(i. e., the tradition of Anglo-American law embalmed in the declaratory theory of precedent), has given over the standpoint that antecedent to or alongside of formulated or declared law there may be discovered a complete and permanent code of Natural Law sufficient to the last detail to adjust the conflicts of human life. Both adjectives of the code have been omitted by the present-day schools of thought. Natural Law is neither a complete code of prescriptions, nor is it a perpetual monument of truth and justice. Yet, Natural Law remains. But it is Natural Law thoroughly saturated, and, also, invigorated, first, with the historical element, and, later, with the evolutionary concept. It now represents not a fixed and full content of rules, but an instrument for charting the directions of human destiny in accordance with which the conformability of legal rules is to be standardized. This would appear to be the best and the most unimpeachable development possible at this time in the Natural Law idea; but the regnant schools which still flourish under the ancient banner, thinking that such a solution is too transcendental, have occupied intermediate ground-ground between the first line trenches, as it were, and propose to construct lines of barbwire around their legal establishment beyond which it shall formally be impossible to go (Stammler, Del Vecchio) and within which protected limits there may be a great variety of historical movement.

Geny, if we understand him, does not accept as the basis for his Natural Law either the idea of immanence or transcendentalism. It seems to be a compound of objective and subjective factors determined by a principle of intermediate ends. But yet, for him "while the regulation of moral and social conduct follows a progressive development, the criterion must be sought in a domain superior to the contingencies and hazards of life." Again, the "rational datum must intervene with a preponderant value." He reverts to the classical form of Natural Law in which the rational element is the essential basis; but he rejects the strict Natural Law (as it appears, e. g., in Boistel or Cathrein) where the unsuccessful attempt is made to answer all concrete questions of law and justice. As he puts it, "the rational cannot be reduced to a single formula of precise contour."

Objective justice is represented to the mind in the idea of order, "in the idea of an established equilibrium following the idea of. harmony [based on the nature of man as a social, free, and reasonable being], moral in its substance, external in its manifestations, and founded on the conditions of life of man in society." But he adds, "this abstract

nature of justice is too vague for a scientific elaboration of law. It implies a philosophy which is wanting." This appears to involve the author in inconsistency; but whether it does or not, it is clear that the Natural Law function in legal method is somewhat elusive.

The objective basis of Geny's rationalism is found in an "examination of institutions of private law which show at their base certain natural data in which reason discovers, but not without difficulty, directions for human conduct." "History reinforces and makes precise these directions which a common ideal permits in turn to be amplified.” In it is found an "ensemble of data giving the object of a true and scientific elaboration of law."

In a word, the method of scientific elaboration is based on the following elements (as we understand Geny's position): 1. the nature of things; 2. reason and the social ideal; and 3. legal evolution. Geny forestalls the charge of eclecticism for his system with its multiple bases, and thinks that he has presented not a mere collection of attractive residues of other systems, but a reasoned syncretism based on Natural Law.

Natural Law as employed by Geny is equivalent to the issues of reason, derived from the nature of man in contact with the world, and which, because of its origin and nature appears universal and immutable. But it becomes Natural Law with an objective base instead of a purely subjective content. He, therefore, finds himself in accord with even such a revolutionary as Duguit in his position touching the objective basis of law. The problem of purpose is always one of the stumbling blocks in legal philosophy, and too little attention has been given heretofore to the important distinction between ultimate and intermediate ends. Geny favors that view of Natural Law which is represented in this connection by Brütt as an amendment of the still somewhat inflexible point of view of Stammler. Of the philosophical views which have to a greater or less extent agitated the waters of French thinking, Geny at the outset rejects, among a variety of other things, the position of juridical socialism, and individual anarchism; and, incidentally, as a datum which further concerns the author's local setting, he accepts the proposition of intuition.

If the author had not already shown his capacity to correlate his philosophy of law with concrete problems (as, for example, in his elaborate work, Des Droits sur les Lettres Missives, reviewed in this JOURNAL, October, 1914), doubt might and would be raised as to the practical value of his method. Judge Tanon, on this point, somewhere remarked

with some bitterness that when legal philosophers descend to concrete problems, they are obliged to use the same methods as practical men; and that the metaphysical postulates of the philosopher are lost in the actual solution. Such an attitude while in substance inadequate, may still be valuable in aiding to keep clearly before the mind proper limitations on the possibilities of legal philosophy in the historical world, and in restraining overhopeful efforts to hasten the evolutionary process. It was the great merit of Aquinas to see that the law must be measured by what is possible; and, after all, legal philosophy in a very important measure has the mission, not of regenerating the world, or of eliminating links in the chain of human destiny, but of explaining social institutions, and of attempting with great caution to project the path of the future. The autonomy of the human will and the scope of method must always take a subordinate place; and while the efficacy of effort is not to be wholly denied in an attitude of tortured abnegation, or in resignation to an Heraclitean flux, the function of effort must not be overemphasized. It is precisely the task of philosophy to find the way out of all these difficulties by an intimate understanding of the nature of the Time Spirit, on one hand, and a scientifically fortified view of the reality in which it manifests itself on the other.

