In treating of the application of the renvoi doctrine in the American courts, our author has this to say:

We may be the less troubled about the finer points of this discussion because the territorial theory of the Conflict of Laws, which is accepted by the American courts, has no room for any doctrine of renvoi. If an American court, having according to the territorial theory to apply its own law to existing rights, finds that a right has, by its law, arisen under another law, it has only to learn the terms of that law and the nature of the right which it created; if, on the other hand, it is a question of a new right, created by the law of the forum, but the latter law in creating the right acts in accordance with the provisions of some foreign law, as for instance the law of a foreign domicil, again it has only to learn the terms of that particular foreign law and apply it. In no case is the court concerned with the views of any foreign court on a question of the Conflict of Laws.

This statement seems to the reviewer a proposition which is open to some doubt. Probably the author had in mind only the particular point under discussion,-the renvoi as it applies to the divergence between the law of nationality, and the law of domicil. But is it not possible with regard to other matters that the renvoi, or at least a doctrine closely analogous thereto, might arise in the American courts?

For instance, a Virginia statute enacts that "upon a contract which was made and was to be performed in another state or country by a person who then resided therein no action shall be maintained after the right of action thereon is barred by the laws of such state or country." (Va. Code, § 2933.)

If we suppose a contract made and to be performed in New York by a person then resident therein, and an action to be brought thereon in Virginia, and if we further suppose that by the New York decisions the time within which an action on such a contract is to be brought shall be governed by the law of the forum (Virginia) and not by the law of the place of the contract (New York), it might be argued with some plausibility that, under the Virginia statute above quoted, there would arise the doctrine of the renvoi. At least this will serve to show the possibility of the application of the renvoi, or an analogous doctrine, in the American courts.

In conclusion it may be said that this little portion of his work will give Professor Beale's readers a strong appetite for more. They will at once realize that herein lies the promise of a work on a difficult though fascinating subject, which will advance us far on the road to a scientific treatment of the many intricate problems it presents.

It is to be earnestly hoped that Professor Beale will soon find the time to complete his work so well begun, and that when finished it will justify the strong hopes of his present readers as well as his own.

RALEIGH C. MINOR.

Andreas Fricius Modrevius. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Staats- und Völkerrechts theorien. By Wladislaus Maliniak. Vienna: 1913. pp. 200.

This is a doctor's dissertation of rather more than usual importance, inasmuch as it exploits a field which seems to be almost wholly virgin soil even in Germany, viz. the Polish political literature of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

It appears that the subject of the thesis, a Polish nobleman, usually referred to as Fricius, was born about 1503. Having imbibed the humanistic spirit at the University of Cracow, he settled down as notary in Posen in 1525, and soon became a follower of Laski, one of the leading Polish statesmen of the day. Later he studied theology in Germany and formed a close connection with Melancthon.

In 1540 Fricius was appointed a royal secretary at Cracow, and soon after began his career as a publicist, interspersed with various diplomatic missions, the most important of which was that of secretary to the Polish delegation at the Council of Trent. Drawn more and more into the current of the Reformation, he developed great activity as a writer on legal, political, and theological subjects.

His magnum opum was a commentary in several volumes entitled De emendanda republica published during the years 1554-59. This work, which seems to be filled largely with commonplaces drawn mainly from Aristotle and Cicero, apparently contains little that is novel or particularly important to the student of political theories, though it is doubtless of some historical and scholastic interest.

Nor do the views of Fricius on the nature, origin, and aims of the state, the various forms of government, etc., commend themselves as especially advanced or enlightened for his time. He favored an aristocratic form of government and was a strong advocate of the rights of the privileged classes, more especially of the landed nobility.

It is as a Polish peace advocate of the sixteenth century that the views and attitude of the subject of our author's thesis deserve most consideration, at least by students of international relations.

In striking contrast to his great Italian contemporary, Machiavelli,

Fricius was a strong pacifist. He deprecated all wars except for defence, holding them to be at once unworthy and unpolitical. He advocated arbitration as the best means of settling disputes between sovereign states, and in this connection Fricius appears to have made a unique contribution to political theory. He suggested that sovereignty subsists in the freedom of arbitral judges. Manifestly if all states were equally and reciprocally bound by judicial decisions based upon treaties or courts of arbitration, their freedom or sovereignty and equality of legal rights would be at least theoretically preserved.1

Of the importance of international law as a necessary basis for arbitral decision, Fricius seems to have had no conception. In common with the publicists of his time, he evidently regarded the jus gentium as based upon a natural law which is to be directly applied by statesmen and judges in the conduct of international relations.

Fricius should also be credited with great and (for his time) somewhat exceptional humanity in his views on the conduct of warfare and the treatment of the conquered. He condemns pillage in the most emphatic terms, though he urges the stern punishment of those who have been guilty of bringing on an unrighteous war.

AMOS S. HERSHEY.

