Ochrida?-for she has tender memories with regard to many of these; and the suggestion of the writer in the Near East last November that Bulgaria should be content with Thrace and the eastern bank of the Vardar was by no means welcomed by friends in Sofia. Macedonia is the

national bourn of Bulgaria, and the present methods of the Nish Government can only tend to accentuate those desires.

The Balkans at the present moment seem hopeless; and it is to be feared that, guided by mutual distrust, and blinded by the cloud of Teutonic diplomacy, they will fail to realise the opportunity, which may never occur again. The victory of the Central Empires will enchain them for ever; that of the Entente may bring Aeolia and Ionia to Greece, Transylvania to Roumania, Bosnia to Serbia, Thrace and most of Macedonia to Bulgaria. The moments are slipping by, and if the Dardanelles are forced unaided, the occasion may have passed. If an allied force, however small, were to be landed at Salonika, to strike at Stamboul or at Budapest, as a pledge for the good government of Macedonia, one may be sure that such a step would be greeted by all three States with relief. The hands of Greece, who is only seeking an opportunity for intervention, would be forced. Bulgaria would likewise (as Dr. Dillon has wisely hinted on page 700 of the Jubilee Number of this REVIEW) be glad of this excuse to shake off the influence of Berlin, and Serbia would find new supporters for her invasion of Bosnia.

Let Anglo-French bayonets, backed up by the re-united Balkan legions, cut the Gordian knot of diplomacy, and thus effect the fulfilment of the national aspirations of each Balkan State; and one may confidently predict that the war of Armageddon, against three effete and oppressive empires, will be brought more speedily to a victorious conclusion.

KENNETH LEDWARD.

A WAR OF CONTRASTS.

THE spluttering, insensate hatred of England which is now the common passion of seventy million Germans, united as they have never been united before, awakes in the average Englishman but a feeble response. He has to accept it as a fact because no choice is left to him. Hardly a line or a word reaches him from Germany that is not barbed with this unmistakable detestation. He sees that what was at the beginning an elemental and perfectly intelligible emotion has grown into a religion, and been organised into a mania. Always comically surprised to find himself even disliked, he now has to ruminate with such philosophy as he can muster over the discovery that the Germans loathe us, both as a nation and as individuals, with an intensity that not merely surpasses, but is utterly and fundamentally different from their feelings towards any and all of their other antagonists. He has encountered neutral visitors who return from the Fatherland aghast at the vehemence of its paroxysms. They can find nothing with which to compare it, unless it be the spirit of a lynching party in the Southern States of America or such a gust of revengeful ferocity as swept over England at the first news of the Indian Mutiny. Between white peoples, he is assured, there has never been anything like it. Only the terrible antipathies of race and colour have hitherto evoked convulsions of this frenzied order. And the fury of the Germans, as he cannot help noticing, has the unique property of lasting and growing. It has become part of their permanent plant of war, at once fervid and mechanical, a nurtured madness, a spontaneous ebullition prolonged to order. He has ticketed off in his mind the various stages and tokens of its development-how the war that began as a war against Russia has become for practically all Germans a war against England; how the pamphlets thrust upon stranded Americans at the opening of the struggle and designed to convince them that Germany was engaged in a holy war for Teutonic civilisation against Slav barbarism were out of date almost before their recipients had reached the United States; how, in the meantime, officialdom had given a new turn to popular sentiment, and England, as the betrayer of Kultur, had been installed in the first place of dishonour. Then came the discovery that it was we who were the real instigators of the war, and that our low, shop-keeping cupidity and cunning, our inveterate habit of commercial piracy, disguised under the nauseating pretence of