had been given, and therefore the plea of equity could not be admitted. The ship was therefore condemned.

The Concadoro was a registered Austrian ship which arrived at Port Said on August 18 in ignorance of the outbreak of hostilities. The master fearing that if he put to sea his ship would be captured and thinking Port Said would be considered a neutral port, he decided to remain there. He was offered a pass to a neutral port but refused to accept it. On October 22 the vessel was taken out to sea by the Egyptian authorities. On the following day a crew from a British cruiser was put on board and the ship, after being allowed to discharge her cargo at Port Sudan, was taken to Alexandria for adjudication. On behalf of the master and other owners of the vessel, it was contended that the pass offered was not genuine and did not conform to the requirements of Article 1 of the Sixth Hague Convention. It was also urged that the vessel was a "merchant ship which, owing to circumstances beyond its control was unable to leave the enemy port within the period contemplated," since the master did not have sufficient funds with which to buy coal and provisions to continue his voyage. Finally, it was pleaded that the master had invested the savings of his lifetime in the ship, and that as he had no desire to make war on anyone it was a great hardship that he should be deprived of his hard-earned savings. Regarding the lastmentioned point, the court expressed sympathy, but stated that the case had to be decided upon questions of law and not upon feelings of sympathy. As to the character of the pass, the court held that it would have been an adequate protection against capture had the master accepted it. Concerning the plea that the lack of funds constituted a case of force majeure within the meaning of Article 2 of the convention, the court thought such an interpretation would be stretching the meaning of the term and could not be admitted, all the more so because the consignees of the cargo had in fact offered the master a loan of £530 with which to pay port and other dues. An order for the confiscation of the ship was therefore issued. 45

45 In this connection, a decision of the Belgian Prize Court at Antwerp interpreting the meaning of the term "force majeure" as employed in Article 2 of the Hague Convention may be cited. At the outbreak of the war the Belgian Government gave three days of grace to a number of German vessels that were lying in the port of Antwerp.

In the cases of the Oriental and the Germania the question whether yachts seized in enemy ports at the outbreak of the war come within the terms of the Hague Convention No. VI. The Oriental was a yacht belonging to a Hungarian subject, and was seized at Cowes after the outbreak of the war between Great Britain and Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian Government having granted days of grace to British vessels, the Oriental was allowed a certain number of days to leave "as a matter of fairness due to the comity of nations," notwithstanding the fact that the immunities provided by the Hague Convention apply only to merchant vessels. For certain reasons the yacht was unable to avail itself of the privilege of departure. The prize court, therefore, condemned it and ordered it to be sold.

The Germania was a racing yacht owned by Gustav Krupp von Bohlen, a German subject, and was seized as a droit of admiralty at Cowes on August 6, two days after the outbreak of war between Great Britain and Germany. Germany, unlike Austria-Hungary, not having accorded days of grace to British ships to leave German ports, no days of grace were offered to the Germania in which to leave. Counsel for the owners argued that although not a merchant vessel, the Germania came within the spirit of the Hague Convention. Yachts were not specifically mentioned because it was not imagined that private property of this kind in a belligerent port at the outbreak of the war would be condemned. By the comity of nations since 1854 days of grace had been granted to merchant vessels and a fortiori a racing yacht which had come practically as a guest to the Cowes regatta should have been given an opportunity to leave. Sir Samuel Evans, however, refused to adopt this

As no advantages was taken of the délai de faveur, the vessels were, seized. At the hearing before the prize court the owners, the North German Lloyd Company, set up the plea that the vessels were not liable to condemnation because “circumstances beyond their control" made it impossible for them to leave. The "force majeure” alleged consisted in the departure of the ship's officers and crews to rejoin the German forces conformably to the German order of mobilization, and the consequent inability of the company to procure fresh crews before the expiration of the period of grace allowed. But the court declined to admit the plea on the ground that the "force majeure" contemplated by the Hague Convention did not include inability to depart because of the abandonment of the ship by its officers and crews for the purpose of joining the forces of the enemy. Coleman Phillipson, International Law and the Great War, p. 79.

view and he issued an order of condemnation. The preamble to the Hague Convention, he said, showed that the purpose of the Convention, was to protect only ships engaged in commerce, and by its express terms the immunities which it provided applied only to merchant vessels (navires de commerce). Racing yachts could not be brought within these terms and the case must be decided on the basis of the law and not on the basis of any supposed spirit of the convention. During the course of the argument of the Solicitor-General as to whether the ship came within the terms of the Hague Convention, Sir Samuel Evans interrupted him to say that "assuming for the moment that the vessel is within the Hague Convention, I am not sure that a serious question may not arise some day whether Germany can complain of anything that is done in violation of the Hague Convention. An agreement, whether made between individuals or states, must be observed by both sides, and someone may have to determine whether Germany has so far adhered to the Hague Convention that she can call upon any other party to observe it." To this the Solicitor General replied: "If I am a law officer at the time I shall most certainly contend that a Power, which it would be easy to show has violated many of its important provisions, cannot be heard in this or any other court to contend that we are bound by the remaining provisions."

