also the omission of an article excluding from Mexico all European Spaniards who had been naturalized in the United States since 1820, which was declared to be repugnant to the United States Constitution. Mexico still delayed to act, first objecting to the clause on the rendition of fugitive slaves, and later demanding an article settling the boundary dispute. Finally, after the hasty conclusion of a boundary treaty on January 12, 1828, followed by the quick settlement of disputed points, Poinsett obtained a new treaty (on February 14) which secured both the principle of "perfect reciprocity" and the exception to the principle of "free ships make free goods," and also provided for the return of fugitive slaves. This treaty, ratified by the American Senate on May 1, 1828, failed in the Mexican Congress. Finally, however, over a year after the growing opposition of Poinsett had burst into a demand which resulted in his removal, Anthony Butler (on April 5, 1831) secured a treaty which was ratified and properly exchanged by both Powers, and which contained practically all the articles of the Poinsett treaty except the clause providing for return of fugitive slaves. The commercial controversies, which in the absence of treaty regulations, continually arose over the rights and privileges of United States merchants and merchandise, and which occupied most of Poinsett's time in vain attempts to adjust, are treated by the author in a separate chapter. They relate to requirements of consular certificates to invoice of goods and resulting seizures of vessels and goods, unfair tariff charges, seizure of American vessels and cargoes on various pretexts, the conduct of Mexican naval vessels and Mexican privateers against the commerce of Spain (and their use of United States ports) and losses to merchants and travellers at the hands of robbers and bandits.

The long chapter on "Texas and the Boundary Issue" traces the questions relating to the American desire to regain territory bartered away in 1819, the early suspicions of the authorities of the new state of Mexico, the proposals of the American Government to secure a new and more advantageous boundary west of the Sabine to guard against possible future difficulty, the hope of the Mexican ministry to secure the extreme limits of Spanish claims before the treaty of 1819, the beginning of the Anglo-American independence movement in Texas, the American attempts to purchase the territory in which American citizens had obtained extensive grants from Mexico, the hasty negotiations of the boundary treaty of January 12, 1828, which was promptly ratified by the United States but was ratified too late by Mexico to be exchanged

under the time limit, the rise of new internal questions relating to Texas, and the unsuccessful negotiations by the Jackson administration to secure a new treaty of limits. Poinsett, shortly before his recall, was convinced that the American boundary could not be extended west of the Sabine without driving Mexico "to court a more strict alliance with some European Power." Finally, after Mexico by firm but pacific protests, had been induced to ratify the pending treaty of commerce, the American Government (according to promise) submitted with it, to the United States Senate, the pending treaty of limits, which was thus revived after its obligatory character had been lost by the remissness of Mexico. Ratifications were exchanged exactly one year later, on the last day allowed under the treaty provision.

J. M. CALLAHAN.

Grundzüge des Englisch-Amerikanischen Privat-und Prozessrechts, besonders im Vergleiche mit den Systemen des europäischen Kontinents. By Arthur K. Kuhn, Zurich: Art. Institut Orell Füssli. 1915. pp. xii, 254.

The present volume is the result of lectures on Anglo-American law given by the author at the University of Zurich during the summer semester of 1914. Part I gives a brief history of the origin and development of the common law in England and the United States. Part II deals with the principal characteristics of the English and American constitutions as regards their influences upon private law, and with the organization and jurisdiction of courts. In Part III the author sketches the law of Procedure from the pleadings at law and in equity to the execution of judgments, and outlines the subjects of Evidence and of Preliminary and Extraordinary Legal Remedies. Parts IV and V are devoted to the subject of Private Law, being entitled, in accordance with the customary classification in Continental countries, "Civil" and "Commercial" Law, respectively. Under the former title our author takes up the law of Persons, Domestic Relations, Real and Personal Property, Obligations (Contracts, Sales, Agency, Suretyship, Bailments, Partnership, Torts and Quasi-Contracts) and Wills and Administration. Under the heading of Commercial Law the subject of Bills and Notes and Checks, Corporations and Carriers are treated.

The main interest of the work to students of law in this country consists in the comparisons which are drawn on every hand between AngloAmerican institutions and those of Continental countries. Our author's

familiarity with both legal systems, acquired through a long study in this country and abroad, qualified him preeminently to undertake this delicate task. The execution of the general plan of work is done with skill, ability and judgment. The presentation of the subject is characterized by clarity and force. A fine sense of proportion is maintained throughout the work. To the Continental student, Kuhn's Outline will serve as an illuminating introduction to Anglo-American law. In the Continental literature it will fill a long-felt need.

ERNEST G. LORENZEN.

Treaties, Their Making and Enforcement. 2d ed. By Samuel B. Crandall. Washington: John Byrne & Co. 1916. pp. xxxii, 663.

