tion artificial and unjust, because regardless of the real fact of navigability.

We may conceive that some such considerations led to the enactment, in the year 1845, of an act, in addition to that of 1789, declaring that "the district courts of the United States shall have, possess, and exercise the same jurisdiction in matters of contract and tort, arising in, upon, or concerning steamboats, and other vessels of twenty tons burden and upwards, enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade, and at the time employed in business of commerce and navigation between ports and places in different States and Territories. upon the Lakes, and navigable waters connecting said Lakes, as is now possessed and exercised by the said courts in cases of the like steamboats and other vessels employed in navigation and commerce upon the high seas or tide-waters, within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States."

It is observable that the act of 1789 applies the jurisdiction of the United States to all "waters which are navigable from the sea" for vessels of ten tons burden; and that of 1845 extends the jurisdiction to enrolled vessels of twenty tons burden, on the Lakes, and navigable waters connecting said Lakes, though not waters navigable from the sea, provided such vessels be employed between places in different States and Territories.

Thus it appears that these provisions of law, in effect, prescribe conditions by which to determine whether any waters are public navigable waters, subject to the authority of the federal government. The conditions include all waters, whether salt or fresh, and whether of sea, lake, or river, provided they be capable of navigation by vessels of a certain tonnage, and for commerce, either between the United States and foreign countries, or between any two or more of the States or Territories of the Union. This excludes water wholly within any particular State, and not used as the means of commercial communication with any other State, and subject to be improved or obstructed, at will, by the State within which it may happen to be.

The constitutionality of these provisions of statute has been called in question. Their constitutionality has been maintained, however, by repeated decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, and they are, therefore, the law of the land by the concurrent act of the legislative, the executive, and the judicial departments of the government. Regarded as affording a criterion of what is navigable water, and as such subject to the maritime jurisdiction of the Supreme

Court and of Congress, these acts are objectionable in this, that the rule of navigability is an arbitrary one; that Congress may repeal the present rule, and adopt a new one; and that thus a legislative definition will be able to restrict or enlarge the limits of constitutional power. Yet this variableness of standard seems inherent in the nature of things. At any rate, neither the first Congress, composed of the statesmen of the era when the Constitution was adopted, nor any subsequent Congress, has afforded us the means of attaining greater precision of construction as to this part of the Constitution.

This reflection may serve to relieve from undeserved reproach an idea of one of the greatest men of the Republic, 'President Jackson. He, seeking amid all the difficulties of the subject for some practical rule of action in regard to appropriations for the improvement of rivers and harbors, prescribed for his own official conduct the rule of confining such appropriations to "places below the ports of entry or delivery established by law." He saw clearly, as the authors of the above mentioned acts of 1789 and 1845 did, that there is no inflexible natural line of discrimination between what is national and what local, by means of which to determine absolutely and unerringly at what point on a river the jurisdiction of the United States shall end. He perceived, and of course admitted, that the Constitution, while conferring on the general government some power of action to render navigation safe and easy, had of necessity left to Congress much of discretion in this matter. He confided in the patriotism of Congress to exercise that discretion wisely, not permitting himself to suppose it possible that a port of entry or delivery would ever be established by law for the express and only purpose of evading the Constitution.

It remains, therefore, to consider the question of the measure of discretion in the exercise by Congress of the power to provide for the improvement of rivers and harbors, and also that of the legitimate responsibility of the Executive in the same relation.

In matters of legislation of the most unquestionable constitutionality, it is always material to consider what amount of public money shall be appropriated for any particular object. The same consideration applies with augmented force to a class of appropriations which are in their nature peculiarly prone to run to excess, and which, being made in the exercise of incidental powers, have intrinsic tendency to overstep the bounds of constitutionality.

If an appropriation for improving the navigability of a

river, or deepening or protecting a harbor, have reference to military or naval purposes, then its rightfulness, whether in amount or in the objects to which it is applied, depends, manifestly, on the military or naval exigency; and the subject matter affords its own measure of legislative discretion. But if the appropriation for such an object have no distinct relation to the military or naval wants of the country, and is wholly, or even mainly, intended to promote the revenue from commerce, then the very vagueness of the proposed purpose of the expenditure constitutes a perpetual admonition of reserve and caution. Through disregard of this, it is undeniable that, in many cases, appropriations of this nature have been made unwisely, without accomplishing beneficial results commensurate with the cost, and sometimes for evil, rather than good, independently of their dubious relation to the Constitution.