The larger part of Geny's present contribution deals with a review of modern legal philosophy. No one in so vast a field can do more with thoroughness than treat particular parts of the whole. Geny has limited his review to France and Germany. His examination of schools and writers appears to be based on first-hand reading, and his documentation is always thorough. As a summary, this work will be found valuable for the reader who lacks the time or inclination to read the sources. While we believe that no true philosophy of law can exist without a metaphysical foundation—a position which is put aside by Geny—yet we can regard the author's plan as greatly superior, in its possibilities, and richness of material, either from the angle of what we can know, or, of what we can do, in the field of legal phenomena, to that type of positivism represented by the Comtean social physics, or the other extreme, juridical idealism. We are, furthermore, constrained to believe, in the midst of much that we are unwilling to accept in Geny for a philosophy of law, that he has in the main hit upon a valuable method for rationalizing a hitherto unscientific legislative policy; and we therefore conclude that we have before us a valuable contribution which should be an influential document in reaching solid ground for legal

ideas in the world upheaval which has thrown all social, ethical, and juridical values into the melting pot.

Two additional parts are promised dealing with a technical elaboration of private law, to complete the work of which the theoretical foundations have now been laid.

ALBERT KOCOUREK.

Notes of a Busy Life. By Joseph Benson Foraker. Cincinnati: Stewart & Kidd Company. 2 vols.

This is practically an autobiography from the author's birth in 1846 to his retirement from public life in 1914. As he was an active participant in public affairs from his boyhood, this work constitutes a record of and comment on the most important questions which agitated the people of this country through a period of more than sixty years by one of the most virile and active minds this nation has produced.

He entered the Union Army as a private at the age of sixteen and was discharged from the service as captain at the age of twenty. He completed a full collegiate course of study by means of the money he had saved from his army pay and a contracted indebtedness not discharged until he had entered his profession. He became an able and successful lawyer and a judge of repute. At the age of forty he entered political life, was four times nominated for governor of his State and twice filled the office. He attended the Republican national conventions as a delegate at large consecutively from 1880 to 1904; and, as indicating his effectiveness as a speaker, he was twice chosen to nominate Mr. Sherman for President, and twice Mr. McKinley. He entered the Senate of the United States in 1897; and served in that body until 1909. Such a varied and distinguished service may well be styled "A Busy Life," and the narrative will be found of unflagging interest from beginning to end, but this review must be limited to that part of his career in the Senate which relates to foreign questions and international law.

On his admission to the Senate he was placed on the Committee on Foreign Relations, and remained on that committee during the twelve years of his service. John Sherman, so long a Senator from Ohio, entered the cabinet of President McKinley as Secretary of State at the same time that Mr. Foraker entered the Senate, and immediately thereafter Mr. Mark A. Hanna succeeded Mr. Sherman as Senator. In The Notes Senator Foraker comments:

This is a disagreeable chapter in Ohio politics, not only because of the embarrassment caused by the plan agreed upon by the President and Mr. Hanna for putting Mr. Sherman in the cabinet and Mr. Hanna in the Senate, but also, and because of the unfortunate results that followed, so far as Mr. Sherman was concerned.

The latter greatly preferred to remain in the Senate, but Mr. Hanna's ambition could only be satisfied by a seat in the Senate, and President McKinley's obligation to Mr. Hanna could only be discharged by inducing Mr. Sherman to accept the transfer. Senator Foraker states that when he learned from Mr. Hanna of this arrangement he remonstrated to him plainly against the appointment of Mr. Sherman as Secretary of State at that particular time, when we were threatened with complications with Spain and other European nations. He was plainly in failing memory, and while he might go on doing faithful work in the Senate, to put him at the head of a great department, with the work of which he was not familiar, at a critical time, was to subject him to a tax, both mentally and physically, for which he was not able. He failed to convince Mr. Hanna, and he was so impressed with the unwisdom of the proposed plan, that he went at once to Canton and presented the same remonstrance to the President elect, warning him that the appointment might make trouble; but he reports that he found Mr. McKinley thoroughly committed to the plan. (Vol. 3, pp. 499, 500.) After the new administration went into operation it soon became apparent that the President was largely consulting with the Assistant Secretary of State, Judge Day, on important matters, and Senator Foraker reports that Mr. Sherman began to take offense at his neglect. Nor was it possible to keep the situation concealed from the diplomatic corps; for instance, at the very time that the Secretary of State was assuring the Japanese Minister that the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands was not being considered, the treaty of annexation was being engrossed for signature, and in a few days the Secretary was called upon to sign it. Hence no one in Washington was surprised when, upon the declaration of war with Spain, Mr. Sherman tendered his resignation which was promptly accepted. What passed between him and the President has never been made public; but The Notes reports that though Mr. Sherman continued to reside in Washington until his death, more than two years thereafter, his intercourse with the President and Senator Hanna ceased, and in private conversation he had only bitter words for them. A facsimile letter of Mr. Sherman is reproduced, from which this extract is made: