as the Declaration has not been accepted as binding and has not the status of law, the Anglo-American doctrine which we have been discussing, must still be regarded as in force in Great Britain and in this country.

A natural development of this principle led to the application of the so-called doctrine of "continuous voyages" to blockade running. If a ship destined for a closed port is subject to capture from the moment that it leaves the port of departure, should it make any difference as to its liability to capture and condemnation that it is to stop at a nonblockaded port on the way? This question presented itself during the Civil War and was answered in the negative. The first case in which it came before the United States Supreme Court was that of The Circassian. 23 The controversy involved a vessel which left Bordeaux for Havana, intending to proceed thence to New Orleans, which was then in a state of blockade. It was captured by an American warship on the way to Havana. The court held that the vessel was subject to condemnation. It reasoned that sailing for a blockaded port with knowledge of the blockade constituted a violation of the blockade, and that an intention to stop at an intermediate neutral port did not change the character of the voyage. The mere fact that after arriving at Havana the ship might change its ultimate destination was immaterial, according to the court, since at the time of capture its ultimate destination was New Orleans and in that fact lay the gist of the offense.

The question again came before the Supreme Court in the case of The Bermuda,24 which was a ship that originally left Liverpool for Bermuda and from the latter point proceeded to Nassau, a port in the Bahama Islands. From Nassau its cargo was intended to run the blockade of the Confederate ports. The transshipment was to be either by the Bermuda or by some other vessel, but the court considered that fact immaterial. The vessel was captured en route between Bermuda and Nassau. It was held that the voyage from Liverpool to the blockaded port was a single voyage and that consequently the vessel became subject to seizure as soon as it left the territorial waters of Great Britain. The ship was, therefore, condemned.

23 (1864), 2 Wall. 135. 24 (1865), 3 Wall. 514.

Similarly, the case of The Adela 25 involved a British vessel which sailed for Nassau, and was intended to proceed thence to Charleston, then in a state of blockade. The ship was captured on the way to Nassau and was condemned.

It would seem that in essence these cases did not evolve a new doctrine, but merely applied a well-established principle to a new state of facts. The general rule was well-recognized, as we have seen, that a ship destined to run a blockade became subject to capture and condemnation as soon as it left port and appeared upon the high seas. The fact that the ship was to stop at a non-blockaded port or ports on the way did not affect the situation. The entire voyage from the original point of departure to the ultimate destination was a single, continuous voyage. Consequently, to confine the general rule to that part of the voyage which extended from the last intermediate port to the blockaded port, would have been an altogether artificial limitation and not justified in reason.

A somewhat different problem presented itself in the case of The Springbok.26 The Springbok was a British ship, which sailed from Great Britain for Nassau in the Bahamas and was captured en route by an American cruiser. The voyage for Nassau was bona fide and the ship was not intended to proceed further, but it was found that its cargo was to be transshipped in another vessel from Nassau to some Southern port then in a state of blockade. The owners of the ship were not aware of the design of the owners of the cargo. The court held that the ship was free from fault and should consequently be restored, but that the cargo should be condemned. This decision represents an extension of the general principle which we have been discussing. Thus far the courts had held that a ship sailing with an intention of ultimately evading a blockade was lawful prize as soon as it left its original port of departure. In the Springbok case the court applied the same rule to cargo, and held that cargo which was shipped with an intention of ultimately attempting to bring it into a blockaded port was subject to seizure as soon as it left the original point of shipment, even though it was to be transshipped at an intermediate port and the vessel in which it was found

25 (1867), 6 Wall. 266.

26 (1866), 5 Wall. 1.

at the time of capture was not the one which was to attempt to carry it into the blockaded port.

The application of the doctrine of "continuous voyages" to the law of blockade met with severe criticism at the hands not only of Continental savants, but also of some British writers." The British Government, however, acquiesced in it and recognized it as correct. Consequently, since the principles of international law are to be deduced from the practice of nations rather than from the writings of theorists, where the two are at variance, the rule of "continuous voyages" as applied in the Civil War must be regarded as part of the Anglo-American law of blockade.2 28

If, however, the Declaration of London should ever be adopted, this principle would cease to exist, for Article 19 provides that "whatever may be the ulterior destination of a vessel or of her cargo, she cannot be captured for breach of blockade, if, at the moment she is on her way to a non-blockaded port." This statement seems almost superfluous, since other provisions of the Declaration in effect adopt the Continental doctrine that a breach of blockade can consist only of an attempt to pass the line of blockade.

