safety of the nation-is recognized as an elementary part of international law."

99 11

The question of legal justification, be it said, arises only when a specific act or intervention under the policy is performed or contemplated. The question then presents itself, Is the proposed action of the European government, which we desire to prevent, an action that would be dangerous to our peace and safety? If this question is answered in the affirmative, the right of self-protection is a sufficient legal justification for an intervention to prevent the occurrence of the act.

Dr. Herbert Kraus, of Leipsig, distinguishes between immediate and remote danger to the state, and argues that only intervention to prevent an immediate danger is justified by the right of self-preservation or selfprotection. He says:

Accordingly, one will have to limit the application of the interventions based upon the right of self-protection to such measures and only such, as seem necessary to ward off a present danger to the inviolable permanency of the intervening state. 12

Of course, the distinction is one that in practice is difficult to draw. Obviously the Monroe Policy is of no value to the United States did it not prevent conditions that if left alone would be a "present" and "immediate" danger to the United States. The distinction is a wholesome one in that it emphasizes the narrow and well-defined limits of the Monroe Policy. If the Monroe Policy is defined as the policy which under certain circumstances prevents conditions that would be a present and immediate danger to the United States, the right of self-protection, even under the restricted definition of Dr. Kraus, is sufficient legal justification for any intervention under that policy.

11 Century of American Diplomacy, p. 477.

12 Monroedoktrin, p. 373: “Nach alledem wird den Kreis der mit dem 'Selbsterhaltungsrecht' zu begründenden Interventionen auf alle solche Massnahmen und nur solche zu beziehen haben, die zur Abwehr einer gegenwärtigen Gefahr für den unverletzten Bestand des intervenierenden Staates notwendig erscheinen."

Cf. Creasy, p. 291: "Clearly the danger in order to amount to a justification for a war of intervention must be a danger which directly affects the vital and substantial interests of the foreign state."

Cf. Hershey, p. 150: "To justify intervention on this ground, the danger must be, of course, direct and immediate and not merely contingent and remote."

*

In a certain sense the Monroe Policy is the assertion of the legal equality of the Latin republics with all other nations, however powerful, and to that extent it guarantees to them a right which is unquestionably theirs in international law. Vattel said: "A small republic is no less a sovereign state than the most powerful republic." 13 Chief Justice Marshall said: "Russia and Geneva have equal rights. It results from this equality that no one can rightfully impose a rule on another." 14 The Hon. Elihu Root said recently: "The fundamental principle of international law is the principle of independent sovereignty. * The Monroe Doctrine asserts the right." But let us not be deceived. Although the right of legal equality is a part of international law, in practice it is limited by the rights of other sovereign states.16 Violation of international obligations may forfeit the right to freedom from foreign interference.17 In the last resort a nation pays the penalty for wrongdoing by giving up its territory. But the Monroe Policy asserts that the territory of any Latin republic must never be relinquished to a European Power, for in that case the "destiny" of that republic would be "controlled" by that Power.

*

" 15

It is conceivable that as a result of wrongdoing by an American republic, a European Power might be acting entirely within its legal rights in assuming a superior political relation to an American republic. The policy of denying to the whole world the right of "controlling the destiny" of any Latin republic under any circumstances may conceivably be in direct conflict with legal rights possessed by other Powers. The Monroe Policy, while based upon legal rights, will not in all cases. square with international law unless we take upon ourselves the responsibility of seeing that no American republic performs an act that would justify the injured Power in taking territory. 18

13 Law of Nations, Preliminaries, sec. 18, p. 52.

14 In the case of the Antelope, cited 10 Wheaton, 66, 122.

15 Proc. Am. Soc. Int. Law, 1914, p. 13.

16 Cf. Root, Proc. Am. Soc. Int. Law, 1914, p. 17.

"Roosevelt, Message of 1904: "It is a mere truism to say that any nation, whether in America or elsewhere, which desires to maintain its freedom, its independence, must ultimately realize that the right of such independence cannot be separated from the responsibility of making good use of it." Moore's Digest, sec. 968.

