by which his will and actions are constantly determined to what is just and equal; to require nothing of us but what is possible, to proportion our burdens to our strength, and our strength to our burdens; to satisfy all his engagements to us, and not withhold from us any of those goods which we can claim by the title of his gracious promises; in a word, to proportion the evils of our sufferings to the evils of our sin, and not to plague us for nothing, or for what we cannot help, or beyond the guilt and demerit of our fault: and whatsoever else is just from a God to a creature, he is unchangeably determined to choose and act by the law of righteousness in his own nature. Since therefore the nature of God is the great exemplar and pattern of all reasonable natures, as being itself the most perfectly reasonable; whatsoever is imitable in it we are eternally obliged to copy and transcribe into our own; and consequently since he is eternally just, that is an eternal reason why we should be so. By dealing justly with one another we act like God, whose nature is the standard of ours: and it is certainly fit that all reasonable beings should deal by one another, as God who is the most reasonable deals by them; that they should choose and act in conformity to him who is the pattern of goodness and the rule of perfection. And herein consists our conformity to him, that we live by the law of his nature; and therefore so long as that law determines him to deal justly by us, it ought to determine us to deal justly by one another. So that the obligations of justice are as eternal as the nature of God: for so long as he is righteous, we are bound to be righteous in conformity to him; and therefore since he cannot cease

to be righteous without ceasing to be happy and good, or, which is all one, to be God, we can never cease being obliged to be righteous so long as God

is.

III. Another eternal reason by which we are obliged to do justly, is the agreement and correspondency of it with the divine providence and disposals. For God being the supreme lord and proprietor of beings, all those rights and properties which we claim of one another must be originally derived from him; even as the claims of the undertenants are from the head-landlord. All those natural rights we are invested with we derive from him who is the Author of our nature; who, by creating us what we are, and uniting us by natural ligaments to one another, hath endowed us with all those rights which we claim as rational creatures dwelling in mortal bodies, and joined together by natural relations and society. So that to deal justly by one another, or with respect to our natural rights, is only to allow one another what God hath entailed upon our natures, and mutually to render those dues to each other, which he hath entitled us to by the very frame and condition of our beings; and for us to withhold from one another those rights which God hath consigned to us by the state and formation of our nature, is to quarrel with his workmanship, and declare ourselves dissatisfied with the state of his creation. For whatsoever I have a right to as I am a man, I have a right to by the state and condition of my nature; and therefore he who allows me not that, allows me not to be what God hath made me; permits me not to enjoy that state and condition of nature wherein God hath created and placed me. For whatsoever I have a

right to as I am a man, I have a right to from God who made me a man; and therefore he who denies me the right of my nature, thrusts me down from the form wherein God hath placed me, and uses me as if I were not what God hath made me; whereby he doth in effect fly in the face of my Creator, and quarrel with God for making me what I am. In a word, it is eternally reasonable, that I, who am the creature of God, should pay so much reverence to his all-creating wisdom and power, as to treat every creature suitably to the state and condition of its creation; and consequently to treat men as men, that is, as beings endowed by God with the common rights of human nature; which if I do not, I alienate from my own kind what God hath endowed it with, and so in effect do disallow of his endowments, and impiously call in question the rights of his creation. For either I must own that God ought not to have. constituted human nature with such rights, which would be to impeach his creation, or that I ought to render it those rights which result from its frame and constitution; and therefore, when by my actions I disown that I ought to render them, I do in effect quarrel with God's creation for entailing such rights upon human nature, and declare that I am resolved not to be concluded by it; but that I will for ever defy the laws of the creation, and will not abide by that rule and order which it hath established in the nature of things. If therefore it be reasonable, eternally reasonable, for creatures to act agreeably to the order of their creation, this is an eternal reason why we should render to one another those rights which God hath bequeathed to us by the constitution of our

natures.

And as our natural rights are derived to us from God by his creation, so are our acquired also derived from him by his providence, who, having reserved to himself the sovereign disposal of all our affairs, is our founder and benefactor, upon whom we all depend for every right and property we acquire by our conversation and intercourse with one another; and that this is mine, and that yours, is owing to the providence of God, which carves out to every one his portion of right, and divides as he sees fit his world among his creatures. So that justice, as it refers to acquired rights, consists in allowing every man to enjoy what God hath given him by his all-disposing providence and if God hath an eternal right to share his own goods among his own creatures as he pleases, then that is an eternal reason why we should allow one another to enjoy those portions which he hath shared and divided to us For by depriving another man of what God's providence hath given him, I do not only rob him of his right to enjoy it, but I also rob God of his right to dispose it. For while I withhold or take away what God hath given to another, I take his goods against his leave, and impiously invade his province of bestowing his own where he pleases: and whilst I thus carve for myself out of those allowances which he hath carved to others, I live in open rebellion against his providence, and am an outlaw to his government. For this in effect is the sense and meaning of my wrongful encroachments upon other men's rights, that I will not be concluded by that division and allotment of things which God hath made, but that I will divide and carve for myself, and live at my own allowance ; that I will not suffer him to share his own world,

nor endure him to reign lord and master in his own family of beings, but even live as I list, and take what I can catch without asking God's leave, who is the supreme proprietor and disposer. So that to deal unjustly by men, whether it be in respect of their natural or acquired rights, is a direct opposition to the divine ordination and disposal; and therefore if it be eternally reasonable for us, who are God's creatures and subjects, to comply with the order of his creation and the disposals of his providence, that is an eternal reason why we should deal justly with one another.

IV. Fourthly, and lastly, Another eternal reason why we are obliged to do justly, is the everlasting necessity of it to the happiness of men: for justice is the pillar and support of all society, without which it is impossible for rational beings ever to live happily with one another. For while I deal unjustly by others, I draw all men into a combination against me; who having all the same tender sense of their own interest and happiness as I have of mine, must be sufficiently jealous of all designs and encroachments on their rights and properties; and consequently be ready to conclude from my injustice towards one, that I am prepared to do mischief to many for the advancement of my own ends: so that when once I am remarked for a person that bears no regard to right and wrong, it becomes the joint and equal interest of all to declare open war against me, and treat me as an open enemy without mercy and compassion. So that one unjust man in a society is a common disturbance to all the rest; for by every single injury he doth, he alarms the jealousy of every man, every man having reason to conclude that he