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but fill the King's Government with apprehensions lest they should result in possible prejudice to the legitimate interests of neutral Powers.

These apprehensions have unfortunately proved fully justified by the forcible seizure on board the neutral mailpacket the Trent, and the abduction therefrom, of Messrs. Mason and Slidell by the Commander of the United States' man-of-war the San Jacinto.

This occurrence, as you can well imagine, has produced in England and throughout Europe the most profound sensation, and thrown not Cabinets only, but also public opinion, into a state of the most excited expectation. For, although at present it is England only which is immediately concerned in the matter, yet on the other hand, it is one of the most important and universally recognized rights of the neutral flag which has been called into question.

In the absence of any reliable information we were in doubt as to whether the Captain of the San Jacinto, in the course taken by him, had been acting under orders from his Government or not. Even now we prefer to assume that the latter was the case. Should the former supposition, however, turn out to be the correct one, we should consider ourselves under the necessity of attributing greater importance to the occurrence, and to our great regret we should find ourselves constrained to see in it not an isolated fact but a public menace offered to the existing rights of all neutrals.



The French Foreign Office wrote, on the third of December, 1861, to the French Minister in Washington:

The wish to contribute to prevent a conflict, imminent perhaps between two Powers towards which it is animated by sentiments equally friendly, and duty to maintain certain principles essential to the security of neutrals with the effect of protecting the rights of its own flag from injury, have convinced it (the Government of the Emperor) after matured reflection, that it cannot under these circumstances remain altogether silent.

M. Thouvenel then discusses the merits of the Trent Affair, and proceeds:

Not wishing to enter into a more thorough discussion of the question raised by the capture of MM. Mason and Slidell, I have said enough about it, I believe, to establish that the Cabinet at Washington would not be able, without infringing upon the principles for which all neutral Powers are equally interested in assuring respect or without contradicting its own conduct up to this time, to give its approval to the proceedings of the Commander of the San Jacinto.

The Austrian Government instructed its Minister in Washington in the same sense.

Here was a case in which these great Powers asserted unhesitatingly their interest in maintaining the common right of nations to have the rules of international law maintained. The case happened to be free from those obstacles to frank expression which have been so frequently presented by the delicate adjustments necessary to preserve the balance of power in Europe, and accordingly the Powers expressed themselves freely. It never occurred to anybody to deny that they were within their rights. We can hardly doubt that their expressions had a material effect in leading to the action of the American Government in preventing war between Great Britain and the United States and in making effective a rule of law which protects the rights of all neutrals.

Any nation which adheres to the American Institute's declaration of the rights and duties of nations rests under a duty, whenever the law which declares and protects those rights is clearly violated or threatened, to follow some such course as these continental nations followed in the Trent case. This is not a duty created by law or by treaty. There is no legal obligation, but there is a moral obligation, supported by enlightened self-interest, such as urges every member of a civil community who is worthy of respect to give his voice, his influence, his example, towards the preservation of the law through which alone the community can continue to exist. If the nations really wish to have peace and order maintained by law they must take an interest in having the law observed. They must really mean it, and act accordingly.

Furthermore the declaration of the Institute asserts the subordination of nations to the obligations of morality. It denies that any aggregation of human beings in any state, under any form of government, can be superior to the duties of good faith, of justice, and of humanity. I shall not discuss that. No democracy, no republic, no form of government based upon the rights of men, can continue to live in a world which rejects that view. This republic cannot continue to live in a world which rejects that view.

It is to be observed that this declaration, in which representatives of all the American countries unite, asserts for all the world as a matter of general public right the same principles which, somewhat more narrowly

and upon a different ground, the famous declaration of President Monroe asserted in respect of the American Republics. The message of Monroe affirmed in effect that all the American states were to be regarded as members of the community of nations; that they were entitled to live, to be independent, to be treated as equals, and to be free from oppression by other Powers. He gave notice that the attempt by any European Power to override these rights of the American states would be regarded as unfriendly to the United States because it would be dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States.

As we turn from the narrow limits of the Monroe Doctrine to the broader field of universal international right set forth in the declaration of the Institute, with the terrible lesson of the great war in our minds, we may well assert that the repudiation of these principles, the violation of these rules anywhere within the confines of civilization, is dangerous to the peace and safety of the whole community of nations. To the efforts of the community of nations towards defending its peace and safety against the destruction of the fundamental bases of its public right, the often quoted words of Mr. Calhoun regarding the Monroe Doctrine are applicable. He said, in the Senate, in 1848:

Whether you will resist or not, and the measure of your resistancewhether it shall be by negotiation, remonstrance, or some intermediate measure, or by a resort to arms; all this must be determined and decided on the merits of the question itself. This is the only wise course.

There are cases of interposition where I would resort to the hazard of war with all its calamities.


Whether the United States will soon have occasion or will long have the ability or the will to maintain the Monroe Doctrine lies in the uncertain future. Whether it will be necessary for her to act in defense of the doctrine or abandon it may well be determined by the issue of the present war. Whether when the occasion comes she will prove to have the ability and the will, to maintain the doctrine depends upon the spirit of her people, their capacity for patriotic sacrifice, the foresight and character of those to whose initiative in foreign affairs the interests of the people are entrusted.

Whether the broader doctrine affirmed by the American Institute of International Law is to be made effective for the protection of justice and liberty throughout the world depends upon whether the vision of the nations shall have been so clarified by the terrible lessons of these years that they can rise above small struggles for advantage in international affairs, and realize that correlative to each nation's individual right is that nation's duty to insist upon the observance of the principles of public right throughout the community of nations.



One of the most far reaching events which may be said to have sprung indirectly from the European War, is the readjustment of the relations between Japan and China. The exact nature of this readjustment is but dimly understood in the United States, and its ultimate effects upon which is commonly called the Far Eastern Question, can be but vaguely foreseen at the present time. But the world will not fail to realize that these effects will be momentous. For this reason it is timely to trace the history of the “Japanese demands" upon China, to study the negotiations that followed and their results as embodied in the new treaties between the two Powers.

In attempting an impartial statement regarding this negotiation, it is impossible not to take cognizance of the fact that the demands of Japan for a radical modification of her treaty relations with China, followed within six months after the outbreak of the European War, and at a time when Japan's ally, Great Britain, was engrossed in that war, and unable to give close attention to Far Eastern matters. Under the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance signed August 12, 1905, as modified July 13, 1911, the two governments are mutually bound to "the preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire, and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China.” To what extent, if at all, that agreement may have to be disregarded in the new treaties, is a question certain to be raised when the European War shall have come to an end.

In the meanwhile, all the documents in relation to the negotiations justify the statement that the treaties were forced upon China against her protest and resistance; that they were accompanied by the dispatch of Japanese troops to strategic points in China, and the announcement that they would not be withdrawn until the negotiations were concluded; and that the demands, so far as they were acquiesced in, were accepted under duress. As originally presented, these demands would have es

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