devil was sick, the devil a saint would be." What would be the consequence of such action as the German Emperor and his agents recommend? Presuming that President Eliot's benevolent idea of a "freedom of the sea" alliance could be carried out, what guarantee would there be that any one of the signatory Powers would not secretly construct battleships or cruisers or submarines with a range action of 3,000 to 6,000 miles? The present war has shown that, with precautions, large numbers of submarines can be constructed without the fact coming to the knowledge of other nations. In the conditions which President Eliot regards as ideal, a very small naval effort on the part of one aggressive Power would be sufficient to secure command of the seas, since no other Power, actuated by honest intentions, would possess the ability to defend its sea-borne interests. The obvious result of such an alliance, if effective, would be a discontinuance of the construction of warships and the organisation and training of personnel by all honest Powers of the world. There would be no navies worthy of the name, for the main purpose for which navies exist would have been abolished. And once navies had been disestablished, they could not be rapidly called into being again. The result would be that the command of the sea would pass automatically to the nation possessing the greatest ability for organisation in secrecy. Can there be any doubt, after twelve months of war on sea and on land, which country would possess the advantage of initiative in such conditions? President Eliot's conception of the freedom of the seas would provide the ideal conditions in which Germany would be able to secure the dominion of the seas.

These reflections do not exhaust the considerations which this new interpretation of the freedom of the seas suggests. There is a widespread impression that a country which is surrounded by the seas is ipso facto provided with an adequate defence. Water is not a defence, but a menace, in the absence of the military power which it can carry under this or that flag. Owing to the development of steam, invasion by sea is, in the absence of naval power, easier than invasion by land. During the present war there is no reason why, had it not been for the British Fleet, Great Britain should not have shared the fate of Belgium. It would have been easier for Germany, with her vast mercantile marine, to embark troops at her North Sea ports and convey them across uncommanded waters to specified points on the British coast than it was for her to batter down the fortifications that had been erected for the defence of Belgian neutrality. An army can travel by sea, in the absence of opposing naval force, more easily than it can travel by land, and

far more swiftly. An army on land can move, with all its services and over a long distance, only a few miles in twenty-four hours; the army of a country possessing a large mercantile marine, such as Germany, can travel in the same period from two to three hundred miles.

Germany has everything to gain by recommending to the world the new doctrine of the freedom of the seas, because she is to-day-and hopes to continue to be to-morrow-the greatest of all military Powers. So long as the existing conditions at sea continue her army is imprisoned; it cannot move beyond the confines of the Continent which, for decades past, she has found too narrow for her ambitions. If once she could prevail upon the peoples of the world to agree to her conception of the "freedom of the seas," as expounded by Herr Dernburg and Dr. Bethmann-Hollweg, or even the alternative scheme advocated by President Eliot, then, indeed, world domination would no longer be merely an idle dream. "No storm-tossed ships" would then stand between her and the attainment of "the Empire of the World." The master Power on land would then automatically become mistress on the sea.

But if we dismiss, as we may dismiss, the German suggestion of the freedom of the seas, we shall do well to honour by our acts at sea the broadly defined doctrine which has received endorsement by the great civilised maritime nations of the world. It is to our permanent interest to do nothing in limitation of the influence of that doctrine, because the very existence of the Empire depends on its perpetuation. We are at war to-day, fighting not only in defence of British interests, but in defence of the world's freedom, and it would ill become us to offend against the cause of freedom at sea. To-morrow we may be in a neutral position while war is in progress between other Powers. The precedents which we establish to-day may then be quoted against us to our detriment. We offer for attack a vast target-our oversea dominions, half the mercantile shipping of the world, and an ocean-borne commerce which is the very life-blood of the Empire. Lord Stowell, on one occasion, made a declaration of wide implication. "In forming judgment," he said, "I trust that it has not escaped my anxious recollection for one moment what it is that the duty of my station calls for from me; namely, to consider myself as stationed here, not to deliver occasional and shifting opinions to serve present purposes of particular national interest, but to administer with indifference that justice which the law of nations holds out without distinction to independent States, some happening to be neutral and some to be belligerent. The seat of

judicial authority is, indeed, locally here, in the belligerent country, according to the known law and practice of nations, but the law itself has no locality. It is the duty of the person who sits here to determine this question exactly as he would determine the same question if sitting at Stockholm; to assert no pretensions on the part of Great Britain which he would not allow to Sweden in the same circumstances, and to impose no duties on Sweden, as a neutral country, which he would not admit to belong to Great Britain in the same character."

