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obtained the highest administrative ranks, and have at times. exercised a decisive influence on the conduct of public affairs in Egypt those with whom I have been brought in contact appear to me to constitute, with the Syrians, the intellectual cream of the Near East."

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That generous, discriminating testimony to the political aptitude of the Armenian compensates for the scornful dismissal of the Armenian race as wanting in "political aptitude.'

Such, in brief, is the record of the Armenian political achievements in modern times. It will need more than an ordinary amount of prejudice for anyone to argue that a people capable of such achievements, under the most adverse circumstances, will not succeed in regenerating itself under much kinder conditions. of national life.

These indisputable facts and evidences place on a firm and unassailable basis the claims of the Armenian people to be considered and consulted as to their own future, when the day of settlement comes. Nor do they leave open to any doubt the question raised in some quarters, whether Armenians can be trusted to establish and maintain an autonomous existence in their own country, after a term of occupation by the Entente Powers, or one of them acting as their mandatory. The Kurdish problem will solve itself, first, by the absence of the support and encouragement of the Central Turkish Government which they have always enjoyed; secondly, by disarming them, or if they are allowed to carry arms by permitting the Armenian peasantry to do likewise, and by gradually bringing them under law and order by an efficient force of gendarmerie, as the unruly sections of Caucasian Tartars have been dealt with by Russia, chiefly by means of Armenian gendarmes. It is a patent fact that armed Armenian villages have always been immune from depredations. The Armeno-Tartar troubles of 1905 prove conclusively that Armenians are more than able to deal with their barbarous neighbours on anything like equal terms in the matter of arms.

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Two other questions remain to be examined for the purpose of stating with some fulness the case for autonomous Armenia : (1) The much-discussed question of population in the provinces concerned; (2) the probable effect of such an autonomous State on international politics in the future.

(1) As regards population. Reliable statistics are not available, but we are on safe ground if we put down the Armenians as, roughly, 35 per cent. of the total population. In Van they form

(1) "The Baktiari, Kurds, and Shahsevens, all of whose performances, at various times, I have witnessed. I incline to think that the tribesman is

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an over-rated warrior, whose prowess lies in terrorising helpless villagers."(Moore's The Orient Express, p. 151.)

a majority in the proportion of two to one (Lynch's Armenia, Vol. II., pp. 424-5) as against all Moslems. Throughout the whole country, though in a minority as against the Moslem races as a whole (thanks to the State policy of massacre !), they still outnumber either Turks or Kurds taken separately. But the numerical standard is both unjust and misleading. No sound conclusions can be based on mere numbers. More important is the political, cultural, moral, and economic value of the respective elements. The superiority of the Armenians in each and al' of these regards is beyond question. Mr. Lynch declares that over the whole wide area of Nearer Asia "in every trade and every profession, in business, and in the Government services, the Armenian is without a rival, and in full possession of the field” (Lynch's Armenia, Vol. I., pp. 465-467). Further, he says "that the Armenian population is capable of very rapid expansion under kinder circumstances" (Vol. II., pp. 425–426). Nor should it be overlooked that Armenians, unlike the Jews, would return to their country in large numbers from all parts as soon as settled government was established. Nothing is more certain, therefore, than that the Turkish and Kurdish preponderance in numbers would, in the course of a generation, be entirely changed.

Nor should it be forgotten that the great mass of the Armenians are cultivators of the soil wherever they dwell, and are not, as some imagine, almost exclusively merchants, tradesmen, and money-lenders. It is the undoubted "grit" of the peasantry to which they owe their preservation as a people, and Mr. Lynch, who knew them intimately, declares that “in this respect they are not surpassed by any European nation" (Lynch's Armenia, Vol. I., pp. 466). Sir Edwin Pears says that the Armenians, "though subject to persecution for centuries under Moslem rule, have always, though sometimes after long and arduous struggle, managed to make their race respected" (Turkey and its People, Chap. XII., p. 270). Never were the Armenians less inclined to sit still under oppression and tyranny. The massacres in the Vilayet of Van at the present time are of an unarmed population. But the military spirit and prowess of the Armenian peasantry, after centuries of oppression, have been demonstrated afresh by the enlistment of masses of the young manhood of Russian Armenians in the volunteer bands to fight their immemorial foes, the Turks. Their numbers, it is known, exceed 100,000. They are generously supported by Armenians both in the Caucasus and in Moscow, millions of roubles having been subscribed. Already they have proved their worth in the field. When the Armenians of Van were threatened with massacre, at the beginning of April last, 10,000 Armenian patriots, armed with weapons of all sorts,

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ejected the Turkish garrison, repulsed the bloodthirsty Kurds, and held the town against a besieging force of a whole division with twenty-six guns, which were eventually captured by a Russian relieving force, aided by the Armenian volunteers, who knew every inch of the ground.

The absolute solidarity of the Armenian people has never been so effectively demonstrated as in the action of the race since this war began in both the East and West of Asia Minor. Hence it may be confidently affirmed that all the fears expressed by certain writers as to the ability of the Armenian people to protect themselves and maintain their autonomy, are utterly without foundation in view of the proved capacity, courage, and patriotism of the

race.

