reared and fostered by such periodicals as the Corriere Della Sera and the Idea Nazionale; of the Italy which loathed the foul crust that had grown around its body public, and was impatient for a battle cry; a suitable occasion to rise up and cut away the cancerous growth that was threatening the life of the race.

When, in May, thirty-three years ago, the Treaty of the Triple Alliance was first signed, all Europe hailed it as a guarantee of public tranquillity. Bismarck himself, as well as the Italian Ministers Depretis and Mancini, looked upon it as a safeguard of the international status quo. The German Chancellor had apprehended a French war of revenge. Italy, disgusted with the seizure of Tunis by the Republic, was anxious to insure herself against similar surprises in the future, and Great Britain welcomed every settlement which promised an uninterrupted spell of peace. At bottom, therefore, it was a conservative measure destined to eliminate all disturbing factors from international politics. This essentially pacific character was changed first secretly by the intrigues of Austrian statesmen, and then openly by their attempts to subject the Balkan Peninsula to the Habsburg Monarchy, which was but Germany's pioneer. The first overt acts indicative of this deep-rooted design were the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the insolent procedure by which it was effected. The ultimate aim was the reduction to vassalage of the Balkan States, the corresponding substitution of Trialism for Dualism in the Austrian Empire, and the clearing of the road for Germany to the Near East. This programme connoted the renunciation of the basis of the Triple Alliance, inasmuch as it implied the upsetting of the status quo, provoked the resentment of Russia, and tended to undermine Italy's actual position in the Adriatic and to arrest her growth in the Eastern Mediterranean. And when in furtherance of this policy a twelvemonth ago Austria and Germany brought down upon mankind a series of nameless horrors, the words Triple Alliance could only be employed by a mocking demon.

None the less, the Treaty was renewed over two years ago, a twelvemonth before the appointed time, by way of protest against various sins of omission and commission of which the Republic had rendered itself guilty towards Italy. The late di San Giuliano, then Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the course of several long talks which I had with him on the subject, set forth his views on this matter lucidly and plausibly. Reminding me of a phrase used by Prince Bülow that the real meaning of the Alliance for Italy lay in its effect as a preventive of a war between that country and Austria, he assured me that, however Germany and Austria might interpret the arrangement, for Italy it remained

what it had always been a guarantee of peace. He added that Great Britain would do well to envisage it in the same light, seeing that Italy's influence had been and would always continue to be employed in the fullest measure to hinder her two allies from plunging Europe into a sanguinary conflict. When I asked him whether he could give me any concrete instance of the pacific influence to which he alluded, he answered that I must be contented with his assurance, which he gave me deliberately, "that Italy's influence in the Triple Alliance had already been and would continue to be thrown into the scale of peace, and for this reason is a valuable factor in European politics which all peaceloving peoples should appreciate and endeavour to strengthen. The more influential Italy becomes," he concluded, "the greater the chances that war will be avoided." The last of these conversations took place a few weeks after Count Berchtold had sounded him as to what course Italy would adopt if Franz Josef should proceed there and then to declare war-a defensive war forsooth-against Serbia, and should invoke the article of the Treaty which obliged Italy to become Austria's active ally. That was probably the instance of Italian influence being exercised on the side of peace to which di San Giuliano alluded, but which he was not then at liberty to disclose. Parenthetically I should like to record my conviction that that Minister who is now labelled a "Triplicist" was in truth an Italian patriot and an able statesman who knew how to profit by opportunity and to adapt his policy to shifting circumstances. But, as he exclaimed shortly before his death, "History will judge me," and its judgment will be conformable to his work, the character of which is as yet but imperfectly known.1

It is evident, therefore, that Austria's relations towards Italy have for the last thirty-three years had a twofold aspect, according as the Dual Empire acted on its own behalf or as the pioneer of its German ally. But in both capacities the objects of its policy could be compassed only by upsetting Italy's status as a Great Power, because that Power was a formidable obstacle to the Teuton enterprise against the Slavs and to German hegemony in Europe. Insincerity, duplicity, and secret but active enmity characterised the external action of the successive Cabinets of Vienna, while their relentless persecution of the Italian popula

(1) This appeal for a calm consideration of di San Giuliano's influence on Italy's international relations is not made without cognisance of the grounds which the historian after a study of all the documents may allege in support of the contention that he was a convinced "Triplicist even after the outbreak of the war. This remark may also be taken as an explanation of the delay in publishing that part of the official correspondence which would include his despatches to Berlin.

tion of the Dual Monarchy rendered Italy's fidelity to the Alliance increasingly difficult. Indeed, one may say that, had it not been for the depraving effects of the corrupt and corrupting Parliamentary system known as Giolittism which immobilised the foreign policy of the realm in Party interests, and bound up public immorality together with that in one degrading synthesis, it would have been impossible for the Consulta to condone or ignore the gradual extirpation of Italians in Trentino, Trieste, and other parts of the Austrian Empire. But neither Giolitti nor his numerous and influential creatures had an ear for the finer vibrations of the voice of conscience which, always low, waxes superlatively soft as it passes through the dense medium of Party politics. The national feelings of the masses were numbed, and the governing classes cherished but one desire the maintenance of the status quo abroad and at home.