The distinguishing characteristic of the foregoing cases is that in each instance the vessel or the cargo in question was destined ultimately to attempt to reach a closed port from the sea by means of passing the line of blockade. An entirely different situation presents itself, if there is to be no attempt to break the maritime blockade, but the goods are to be unloaded at a neutral port and are to be introduced into the blockaded port from the interior by means of transportation by land, canal, or river. Where a port is blockaded from the sea only, it is no offense from the standpoint of international law to bring into it goods by land. It follows, then, that no offense is committed by shipping goods by sea to a neutral port with the intention of transhipping them to a blockaded port in such manner as to reach the destination by land, without breaking the blockade.

This question was presented for adjudication to Lord Stowell in the

27 Fauchille, Du Blocus Maritime, 337; F. de Martens, III, 290; Phillimore (3d ed.), III, 490; Hall, 711; Oppenheim, II, 470.

28 Oppenheim, II, 470; Woolsey, 356.

case of The Stert.29 The ship's cargo was seized by a British warship and was brought before the prize court and sought to be condemned on the ground that the blockade of Amsterdam had been violated in shipping it. It appeared that during the British blockade of that port the goods were sent from Amsterdam to Emden by inland navigation and were there transshipped to London on the Stert. Lord Stowell ruled that since the blockade of Amsterdam was purely maritime and did not affect interior navigation, no breach of blockade took place when the goods were shipped from Amsterdam, and ordered the cargo restored.

In the case of The Jonge Pieter,30 which was also decided by Lord Stowell, the situation was reversed. The ship was carrying goods to Emden which it was intended to transport thence to Amsterdam by interior navigation, Amsterdam being blockaded from the sea by Great Britain. Although the decision turned upon another point, Lord Stowell, in the course of his opinion, made the following statement regarding the question under discussion:

The blockade of Amsterdam is, from the nature of the thing, a partial blockade, a blockade by the sea; and if the goods were going to Emden, with an ulterior destination by land to Amsterdam, or by an interior canal navigation, it is not according to my conception, a breach of the blockade.

This problem attained considerable importance during the Civil War. For the purpose of evading the blockade of their coast, the government and inhabitants of the Confederate States frequently imported goods via the Mexican port of Matamoras and then transshipped them overland into Texas. The trade of Matamoras flourished as it never had before or since. The Peterhoff,31 a British ship, carrying a cargo to Matamoras which was intended to be transshipped to the Confederate States, was captured en route to that port and brought before a prize court. When the case came up on appeal before the Supreme Court, that tribunal held that while so much of the cargo as was contraband should naturally be condemned in accordance with the principles of law governing the disposition of contraband, the remainder should be restored, since it 29 (1801), 4 C. Rob. 65. 30 (1801), 4 C. Rob. 79.

31 (1866), 5 Wall. 28.

was to reach its ultimate destination by inland navigation and hence without violating the blockade.

The conclusion reached by the British and American courts upon this question has been approved by writers on international law.32 Thus Phillimore says:

But a blockade of a port is not violated by shipments forwarded by inland navigation from that port to an unblockaded port.

Again:

The carriage of goods through the medium of interior communication from a blockaded port to a neutral port, is no breach of a purely maritime blockade, and goods so transmitted cannot be seized on their passage from the neutral port to a lawful port, by reason of their having so, as they certainly have, defeated the object of the blockade.

This doctrine is only a corollary of the requirements of the Declaration of Paris, and any other rule would undermine the fundamental principle that a blockade in order to be binding must be effective, and would permit blockades that are partially fictitious. A blockade is binding only to the extent to which it is properly effective. Thus a blockade enforced as to only a part of the enemy's coast line is binding on neutrals only as to that part, and neutral trade with others of the enemy ports may not be interfered with or interrupted. Similarly, since ordinarily a blockade is purely maritime, overland trade with a blockaded port is lawful. A fortiori, it is legitimate to ship goods by sea to a neutral port with the intention of transshipping them by land to a blockaded port. If such trade could be interfered with, it would mean that by maintaining an efficient maritime blockade of enemy ports, the belligerent would be permitted to impose upon neutrals a paper or a fictitious blockade as to overland trade with such ports. This would, in part at least, bring us back to the state of affairs which the Declaration of Paris sought definitively to terminate.

ALEXANDER HOLTZOFF.

32 Halleck (4th ed.), II, 221; Phillimore (3d ed.), III, 488, 505; Calvo, V, § 2903; Wheaton (4th ed.), 703.