Among the radical changes of the course of legislation in these matters, which, in my judgment, the public interest demands, one is a return to the primitive idea of Congress, which required in this class of public works, as in all others, a conveyance of the soil, and a cession of the jurisdiction to the United States. I think this condition ought never to have been waived in the case of any harbor improvement of a permanent nature, as where piers, jettees, sea-walls, and other like works are to be constructed and maintained. It would powerfully tend to counteract endeavors to obtain appropriations of a local character, and chiefly calculated to promote individual interests. The want of such a provision. is the occasion of abuses in regard to existing works, exposing them to private encroachment without sufficient means of redress by law. Indeed, the absence, in such cases, of a cession of jurisdiction, has constituted one of the constitutional objections to appropriations of this class. It is not easy to perceive any sufficient reason for requiring it in the case of arsenals or forts, which does not equally apply to all other public works; if to be constructed and maintained by Congress in the exercise of a constitutional power of appropriation, they should be brought within the jurisdiction of the United States.

There is another measure of precaution, in regard to such appropriations, which seems to me to be worthy of the consideration of Congress. It is, to make appropriation for every work in a separate bill, so that each one shall stand on its own independent merits; and if it pass, shall do so under circumstances of legislative scrutiny, entitling it to

be regarded as of general interest, and a proper subject of charge on the treasury of the Union.

During that period of time in which the country had not come to look to Congress for appropriations of this nature, several of the States, whose productions or geographical position invited foreign commerce, had entered upon plans for the improvement of their harbors by themselves, and through means of support drawn directly from that commerce, in virtue of an express constitutional power, needing for its exercise only the permission of Congress. Harbor improvements thus constructed and maintained, the expenditures upon them being defrayed by the very facilities they afford, are a voluntary charge on those only who see fit to avail themselves of such facilities, and can be justly complained of by none. On the other hand, so long as these improvements are carried on by appropriations from the treasury, the benefits will continue to inure to those alone who enjoy the facilities afforded, while the expenditure will be a burden upon the whole country, and the discrimination a double injury to places equally requiring improvement, but not equally favored by appropriations.

These considerations, added to the embarrassments of the whole question, amply suffices to suggest the policy of confining appropriations by the general government to works necessary to the execution of its undoubted powers, and of leaving all others to individual enterprize, or to the separate States, to be provided for out of their own resources, or by recurrence to the provision of the Constitution, which authorizes the States to lay duties on tonnage with the consent of Congress.

WASHINGTON, December 30, 1854.

FRANKLIN PIERCE.

XI. THE COAST SURVEY.

THE survey of the Coast begun by Mr. F. R. Hassler, in 1832, (after some fruitless earlier operations) has since his death in 1843, been under the charge of Prof. A. D. Bache, the present Superintendent. It is conducted under the Treasury Department, but is not a Bureau, being of a temporary character, and not possessing an organic structure adapted to that designation. The office is situated on Capitol Hill, some 300 yards from the Capitol, down New Jersey Avenue. During the portion of the year when the Superintendent is not in the field, he has his office in the Coast Survey buildings, and in his absence he is represented by the Assistant in charge of the office.

The coast is divided into eleven sections, extending in order from Maine around to Texas, and thence up the Pacific Coast. Operations are now in progress in all these sections, and thus the widest development of these labors is now nearly reached. The order of field work is essentially the following:

1st. RECONNOISSANCE.-By this is meant that preliminary exploration which is requisite to determine the proper points to be occupied as stations for observations, the sites of base lines, and the facilities and obstacles to the future conduct. of operations.

2d. BASE LINE MEASUREMENTS.-Each section has at least one base of from five to ten miles long, which is measured by a very accurately compensating standard base apparatus of some 20 feet in length. From this base, all the other distances in the section are deduced by a continuation of angle observations and computations.

3d. ASTRONOMICAL AND MAGNETIC OBSERVATIONS.-A limited number of the primary stations in each section are occupied for very accurate and detailed observations for latitude, longitude and azimuth, whereby their positions on the earth are very precisely determined, and the bearings of the various lines between the stations made known. The magnetic elements are so observed as to serve both practical and theoretical purposes.

4th. TRIANGULATION.-Intervisible stations are successively occupied so as to spread along the entire coast a connected net work of triangles, all the angles in which are mea