From the outset circumstances had mapped out Italy's course. As a matter of domestic and foreign policy she had no choice but to follow in the wake of the two militarist empires. For, owing to the incredibly exposed and indefensible frontiers imposed on her by Austria on land and water, she has never been more than a semi-independent State. Unable to stand alone, the keen rivalry between her and France left no course open to her but the one which made her the mate of the Powers whose growth and ambition were feasible only at the expense of her own. But Italian statesmen entered into the concern with open eyes and without illusions either as to the temporary nature of the arrangement or its constant danger, but with hopes that their allies would play fair. Hence Crispi rejoiced to think that the imminent peril of the conflict was counterwrought by the entente with Britain, and di Rudini often assured an Italian friend of mine that if the Triple Alliance could only be maintained at the cost of Italy's friendly relations with England, he as Premier and patriot would have no hesitation about tearing it into shreds. For what it came to was that two natural enemies patched up their quarrels while awaiting the opportunity which circumstance might offer to fight them out or compose them for another period. Cavour had put the matter pithily when he said that "Italy cannot be tranquil as long as Austria remains a Great Power." It was Giolitti who first mooted the doctrine that the Triple Alliance was the bedrock of Italy's foreign and home policy, and as such was immutable.

Austria and in particular Germany were thoroughly alive to the real motives of this unnatural union. The former Empire was jealous of Italian expansion in the Adriatic, and, having formerly ruled Italy with an iron rod, still entertained towards

all Italians a feeling of contempt that was gradually passing into hatred. This sentiment, comparable to that which a wealthy lady may feel towards her insolent maid whom a sudden turn of fortune's wheel has whirled into a high position in the world of wealth or fashion, partly explains the systematically harsh treatment which the Italian population of Austria received at the hands of their rulers, whose dealings with the Slavs were marked by equity or generosity. There was another motive further removed from the surface, but not less cogent than this: Austria, as Germany's fag in the South and East, was being spurred forward to become mistress of the Adriatic, owner of Salonica, guardian of the Balkans, and therefore to blast Italy's hopes, to encircle her with narrow and impassable barriers and keep her in a state of permanent dependence.

It is fair, therefore, to say that Austria and Germany, when entering into partnership with Italy, had in view not the common interests of the three States, but their own particular ends, which were destructive of those of the third member. And that fact alone is an adequate ground of nullity. Neither is it an exaggeration to add that Italy discharged loyally for thirty-three years, and at the cost of heavy sacrifices, the duties which the Alliance imposed on her. The constant grinding down and ousting out of the Italian population of Austria by the Vienna Government put her fidelity to a severe test. Another and more dangerous ordeal was the fiat that recently emanated from Berlin that Italy's accord with Great Britain should in no case be allowed to run counter to the obligations that might flow from her alliance with Germany. This was a radical restriction which virtually shattered the twofold base of the Alliance-namely, the maintenance of peace on land and the reinsurance of Italy on water. But even then the Consulta never swerved from the path of duty to its allies; Germany's will was done, and Italy established a fresh claim to gratitude or recognition.

But there was neither gratitude nor recognition in deeds or in words. On the contrary, loyalty was repaid with disloyalty, open friendship met with secret enmity and intrigue, the story of which has not yet been officially revealed to the world. Austria's duplicity towards her own ally deserved a special chapter in the Green Book, and would probably have received it were an average Italian at the head of the Consulta. But the high-minded, overscrupulous Baron Sonnino needs time to familiarise himself with the ugly idea of holding up the ex-allies of his country to universal opprobrium. His fine sense of propriety recoils from such a radical change of front as from some infamous temptation. As a matter of fact, Austria never lost sight of the first essential con

dition of success either in her own course or in that which was traced for her as Germany's agent. She continued to plan in secret the downfall of her friend and partner, and made ready to compass her design on the first occasion that might offer. It is not generally known, thanks to the fine moral scruples of Baron Sonnino, that during the Alliance Vienna entered into a secret covenant with Petrograd for the purpose of securing the benevolent neutrality of the Tsar's Government in the probable event of an Austrian war against Italy. The Russian Government signed the compact, and the campaign was duly organised. Chance in the form of the first Balkan War warded it off and forced the Austrians to address themselves to the Slav problem first. It would be difficult to characterise more completely the spirit in which the Central Empires contemplated and observed the Triple Alliance in its bearings on the Italian comrade and ally. Austria deliberately prepares to attack her own ally, and Germany backs Austria, while all three parade before the world as devoted comrades! During Italy's war with Turkey both Germany and Austria aided and abetted the latter State by every means in their power, and invoked the Treaty to hinder the military operations which the Italian General Staff relied upon as decisive.

,.

On October 1st, 1911, the Italian military and naval authorities decided to deal Turkey a stunning blow by bombarding Salonica and Kavalla. But Aehrenthal entered his veto and based it on Article VII. of the Alliance. In April, 1912, certain forts of the Dardanelles were bombarded. Again Austria, this time in the person of Count Berchtold, intervened and forbade all such action. A heated discussion ensued, but the Austrian Minister closed it with the words: "If Italy should undertake a like operation again, grave consequences might ensue from it." She was even forbidden to use searchlights on the Turkish coasts. Again she gave way, although the restrictions thus imposed by her own ally cost her hundreds of lives and millions of francs. And while she was being thus insidiously weakened, the Chief of the Austrian General Staff, Konrad von Hoetzendorff, and the partisans of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand were moving every lever to force the aged Emperor to profit by her helpless plight and declare war against her. This chronic danger, combined with the pressure exerted by German commercial interests, such as the Banca Commerciale, which were voiced by Signor Giolitti, brought about a peace which was unsatisfactory and almost humiliating.

For a long time it had seemed certain that, of the two political problems which Austria set to solve the Serbian and the Italian -the latter would be tackled first. It was for this that Konrad