been drafted by Mr. Robert Lansing, dated January 20, 1915, addressed to Senator Stone, ably reviewed the authorities and fully supported the right of our citizens to export munitions of war in general, to belligerents not at war with this country. 13 * * Count von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador, on April 4, 1915, delivered to Secretary of State Bryan, a memorandum suggesting among other things the following: That "the United States is the only neutral country in a position to furnish war materials." That her "existing plants" for the manufacture of the same were "not only being worked but enlarged by all available means, and new ones built." That * * * it can in no event be in accordance with the spirit of true neutrality if, under the protection of such international stipulations, an entirely new industry is created in a neutral state such as is the development of the arms industry in the United States. This industry is actually delivering goods only to the enemies of Germany. The theoretical willingness to supply Germany also, if shipments thither were possible, does not alter the case. If it is the will of the American people that there shall be a true neutrality, the United States will find means of preventing this one-sided supply of arms.14 On April 21, Mr. Bryan replied, intimating that it was not within the choice of the United States Government to inhibit such trade by any change of its law of neutrality, during the progress of a war, which would affect unequally the relations of the United States with the nations at war; that the present indisputable doctrines of accepted international law would make such change an unjustifiable departure from the principles of strict neutrality. 15 This writer, at the session of the American Academy of Political and Social Science at Philadelphia, held April 30 and May 1, 1915, discussing this topic and having regard to this correspondence, referred to Germany as having protested against the export of munitions from this country to the Allies. This, as he understood, was the interpretation of our Department of State. Dr. Bernard Dernberg, the representative of Germany, speaking in reply said, "I want to state here most emphatic 13 Special Supplement to this JOURNAL for July, 1915, p. 255. 14 Ibid., p. 125. 15 Ibid., p. 127. ally that Germany at no time has disputed the right to ship or to sell arms. This statement that she has is absolutely false." 16 The admission of Dr. Dernberg must be received as an important modification of the interpretation which the memorandum of the Ambassador had given rise to. The writer submitted to the Academy, on the above occasion, the following statement as to the practices of Germany: German citizens have habitually sold vast quantities of military supplies to belligerents. Essen is perhaps the very center of military supplies and has exported on an enormous scale to belligerents in all modern wars, making, it is understood, vast profits from this traffic in the late Balkan wars. It will be interesting to know what has been Germany's practice when one of the belligerents had access to her markets and the other had not. Has the rule been observed, which she now presses upon us? Has she recognized this situation as compelling her to deny to the Power having access, the right to buy, on the ground that real neutrality so required? The war between the South African Republic and Great Britain began in October 1899, and was closed by the Treaty of Pretoria at the end of May, 1902. During the earlier portion of the war, supplies were received by the Boers through Lorenzo Marques, a neighboring Portuguese port, with some freedom, but in August, 1900, all the customs officials at Lorenzo Marques were dismissed and their places filled by military officers and a force of 1,200 men was sent out from Lisbon. The frontier was guarded and the trade stopped.17 The strictness of the Portuguese authorities increased with the decline of the fortunes of the Boers. England had seized and searched a number of neutral vessels-including three German steamers and positively claimed the right to seize contraband bound to the Boers though through a neutral port. She relied for this largely on the precedents of our Civil War, and it would appear that the access of the Boer force to German markets was substantially destroyed. The question occurred to the writer, would it be found that during the later years there were imported from Germany into England large quantities of arms and military supplies, notwithstanding this situation? He therefore took the liberty to apply to the British Embassy at Washington, which very obligingly cabled to London for information. April 27, a letter from the Embassy advised that "when the Boers were shut off from supplies by sea, Great Britain got from Germany 108 fifteen-pounder quick-firing guns and 500 rounds per gun. They were purchased from Ehrhardt by private negotiation." It is 16 Annals of American Acad. Political and Social Science, July, 1915, p. 195. 