These words embodied not only the policy of honesty, but the policy which in the long run pays best. Let us use our sea power to the full extent that is permitted by the generally accepted interpretation of international law as adapted to the conditions which confront us. But at the same time, even at some temporary inconvenience, let us be on our guard against committing acts even savouring of illegality or injustice. A temporary advantage may prove a permanent embarrassment. We are not less the champions of the freedom of the seas than we are the immemorial champions of freedom on land. If the war should close leaving on the minds of neutral observers an impression that "British navalism" is in any sense the equivalent at sea of "Prussian militarism," grave injury will have been inflicted on the future of the British Empire, and the war will leave as a legacy seeds which may produce a renewed and fierce and it may be, to us, disastrous, competition for naval power. Our claims to naval superiority at sea rest on the boast that we are, in our normal state, an unarmed and peaceful people, possessing in proportion to our wealth and position in the world the smallest army of any of the Great Powers. We can never make a war of aggression, because our military force is necessarily of slow development. As Mr. Balfour once observed, "Without any fleet at all, Germany would remain the greatest Power in Europe; it is our case that without a fleet the British Empire could not exist."

It would be a calamity if, by any act, we gave the world the impression that our naval power resembles in its expression and results Germany's military power, or that we intend to imitate Germany's policy, when she hoped to be supreme on sea as well as on land. Our case at the judgment-seat of history rests on the fact that our fleet is the life-line of a maritime Empire, that it defends the freedom of the seas for us and for all law-abiding Powers, and that behind it stands no great standing Army to which it can give safe and rapid transport on any errand of aggression. ARCHIBALD HURD.

THE GERMAN WAR IN AMERICA.

THE relations existing at the moment between the Government of the United States and that of Germany are unique; history affords no example of a similar status between two Great Powers. This is a time of extraordinary happenings, however, and no precedents are forthcoming whereby to judge the present actions of Governments or upon which to base predictions as to the future. The sinking of the Lusitania on May 7th led to a diplomatic Note from Washington to Berlin under date of May 15th, or eight days after the catastrophe, in which the American Government laid down certain principles to which it proposed to hold. The most important of these was the right of unarmed and unresisting merchant ships carrying passengers to provide for the safety of the ship's company before being destroyed, and the right of such American passengers as were on the Lusitania or their heirs to material compensation for damage done.

Under date of July 8th, or fifty-three days after the receipt of the American protest, the Imperial German Government made reply, and attempted to justify the sinking of the Lusitania on the ground that the action of the enemy, England, had made this method of warfare necessary, and ignoring entirely the question of compensation for those Americans who had suffered through the sudden destruction of the Lusitania. Under date of July 21st, or thirteen days after the receipt of the German reply, the American Government made answer to the German Note, which, it was declared, was entirely unsatisfactory and in no sense of the word an answer to the queries made in the first instance by the American Government. This last American Note to Germany was not worded in such manner as to demand immediate written answer. It was, in brief, a reiteration of the principles for which America stood; expressed polite surprise that no reference was made by Germany to American demands for compensation for the Lusitania victims, and closed with the statement that further acts of a similar character on the part of Germany "must be regarded by the Government of the United States, where they affect American citizens, as deliberately unfriendly."

Up to the present time the German Government has not seen fit to make further reply, and thus the whole matter still lies in the realm of "unfinished business" from a diplomatic point of view. Upon receipt of the American Note of July 21st it was promptly given out semi-officially by Germany that it would be some time before any further communication upon the subject would be sent to Washington, and it was even intimated that

there might be no answer at all. During the past few days the impression has gained ground both in Germany and the United States that the latter course would be pursued by the German Government. The actual situation is, therefore, that the United States is now waiting, not for an answer to its Note of July 21st, but to see whether or not Germany will respect, in practice at least, the expressed opinion of the Washington Government that under normal circumstances the destruction by German warvessels of unarmed and unresisting merchantmen carrying American passengers should only be proceeded with after providing for the safety of such neutral non-combatants. The question of damages for American lives lost on the Lusitania is one which might possibly be left until a later date.1

So far as the American Government is concerned, therefore, a policy now prevails of "watchful waiting" characteristic of the serious-minded and conservative man who is now President of the United States. As will be realised from the dates of the various Notes to Germany, there has been no delay on the part of the American Government either in presenting its opinions to the German Government or in replying to any Notes from Berlin. Nor has there been any lack of dignified insistence upon what was believed to be American rights in the rather involved situation. The American Notes have also been entirely consistent in their expressions of friendship for the German nation and the desire to reach an amicable understanding upon all matters in controversy, but in all these expressions of friendship there has been no retreat from the original position. The American Government has in effect said to Germany: "Even taking everything into consideration, such as the necessities of submarine warfare, the provocation of your enemies, and your desperately isolated state, you have done a grievous wrong for which there is no excuse. You must make such reparation for this act as is possible, and you must not do it again, as a repetition after this warning will be considered a deliberate act of defiance to a neutral Power."

To all outward appearance Germany has, up to the present time at least, taken heed of the warning. Since that warning has been delivered at Berlin there has been no clearly defined case of an unarmed and unresisting merchantman carrying American passengers being destroyed by a German war-vessel. No answer has been made to the American Note other than this negative performance. Whether this restraint has been imposed upon the commanders of German submarines by the German Admiralty, or

(1) The sinking of the White Star liner Arabic on August 19th has yet to be commented on. [ED., F.R.]