the Narew. As these words are being written General Gallwitz, who is the executive German commander in this locality, is reported to have reached the Narew, and deployed his army between Ostrolenka and Novo Georgievsk.

If Hindenberg forces the Russian defences on the Narew, and Mackensen reaches the Ivangorod-Cholm railway, the Warsaw salient will be untenable, and the Grand Duke will have no alternative but to abandon the Polish capital, give up the line of the Vistula, and draw his army back behind the Bug. Threatened by an all-round enveloping movement, which has been carefully prepared, and is being energetically carried out, Warsaw is in greater danger than it has ever been before during the year's campaign. Vigorous counter-attacks may yet save the situation, but it is doubtful if the Russian troops after their recent reverses are in a mood to resume the offensive with any hope of success. What is more probable is that the Grand Duke will sacrifice Warsaw to save his army, but it is safer not to prophesy for what most frequently happens in war is the unexpected.

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THE

FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW

No. DLXXXV. NEW SERIES, SEPTEMBER 1, 1915.

THE FALL OF WARSAW AND ITS SEQUEL.

THE Fall of Warsaw represents what should be one of the turning
points of the campaign. Whether it will prove so or not is
another matter; and, indeed, it is part of the contention of the
present paper that the general results of so important an event
as this are mainly political, and are not primarily military.
Nevertheless, if we take the matter as it stands, and especially
if we view it in relation to the German programme, we shall see
that its significance, however much it may be explained away
or alleviated by other considerations, is of almost capital value.

After the original designs of the German High Staff came to
naught, there was a period of suspense when various designs
were apparently considered, and tentative efforts were made in
one or two directions. If France had been captured, so to speak,
at the first blow, if Paris had been entered, still more if the
French armies had been demoralised and overthrown, the supposi-
tion in Berlin was that either the French Government might
have sued for a separate peace, or else, if they chose to persist
in the contest, the value of their alliance might be practically
nil. Baulked of Paris, the German initiative turned towards
Calais. Once more it was thought just conceivable that if Great
Britain were threatened with an invasion, and if the German
big guns could somehow be placed on the French coast to terrify
the inhabitants of Kent, there might come a weakening of the
ties of the Triple Alliance. For it must never be forgotten that
one of the main objects of Germany in this war is to win a
victory or secure peace by detaching this or that member of the
Triple Alliance from its allegiance. Probably not in their wildest
moments did German strategists think it possible to prevail against
the greater part of the civilised world. But if Germany showed

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itself powerful, so powerful as to spread dismay in the territories of this or that combatant, the chances were that the innate selfishness of nations, their instinctive desire to secure their own possessions and preserve themselves from a possible defeat, might operate strongly in favour of Berlin, and bring about a triumph of the German cause.

Now, during the twelve months of war, two of the German plans have obviously failed. So far from France being defeated, she is considerably stronger than she was when hostilities began. There is much evidence to prove that the French armies are better in every respect, and that one of the extremely valuable results of the German defeat at the Marne is the splendid revival of the military ardour and the confident self-reliance of our Ally. Never has France proved herself so magnificently in earnest as she has during recent months, and as a matter of fact her example is often quoted as a rebuke-and an unjust rebuke-to ourselves. As to the Calais stroke, we should probably not have heard of it at all if it had been possible for us to create a diversion in Belgium by defending Antwerp and threatening the German lines of communication. For various reasons, which it would be unprofitable to discuss, and perhaps impossible to argue about at the present moment, the Antwerp expedition was a failure. In order to obviate any possibility of a similar scheme the German army at once devastated Belgium, captured Antwerp by means of its heavy artillery, and advanced westward in the direction of the English Channel. Here, once again, in consequence of the devoted gallantry of the British troops, the Teutonic advance was stayed. The Battles of Ypres, Neuve Chapelle, and other engagements, proved conclusively that if we could not carry the German trenches, at least it was impossible for the enemy to carry ours, and that there was as much, or as little, chance of capturing Calais as there was of capturing Paris. As a matter of fact the German menace against Great Britain has dwindled away almost to insignificance in recent months. There may, of course, be only a postponement of the original design, but in war we must live from day to day. And it is a patent fact that since the Allies made an aeroplane demonstration over Karlsruhe, the Zeppelins that were to terrorise London, as well as the English east coast, have until the other day become conspicuous by their absence.1

We now know the reason why the Teutonic Empires, fighting on three fronts, cannot be everywhere at once. They have very large forces, but they have also, between them, lost at least three

(1) After these lines were written a raid of Zeppelins took place on the night of August 9th, another on August 12th, and a third on August 17th.

millions of men. They have not the troops to execute concurrent plans on each frontier, and therefore a selection must be made of possible initiatives, and certain schemes have to be postponed or abandoned in view of other and more pressing contingencies. For the last three months the German General Staff have clearly shown their hand. Russia has been the immediate object of attack, and an attack conducted in such strength as to ensure considerable success. We do not know exactly how large the forces have been that have fought on the eastern frontier, but it may be assumed that they have been not less than two million, and not more than three million, including, of course, the Austrian Divisions. Where their great superiority lay was not so much in numbers as in munitions, in big guns and high explosive shells. The general outlines of the campaign are quite clear.

As the Russians had been tempted by the lure of Cracow to push their way westward, the first step, from the point of view of Berlin, must be to drive them back again out of Galicia. Thus the Germans could pose as being the saviours of Austria-Hungary, and could, if they chose, restore to their Ally that portion of Poland which has hitherto belonged to them. But it is a mistake to suppose that the Galician Campaign constituted an end in itself. It was a portion of a much larger strategic plan, one of the most colossal plans that have ever been designed in war, extending as it did over a front of eight hundred and fifty or perhaps a thousand miles. From Silesia and East Prussia, with their excellent railway system, issued German forces mainly under the control of Marshal von Hindenburg. These were partly to hold the Russian forces in front of Warsaw, partly to attack the Russian salient from the north-west. While von Mackensen was storming against the Lublin-Cholm line in the south, Gallwitz and others under von Hindenburg's command were to cross the Vistula, carry their forces across the Narew, and thus gradually enclose Warsaw between a pair of gigantic pincers. Nor, indeed, is this all. From the north, too, a demonstration was to come under the command of von Below. Here the aim was to cut the line connecting Warsaw with Petrograd-at Vilna— in order to compromise still further the Russian retreat. As we look back over the events of the last few days we see that this gigantic plan has in no uncertain sense come off. The Russians, fighting with that magnificent courage and tenacity which they have always displayed in times of reverse, even more often than in times of success, have been forced to evacuate the line of the Vistula, the Blonie lines, and finally Warsaw itself. The fortresses of Ivangorod and Novogeorgievsk must, of course, fallone of them has already done so-into German hands. Kovno

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