The French Conseil des Prises followed essentially the same course in a number of decisions involving the status of enemy merchant ships in French harbors at the outbreak of the war, or which were encountered at sea, having sailed from their last port of departure before the declaration of war and being ignorant of the existence of hostilities. In the case of the German steamer Porto, which had left its last port of departure before the beginning of the war between France and Germany and which was encountered at sea (rencontré en mer) in ignorance of the existence of hostilities, and captured by a French cruiser, the prize court at Bordeaux 46 in a decision rendered November 10, 1914, held that in consequence of Germany's reservation of Article 3 and paragraph 4 of the Sixth Hague Convention, the owners of the ship and the cargo 47 were 46 The French Prize Council was composed of five judges and a government procurator (commissaire du gouvernement).

47 46 A cargo," said the court, "being transported under an enemy flag is presumed to be an enemy cargo until the contrary is proven." The cargo was claimed by a

not entitled to the benefits of these provisions. The ship and cargo were therefore condemned as good prize and adjudged to the commander, officers, and crew of the capturing vessel. The personal effects of the captain and crew were, however, ordered to be restored to their

owners.

In the cases of the Barmbek, captured August 18, 1914, the Frieda Mahn, captured August 8, the Martha Bockhan, captured September 27, the Czar Nicolai II, captured August 4, and the Walkure, captured August 12, all German vessels which had sailed from their last port of departure before the outbreak of war and which were met on the high seas in ignorance of hostilities, the Council of Prizes made decrees of condemnation. In the case of the Barmbek and the Frieda Mahn, the cargoes having been restored to their English owners by direction of the Ministry of Marine, the court was relieved from the necessity of passing on the liability of the cargo to capture. In the case of the Czar Nicolai II, the owners set up the plea that the reservations made by Germany in ratifying the Hague Convention had a limited weight, and applied only to the second part of Article 3, which established an inequality between the Powers which had numerous ports on the seas to which their prizes could be carried and those which, like Germany, had no such ports; that Germany's objection to the convention had reference only to the provisions which forbade destruction and requisition without compensation; that Germany had always maintained that ships encountered at sea should be allowed to continue their voyages conformably to the principles laid down in the first three articles of the convention; that having few colonial ports she would rarely have occasion to seize, confiscate, or requisition enemy ships encountered at sea, and that in consequence the owners of the Czar Nicolai II and her cargo should be compensated. But the Council ruled that whatever may have been the motives of the German Government in reserving its ratification of certain parts of the convention, the reservation covered the whole of Article 3, the provisions of which were indivisible, and in consequence of the refusal of Germany to promise not to capture French vessels encountered at sea

French company, but no sufficient evidence of French ownership was presented to the Prize Council. It was therefore presumed to be enemy property and was condemned with the ship.

in ignorance of hostilities, German subjects could not claim the benefits of the immunity provided by the convention. 48

On the whole, the decisions of the British and French prize courts during the present war, in respect to the status of enemy merchant vessels to which special immunities are granted by the Sixth Hague Convention, have been characterized by a liberal and enlightened spirit and an evident desire to give enemy ship owners the fullest benefit of the convention, even though it is not strictly binding upon the British or French Governments or the government of any other belligerent in the present war. This spirit was clearly shown by the court in the case of the Mowe, where Sir Samuel Evans, adverting to the fact that the failure of several states, such as Serbia and Montenegro, to ratify the Hague Conventions and thus render them legally operative, should not be allowed to defeat their purpose, he begged forgiveness for "an humble expression of opinion that it would accord with the traditions of this country if such steps were taken as may be necessary to make operative a series of conventions solemnly agreed upon by the plenipotentaries of forty-five states or Powers after most careful deliberation, with the most beneficent international objects." He suggested that "the counselors who have the responsibility of advising the Crown should be requested to declare by proclamation or otherwise that it would give effect to the. conventions whether by the literal terms thereof they were strictly binding or not." 49 As has been said, Sir Samuel announced in his judgment in the case of the Möwe that, whether he was legally bound by the Hague Conventions or not, he would direct that any enemy ship owner who thought he was entitled to a right or immunity under any one of these conventions should be allowed to appear and defend his claim before the court. Both he and the colonial prize judges declared that they would interpret the Hague Conventions in a liberal spirit and that the owners of enemy ships claiming immunity from capture should be given the benefit of every doubt.50 The following remarks of Sir Samuel

49 The texts of the decisions rendered by the Counseil des prises in the above mentioned cases may be found in the Revue générale de Droit International Public, JanuaryJune, 1915, Jurisprudence, pp. 1-12; and November-December, 1915, Jurisprudence, pp. 53-54.

49 Trehern, Pt. I, p. 71.

50 Thus it was said in the case of the Barenfels: "It is our duty to give effect to the