(2) As to the probable effect of such an autonomous Armenian State guaranteed by the Entente Powers. First of all must be noted the result upon the Armenians themselves. The national sentiment, gratified by the concession of self-government in the six Vilayets and Cilicia 1-that is, the area most associated with the history of the race, and where they preponderate as a single coherent racial unit, with an outlet on the Mediterranean, would secure for all time, in the very heart of Asia Minor, a population whose strength and influence would be on the side of peace and progress. An outlet on the Mediterranean is absolutely necessary, unless Armenia, like Serbia, is to be "tied up in a sack" to the detriment of its economic and commercial progress. That surely can be secured without clashing either with French interests in Northern Syria or with Italian interests in Adalia. The whole energies of the people could then be devoted to the work of rebuilding the shattered fabric of their ravaged Motherland. Their supreme interests would be the interest of peace. Once the relations between the new Turkish State in the north, and the nomadic Kurdish tribes on the south and east, were determined, the full influence of the more progressive Armenian would begin to be felt by their lesser civilised, unprogressive neighbours on all sides. That has been the influence of the Armenians in the Caucasus. Their educational work there has been admirable. In 1906 they had over 500 schools, and they were, on the whole, superior to the Russian schools (Fire and Sword in the Caucasus, p. 152). Abundant evidence is forthcoming proving the wholly healthy and civilising influence of the Armenian race. "The virtues of the Armenians," says Villari, "are of the kind which are bound to become more and more valuable as civilisation progresses, while his vices are for the most part the rough edges which under a wise and progressive Government

(1) Erzeroum, Van, Bitlis, Kharput, Diarbekir, and Sivas.

will be rubbed away. This people is the civilising element in the Middle East, and is likely to remain so, . . . and they will unquestionably end by becoming the predominant element in the country" (Fire and Sword in the Caucasus, pp. 147, 152, 165, 175, 291). The one hope of redeeming Asia Minor from barbarism lies in the existence of a free, autonomous, Christian, and therefore progressive Armenian State. Every stride taken by the different races in Asia Minor towards a higher civilisation and a more pacific mode of life strengthens the possibility of an unbroken period of international concord. In that great work the main instrument must be an autonomous Armenia.

Finally, is it necessary to remind our people of the immense debt owed by Europe to Armenia? The nations are all debtors to that martyred people. As the Power mainly responsible for the Berlin Treaty and the only author of the Cyprus Convention, Great Britain owes Armenia a very heavy debt indeed. By tearing up the Treaty of San Stefano and substituting for it the Treaty of Berlin, the opportunity was provided the Turk for that orgy of robbery, lust, and murder which has stained human records for a whole generation. We scarcely realise in this country that in that period it is computed that nearly 500,000 human beings have been slaughtered. Sir Edwin Pears declares that in the massacres of 1895-7 at least 100,000 were murdered! Can we disclaim responsibility for the events of the last two months? Great Britain has made attempts to right the wrong done to Armenia. But they have been fruitless. The day is not far distant when Britain's word, backed by Russia and France, will be law in Asia Minor. That will be the day of reparation. W. LLEW. WILLIAMS.

HISTORY OF THE WAR.

THE Paris communiqué issued on the night of Saturday, September 25th conveyed the first news of the beginning of the Anglo-French offensive between the La Bassée Canal and Arras, and of the French offensive in Champagne. According to a secret order issued by General Joffre on September 14th, and found by the Germans on a fallen French officer, the troops engaged in the attack comprised thirty-five Divisions under General Castlenau, who has command of the Champagne operations, eighteen Divisions under General Foch, who commands the Northern French Army group, thirteen British Divisions under Field-Marshal French, and fifteen Cavalry Divisions, of which five were British. In addition to these first line troops, twelve Infantry Divisions, and the Belgian Army, were held in reserve. Five thousand guns were to be brought into action, 2,000 being heavy guns, and 3,000 field pieces. Eliminating non-combatants these formations would yield something like 1,200,000 infantry with 60,000 cavalry, and 100,000 artillerymen. When he issued his first order General Joffre evidently hoped for decisive results, for he followed it up next day with a second order telling Generals commanding Divisions that his intention was to "drive the Germans out of France, liberate those of our countrymen who have been suppressed for the last twelve months, and snatch away from the enemy the valuable possession of the occupied territory.”

Operations began on the morning of Saturday, September 25th, with the advance of the 1st British Army under General Sir Douglas Haig, who had deployed the 1st and 4th Corps (afterwards reinforced by the 11th Corps, the 3rd Cavalry Division, and the 28th Division) on the line Vermelles-Grenay, and directed a frontal attack against the German first line positions north and south of the village of Loos. These positions were captured over a front of five miles, the British troops penetrating for 4,0001 yards into the enemy's second line trenches, up to the outskirts of Hulluch, and expelling the Germans from the mining works between Loos and Hill 70. From the FieldMarshal's report of September 26th it was inferred that Hill 70 had been stormed, but this turned out to be a misapprehension.2 Besides the gain of ground the day's fighting resulted in the capture

(1) This was the distance given in the Field Marshal's report of September 26th, but in his Order of the Day to his Army issued on September 30th he estimates the gain to be 6,500 yards.

(2) On Thursday, October 14th, Mr. Tennant stated in the House of Commons that Hill 70 had never been in British possession, although apart from Sir John French's report of September 26th it was stated in the Order of the Day of September 30th that "the commanding position known as Hill 70 in advance of Loos was finally captured." It probably was captured, though only temporarily.

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