SERM.

I.

conduct, acceffary to any one of their offences. This St. James afferteth with great earneftness as a principle of the utmost importance to be believed, and deeply impreffed on our minds. Let no man fay (let him reject with abhor-rence any fuggeftion that hath fuch a tendency) that he is tempted of God; for God is not tempted with evil, neither doth be tempt any man.

Secondly, The true and the most useful account of the origin of fin to every particular person; that which really is the fpring of prevailing temptation, is his own luft.

First, That God in all his works and ways, the whole of his adminiftration towards mankind, ftandeth perfectly clear of tempting them to moral evil; he is not in the leaft degree, or by a fair construction, in any part of his conduct, acceffary to any one of their offences. For our better understanding this doctrine, let it be obferved, that it hath an immediate and neceffary connection with the true character of the Deity. Reafon teacheth us, and the fcripture very expreffly, that he is a being of the most perfect moral rectitude or holiness; which attribute,

4

tribute, fo far as we can understand, princi- SER M. pally exerteth itself in his utter averfion to I. the fins of his creatures, and his approbation of moral goodness in them. This the facred writers continually inculcate, teaching us that he is of purer eyes than that he can behold iniquity, that he beholdeth the righteous with a pleasant countenance, but evil cannot dwell with him, and wickedness is an abomination to him; if it be fo, it is impoffible he should be a tempter, for that importeth, at least, that the fin of the tempted would be agreeable, indeed that he defireth it, and is folicitous to have them brought into the fnare. But all religion refteth upon this principle, utterly inconsistent with his tempting any man or any creature, that God is only pleased with rational agents doing that which is right, and displeased with their doing what is wrong in a moral fenfe: If that be denied, piety is intirely fubverted, and all practice of virtue on the foundation of piety. By this argument, which is the most plain and fatisfying, the apoftle fupporteth his affertion in my text, let no man say, I am tempted of God; for God is not tempted with evil himself, and confequently neither doth be tempt any man. A being who is wholly uncapable of any moral turpitude,

SERM. cannot folicit any others to it, nor give them

I.

the least countenance in it, which must al-
ways neceffarily fuppofe a corrupt affection.
Another of the divine attributes is goodness,
equally effential to his character, and of
equal importance and neceffity to the pur-
poses of religion: Without believing it, we
can neither love him, nor truft in him, nor
do good in imitation of him. But if God
be good, he cannot tempt any man; for
that proceedeth from the utmost malevo-
lence, seeing it aimeth at the unhappiness,
nay,
the utter ruin of the human nature.
Perhaps there may be a fond, blind affec-
tion in one man tempting another, directed
by the bias of his own depraved heart, to-
wards criminal pleasure, or imagined advant-
age of fome kind or other, in which he would
have the tempted to participate ; but the mind
which comprehendeth the true interest of
mankind, and feeth what the most enlarged
understanding muft fee, the infeparable con-
nection between virtue and happiness, and
between vice and extreme mifery; such a
mind, I fay, could not be imagined to fo-
licit
any man to fin, will that he should
fin, or do an act with defign to induce him
to it, without a malicious intent to destroy

Secondly,

manner.

I.

Secondly, Let us proceed to confider the SERM works of God which relate to man, and we shall be convinced that far from having a tendency, or fhewing a defign, to draw him into fin, which is tempting him, on the contrary, they provide against it in the best And, firft, if we look into the human conftitution, which is the work of God, curiously formed according to a welllaid defign in his benevolent counfels, one of the most obvious and important appearances in it is, an indelible sense of moral good and evil, the work of the divine law written in the heart of man, fo plainly and fo deep, that the very weakest, who hath the use of reafon, can difcern it; and not the strongest temptations, nay, scarcely the longeft courfe of cuftomary indulgence in profligate vice, have been able to wear it out. This sense of right and wrong difcovereth itself early; it is not the refult of mature reflection, close reasoning, and long study, but it plainly appeareth that the gracious author of our being intended to prevent us with it, that we fhould not be led aftray before our arriving at the full exercise of our understanding, which was defigned to be the principal guide of the rational life, or of our free actions; the understanding, however,

I.

SERM. however, advanceth flowly to its maturity ; but in every step of its progress, if we use it aright, it cafteth a growing light upon, and ftrengtheneth what I may call the virtuous pre-fenfation originally planted in our minds; for doth not reafon teach any man who calmly attendeth to it, that the God of nature, by prepoffeffing the mind fo powerfully in favour of the things which are pure, and honeft, and virtuous, hath not led us away from our true intereft and happiness, but directly to the profecution of it? To this fenfe of good and evil, there is added in our constitution a ftrong inforcement of the choice, and the practice of the former, in that high pleasure of felf-approbation which is naturally and infeparably annexed to it, which is the greatest enjoyment that we are capable of; and a ftrong motive to our efchewing the other, that is, moral evil, in that inward self-condemning and remorse, which as naturally and neceffarily follow it, and is of all pains the moft intolerable. Muft it not be acknowledged, then, that the frame of our nature prompteth to the practice of virtue as its proper end, and that the defigning cause of it did not intend to tempt us to evil, but to provide against our being tempted? It is true that liberty is a part of the