It is said that every lawyer owes to his profession the debt of writing a book on the subject with which he is most familiar. If that be so, Mr. Crandall has paid doubly his debt. His second edition of Treaties, their Making and Enforcement, makes its appearance at an opportune moment, for while this may not be an era of making treaties, it is certainly one when their enforcement is a consummation most devoutly to be desired. The more that the making and enforcement of treaties is studied and made the subject not only of text books, but of courses in law schools and universities, the less chance there will be of those farreaching instruments being regarded as "scraps of paper" by courts or by statesmen. Mr. Crandall has treated the subject broadly and has not confined himself to treaties to which the United States is a signatory, but has gathered between the two covers of his book much useful information conveniently arranged and exhaustively indexed relating to treaties made, construed and enforced by, and in, other jurisdictions.

In regard to treaties with the United States, he calls attention, as must every one who discusses the subject, to the still unsettled controversy that has existed for over a century between the Senate and the House of Representatives regarding the effect of a treaty between a foreign Power and the United States, negotiated by the Executive and confirmed by the Senate, but requiring affirmative action to put it into effect. In 1902, while the Cuban Sugar Treaty was being discussed, a Senator in a speech in the Senate insisted that a treaty containing a provision for a specified reduction of the tariff on a specified article was self-enforcing and needed no further action by Congress. The writer was asked by a member of the House of Representatives where the latter could find material to use in reply, and the writer advised him

to find the speech which the same Senator had made several years before when he was a member of the House and naturally took the other side of the question.

So long as the Constitution equally provides that treaties and acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land, the clashing of the two will not only be constant, but will correspond very much to the meeting of an irresistible force with an immovable body. Fortunately, up to the present time, the two branches of the legislative body of the government have met the question on every occasion that it has arisen in a spirit of patriotism and accommodation; and while no definite conclusion has ever been reached, there have been expressions of accord and agreement, notably the statement incorporated in the act appropriating for the payment of Alaska to the effect that under some circumstances treaty stipulations cannot be put into effect except by legislation to which the consent of both houses is necessary. Mr. Crandall's chapter on treaties involving modification of the revenue laws throws much light on this phase of treaty making and enforcement.

The appendices, tables of cases, and compendium of decisions are admirably made up and are invaluable not only to the student interested in the subject, but also to every lawyer whose case may have its origin in a right based on treaty stipulations.

After the war in Europe is over-and may that be soon-someone will have another opportunity to write on the effect of treaties in, and their modification by war; and surely no one will be better able to do it than Mr. Crandall.

CHARLES HENRY BUTLER.

Der Streitfall zwischen Schweden und Norwegen. By Dr. Karl Strupp. Leipzig: Duncken and Humblot. 1914. pp. 92 and map.

This monograph is a reprint from the second volume of Professor Schücking's great compilation, Das Werk vom Haag. It is a study of the maritime frontier controversy between Sweden and Norway and of the arbitral award of the Hague Court dated October 23, 1909. A peculiar difficulty confronted the author in this, that the governments involved declined to permit an examination of the pleadings filed with the arbitral court; and he expresses the very pertinent hope that in the future some way may be found to obviate such an obstacle to purely scientific legal study. With the same painstaking marshalling of authorities and examination of precedents as characterize the other writ

ings of this distinguished young scholar, he has presented a readable exposition of this international litigation.

The subject is treated under five principal heads: an account of the available material and authorities, the history of the controversy, the proceedings before the Hague Court, the arbitral judgment, a criticism of the judgment.

The author takes exception to the form of the judgment and we would heartily second him. Following the form of the French judicial arrėt, this award contains eleven pages of "whereases" (as reproduced in Wilson's "The Hague Arbitration Cases"), preceding a judgment of seventeen lines. Only a specialist can easily find his way through such a recital, which commingles statements of claims, findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judicial argumentation. The admirable judgment of November 11, 1912, in the case between Russia and Turkey, concerning the arrears of interest on indemnities, with its sharp divisions en fait, en droit, en conclusion, is commended as a model.

Though Dr. Strupp disagrees with the opinion of the court that the principles of international law existing at the time of the Peace of Stockholm and the boundary agreement of 1661 were inadequate to solve the controversy, he nevertheless approves the result arrived at by the application of present-day law. Nor does he agree that the facts are sufficient to create a prescriptive title by international law in either claimant. The final decision, which runs a line 19° south midway between the Grisbâdarna shoals, which are awarded to Sweden, and the Skjöttegrunde, which are awarded to Norway, has been criticised in some quarters as a jugement Solomonique." Dr. Strupp, however, calls attention to the compromis which requires the court to fix the boundary, "having regard to the circumstances of fact and the principles of international law." Though the exploitation of these famous lobster fishing grounds by the respective nations and the maintenance of an occasional light house or buoy here and there did not of themselves create any sort of exclusive rights, still they were pertinent "circumstances of fact"; and the court was free to apply such rules of law for determining maritime boundaries as best harmonized with these "circumstances of fact." In this opinion the reviewer heartily concurs.

It is true, as Dr. Strupp suggests, that this case is deserving of greater attention than it has heretofore received at the hands of students of international law. Though the res involved is apparently of small value, the law questions are quite intricate and, one might say, elusive.