Early Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Mexico. By William R. Manning. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1916. pp. ix, 406.

This valuable volume, published as one of the series of Albert Shaw Lectures on Diplomatic History, covers the period of Mexican-American relations from 1821 to 1830 which has never before been adequately -a period which might have been used to establish friendly relations, but which was wasted in quibblings and misunderstandings. In the latter the author finds the origin and largely the explanation of the growing and apparently irreconcilable differences of the next two decades, and the discord of half a century.

Parts of four or five chapters have previously appeared in various standard periodical publications. Chapter I supplements the detailed treatment of the policy of the United States found in Paxson, and the

The reviewer assumes the responsibility for the argument by which the suggestion of Fricius is supported. The author of the thesis does not seem to have realized the importance of the suggestion (see page 167).

chapter on Cuba supplements the earlier accounts of Callahan and Chadwick.

The history is presented in ten chapters: Beginnings and early Mexican representations at Washington; Tardy appointment and cool reception of the first United States Minister to Mexico; British influence in Mexico and Poinsett's struggle against it; Cuba saved to Spain; Diplomacy concerning the opening of the Santa Fé trail; Denunciation of Poinsett because of his relations with the York Masons; Obstacles in the way of concluding a commercial treaty; Commercial controversies; Texas and the boundary issue; Public attacks on Poinsett and his recall. The chapters on Cuba (77 pages) and the boundary issue (72 pages) are disproportionately long.

An additional chapter presents comments on authorities. The author has obtained his materials largely from official manuscript sources of the State Department at Washington and of the Ministry of Foreign Relations in Mexico. He has also drawn from the Van Buren manuscripts in the Library of Congress at Washington much material on the beginnings of Jackson's and Van Buren's plan for the purchase of Texas in 1829. He has also made a careful study of the public documents and many secondary sources. The chief authorities are cited in the footnotes, which add much to the value of the book.

The real beginning of the Mexican legation dates from the arrival (November, 1824) of Obregon, the fourth minister plenipotentiary appointed by Mexico. The appointment of an American representative to Mexico was used as a political football or political pawn at Washington while Canning was busy establishing a British influence which overshadowed the importance and influence of the earlier American recognition of Mexican independence and the declarations of Monroe. Joel R. Poinsett, who accepted the appointment, previously declined by others, received his instructions on March 8, 1825. To recover the prestige lost by delay, and with a desire to preserve republican institutions in Mexico and prevent encroachment of European Powers, he used means which subjected him to charges of interference in internal affairs and produced increasing distrust and suspicion, which postponed the satisfactory conclusion of pending negotiations, endangered peaceful relations, and finally led to public Mexican attacks which resulted in his recall. In Clay's instructions to show an unobtrusive readiness to explain to the Mexican Government the working of the American Constitution, which had been so largely copied by Mexico, Poinsett

found his only excuse for his activities (through the York rite Masons) which gave rise to the charge of meddling in internal affairs. At the same time he corrected the implication of Alaman (the Mexican Minister) that the declaration of Monroe gave Mexico the right to demand that the United States interfere in behalf of the new American states. In his longest chapter, the author traces the negotiations in regard to the serious international question of the destiny of Cuba, in which seven nations were involved, and in which the United States, while opposing the acquisition of the island by any European Power or by Mexico or Colombia, declined to be drawn into a self-denying pledge.

In Chapter V he treats the growing intercourse along the Santa Fé trail on the far northern frontier, after 1821, the substitution of wagon trains for pack animals in 1824, the measures to establish and protect the trade, the efforts to secure the coöperation of Mexico in constructing the road, which she opposed until the question of boundary line should be settled, and the military escort furnished by the United States before the regulation of trade by the treaty of 1831.

The two most valuable chapters in the book are those relating to the negotiation of treaties of commerce and boundaries. For over four years the negotiations for a commercial treaty were fruitless, and in this period Mexico twice allowed the time for exchanging ratifications to pass without action. The chief initial obstacles, after the agreement to separate the question of commerce from that of boundaries, were the attempt of the United States to modify the most favored nation clause by a new principle of "perfect reciprocity" of tonnage dues, which was opposed by Mexico, and the demand of Mexico for an exception in favor of the new Spanish American states on the ground that they were engaged in a common contest against Spain in which the United States was not participating. In reply to the latter, Clay and Poinsett urged that the United States by maintaining neutrality had prevented the precipitation of a detrimental union of European Powers against Americans, and thus had been enabled to render assistance more valuable than military coöperation. Poinsett successfully made the omission of the exception a sine qua non and yielded on the proposed "perfect reciprocity." He also withdrew an anti-British exception which he had proposed to the principle of "free ships make free goods."

The treaty was signed on July 10, 1826, and, on its arrival at Washington, still not ratified by Mexico, was promptly ratified (February 26) by the Senate, after the insertion of Poinsett's proposed exception and