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sidered than the line of argument by which he deprecates the proposals for excluding from the House all placemen and pensioners upon the Crown. Is it not better, he asked, that the greater part of those who hold civil employments, and of such mighty and important bodies as the military and naval establishments, should have even a corrupt interest in the forms of the constitution, than that they should have none at all? Again, if the Government were deprived of this open. and avowed sort of influence, would they not be sure at once to resort to oblique and underhand ways? "For," he added, with one of those incomparably luminous and profound strokes that are not absent even in his most extravagant sallies, "it is no inconsiderable part of wisdom to know how much of an evil ought to be tolerated, lest by attempting a degree of purity impracticable in degenerate times and manners, instead of cutting off the subsisting ill practices, new corruptions might be introduced for the concealment and security of the old." Of all the modes of influence, a place openly held under the Government appeared to him the least discreditable to the man who holds it, and by far the least dangerous to the national interests.

What, then, was the remedy, or was there no remedy

for these grave distempers of Parliament? Only the remedy of the interposition of the body of the people itself. We must beware of interpreting this phrase in the modern democratic sense. The central article of the democratic faith, its cardinal dogma, is that a depth and a strength of virtue and power is developed in the massing and union of men, which is no more to be measured by the force of the individual, than the might of the waves of the sea is to be measured by the tiny salt pools on the sand. This conception, though destined to leaven and convert prevailing political ideas into their most effective future forms, was barely, if at all, realised in England at this time, and by Burke least of all men. In 1766 he had deliberately declared that he thought it would be more conformable to the spirit of the constitution, "by lessening the number, to add to the weight and independency of our voters." "Considering the immense and dangerous charge of elections, the prostitute and daring venality, the corruption of manners, the idleness and profligacy of the lower sort of voters, no prudent man would propose to increase such an evil.”1 In another place he denies that the people have either enough of speculation in the closet or of experience.

1 Observations on late State of the Nation, Works, i. 105, b.

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in business, to be competent judges, not of the detail of particular measures only, but of general schemes of policy-the assumption on which the Whig or Benevolent Aristocratic theory has been uniformly made to rest. Even in the circumstances of the election of 1774, when the Opposition candidates were pressed to pledge themselves to support a given set of instructions, and when Burke might perhaps have been excused for some sort of compliance, he declined point-blank to go to Westminster as a Bristol delegate. It is the duty of a representative, he said to the people who had just elected him, to sacrifice his repose and his pleasure to his constituents; and, above all, ever, and in all cases, to prefer their interest to his own. His judgment, on the contrary, he ought never under any circumstances to sacrifice. "Your representative owes you not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion." 2 On Burke's theory, the people, as a rule, were no more concerned to interfere with Parliament than a man is concerned to interfere with somebody whom he has voluntarily and deliberately made his trustee. But here, he confessed, was a

1 Speech on Duration of Parliaments, Works, ii. 482, b.
2 Speech at Conclusion of the Poll, Ibid. i. 179, b.

shameful and ruinous breach of trust. The ordinary rule of government was being every day mischievously contemned and daringly set aside. Until the confidence thus outraged should be once more restored, then the people ought to be excited to a more strict and detailed attention to the conduct of their representatives. First, the meetings of counties and corporations ought to settle standards for judging more systemati cally of the behaviour of those whom they had sent to Parliament. Secondly, frequent and correct lists of the voters in all important questions ought to be procured. Thirdly, the severest discouragement ought to be given to the pernicious practice of affording a blind and undistinguishing support to every administration. 'Parliamentary support comes and goes with office, totally regardless of the man or the merit."1 The

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1 For instance, Wilkes's annual motion to expunge the votes upon the Middlesex election had been uniformly rejected as often as it was made while Lord North was in power. Lord North had no sooner given way to the Rockingham Cabinet than the House of Commons changed its mind, and the resolutions were expunged, by a handsome majority of 115 to 47.

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In 1779-80, when Lord Thurlow was, by the King's commands, endeavouring to strengthen administration by securing the accession of some of the Opposition, he complained that Lord North looked too exclusively and simply to the concurrence of members of Parliament. "In my notion," said Thurlow, "the strength of a ministry consists, besides the credit and esteem of Parliament, in their influence upon

will of the King was omnipotent over his ministers, because he would endure none for ministers who would not brook his omnipotence. And administration was omnipotent in the House, because, as we have seen, it could be a man's most efficient friend at an election, and could most amply reward his fidelity afterwards. Against this system Burke called on the nation to set a stern face. Root it up, he kept crying; settle the general course in which you desire members to go; insist that they shall not suffer themselves to be diverted from this by the authority of the government of the day; let lists of votes be published, so that you may ascertain for yourselves whether your trustees have been faithful or fraudulent; do all this, and there will be no need to resort to those organic changes, those empirical innovations, which may possibly cure, but are much more likely to destroy.1

It is not surprising that so halting a policy should have given deep displeasure to very many, perhaps to most, of those whose only common bond

other parts of the empire, and other great bodies within the kingdom; their authority over the fleets and armies, and other branches of executive government, together with many other obvious articles." Cf. Donne's Correspondence of George III. with Lord North, ii. 301.

1 Present Discontents, Works, i. 147, a; 149, b.

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