17 See Campbell's Neutral Rights in Anglo-Boer War, p. 60. respectfully submitted that this is sufficient to support the practice of our government. But this writer had made other investigations which showed vastly larger military supplies passing from Germany to Great Britain at this time. This appears from the statistics as to the foreign trade of the United Kingdom compiled at the custom house, and presented to both Houses of Parliament by command of His Majesty and printed by His Majesty's stationery office. These published records, long anterior to the present unhappy controversy, preserved in the library of the Department of Commerce of the United States, show that there were imported from Germany into Great Britain. In 1899. Swords, cutlasses, machets, and bayonets, cwts. 782. 1900. Swords, cutlasses, machets and bayonets, cwts. 1,664. 1901. Swords, cutlasses, and arms of other sorts not firearms, cwts. 12,560. 1902. Swords, cutlasses, and arms of other sorts not firearms, cwts. 50,734. Many more than from any other source. Rifles, carbines, fowling pieces, muskets, pistols, or guns of any sort. 1899. Value £655; in 1900. £ 428. In 1901. Metal cartridge cases, other than small arms ammunition (more than six times as many as from any other source), 1,378,600. 1901. Cordite and other smokeless propellants, 231 cwts. 1901. Gunpowder, 318 cwts. 1902. 253 cwts. Dynamite and other high explosives. 1901. 11,029 cwts. 1902. 14,771 cwts. and in latter year these explosives were worth £84,894. Rockets and other combustibles for warlike purposes. Explosives and ammunition unenumerated. 1901. Of the value of £29,546. 1902. Of £26,171. Small arm ammunition 1901. Numbers 3,350,040. 1902. Numbers 4,732,500. Fuses, Tubes and Primers 1901. Numbers 892,007. 1902. Numbers 2,033,116. The consumption of ammunition in the present war is on so vast a scale that the above figures may seem trivial, but we must remember that Mr. Lloyd George has recently said that in a single battle in the present war more ammunition was consumed than during the entire Boer War. It is submitted that the above trade figures between Germany and Great Britain embalm a principle and afford a German precedent in entire accord with the law and practice announced by our own government. They are the more convincing because Germany's sympathy was strongly with the South African republic and strongly against England. 18 18 Annals American Academy of Political and Social Science, July, 1915, p. 189. On June 29, 1915, the Austro-Hungarian Government in turn addressed a communication to our Ambassador at Vienna calling attention to the great traffic in munitions of war between the United States and the Allied Powers while "Austria-Hungary as well as Germany have been absolutely excluded from the American market," intimating that it seemed imperative "that appropriate measures be adopted toward bringing into full effect the desire of the Federal Government to maintain an attitude of strict parity with respect to both belligerent parties." It further said that, tried by the criterion laid down in sciences, "the exportation of war requisites from the United States as it is being carried on in the present war is not to be brought into accord with the demands of neutrality." 19 Mr. Lansing, Secretary of State of the United States, replied August 12, 1915: 20 To this assertion of an obligation to change or modify the rules of international usage on account of special conditions, the Government of the United States can not accede. The recognition of an obligation of this sort, unknown to the international practice of the past, would impose upon every neutral nation a duty to sit in judgment on the progress of a war and to restrict its commercial intercourse with a belligerent whose naval successes prevented the neutral from trade with the enemy. Further that the ideas advanced would involve a neutral nation in a mass of perplexities which would obscure the whole field of national obligation, produce economic confusion, and deprive all commerce and industry of legitimate fields of enterprise, already heavily burdened by the unavoidable restrictions of the war. The attention of the Austro-Hungarian Government was directed to the facts as to the sale of munitions by Germany and Austria-Hungary to England during the Boer War when the South African Republics were cut off from all access to European markets, and it was pointed out that "the allied republics were in a situation almost identical in that respect with that in which Austria-Hungary and Germany find themselves at the present time." 19 See Spl. Sup. this JOURNAL, July, 1915, p. 146. 20 Ibid., p. 166. The Secretary of State, Mr. Lansing, had advised this writer by letter of June 7, 1915, that he had "read carefully" his paper on this subject presented to the American Academy of Political and Social Science. The Department of State retabulated the figures as to German and Austro-Hungarian sales of munitions to England during the Boer War, during much of which the African Republics were so isolated. The figures given by it are as follows: AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EXPORTS OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION TO GREAT BRITAIN The attempt has been so far to show the validity and customary character of such neutral trade in munitions, and that it is unaffected by the varying conditions of the war. It remains to consider the most important aspect of all, namely, the effect of such traffic upon the welfare of mankind in general, and hence its morality. Upon that subject this writer again ventures to quote his remarks |