18 Prof. Paul S. Reinsch, now Minister to China, said: “Such a State answers in the last resort by its territorial sovereignty, which in the case of Latin America is de

These circumstances make necessary another policy, a policy of "enforcement," which may be defined as the policy which aims to prevent conditions in an American state that would justify foreign control. This may be done in several ways,-by protest, by diplomatic pressure, by the use of good offices, and, in extreme cases, by armed intervention. In so doing we are acting under a variety of legal rights. The right of self-protection, which is the basic warrant for the Monroe Policy itself, may be invoked in certain cases of enforcement, although obviously the danger to be guarded against by the enforcement policy is more “remote" than the danger guarded against by the Monroe Policy. In cases where our own citizens, as well as those of other Powers, have been mistreated, our intervention could be based upon the fundamental right of protecting our own citizens abroad.19 Much good can be done by the use of our good offices, and our right to do this under any circumstances is unquestioned.20 If treaties have been violated, we have the right to intervene to compel the observance of good faith.21 Besides rights already in existence, we can acquire new rights by treaty, rights to intervene under certain circumstances, as in Cuba, or to supervise finances, as in San Domingo. These rights, when obtained by treaty have all the force of international law.

There are two policies, therefore, the Monroe Policy and the "enforcement" policy, and there are two issues that must be squarely faced:

(1) Should we abandon the Monroe Policy, by which the United States declares that any foreign control over the territory of any American republic would be regarded as an unfriendly act?

(2) Should we abandon the "enforcement" policy, viz., the acts of protest, good offices and intervention, designed to prevent any American republic from committing such acts as might make it liable to seizure of territory or loss of sovereignty? 22

clared inviolable. The United States, by shielding the southern republics in this manner, is itself assuming a certain responsibility for them." Independent 55:10. 19 Hershey, Essentials, p. 150.

20 Conventions of the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, Art. 3: "The exercise of this right can never be regarded by either of the parties at variance as an unfriendly act."

21 Hershey, Essentials, p. 150.

*

22 Prof. Leo S. Rowe said: "* it is a matter of vital importance to our position among the nations that new principles of our foreign policy should not masquerade as integral parts of the doctrine, but should be formulated as positive

II. SHOULD THE MONROE POLICY BE ABANDONED?

The United States maintains the Monroe Policy for the same reasons that European Powers maintain the balance of power, offensive and defensive alliances, and until lately the Concert of the Powers. 23 While on the objective side, these policies bear no resemblance to each other, the underlying purpose is the same, namely, to protect various nations from conditions which they regard as dangerous to their peace and safety. The question which must be answered in discussing the Monroe Policy is this, Does the Monroe Policy prevent conditions that would be dangerous to us, in other words, is the maintenance of the Monroe Policy necessary to our peace and safety?

Let us first raise the question whether any European nation or nations have ambitions in South and Central America that contemplate the overthrow of the existing governments or the seizure of their territory. Are we conjuring up terrors that do not exist? Are we, like Don Quixote, employing our chivalry for the purpose of fighting windmills?

In the past it has been the Monroe Policy which has prevented "interposition for the purpose of controlling the destiny" of the Latin states. It was the firm attitude of the United States in 1823, with the support of Great Britain, that prevented the subjugation of the former Spanish colonies. It was the protest of Secretary Seward, backed by the forces of the Union Army, that caused the withdrawal of the French troops from Mexico in 1865 and prevented the establishment of a Mexican empire under European control. It was the determination of the United States to allow no European Power to acquire territory in the Isthmus that prevented the building of an Isthmian Canal under British control. It was the Monroe Policy that caused England to submit the boundary dispute of 1895 with Venezuela to arbitration, and that caused the joint intervention of 1902 for the collection of claims to stop short of the permanent occupation of Venezuelan territory.24 How many ambitious projects for European expansion in South and Central America have principles supplementing its negative prohibitions." Proc. Am. Soc. Int. Law, 1914, p. 131.

23 See Hershey, Annals (1898), 11:362.

24 Refer to citations of diplomatic correspondence on these cases in Moore's Digest.

never been formulated because of the opposition of the United States we shall never know.

The spirit of colonial expansion still exists.25 The rich, almost untapped resources of South America and the tremendous naval importance of territory in Central America and the West Indies still tempt the ambitions of European military and colonizing Powers. According to Mr. Hamilton Holt: "Nothing but the attitude of the United States, standing firmly upon the Monroe Doctrine, has, in our judgment, prevented the acquisition of territory in South America and in the neighborhood of the Panama Canal in recent years by certain nations of Europe.' "26 Even Professor Snow said in guarded language: "It is by no means improbable that did a favorable opportunity offer itself, they would attempt to gain vantage ground on the continents or islands of this hemisphere." 27

Since 1895, England, it is true, has practically ceased to oppose the Monroe Policy. Sir Frederick Pollock 28 and Admiral Lord Charles Beresford,29 representing the most intelligent statesmanship of Great Britain, go so far as to advocate an explicit avowal of the Monroe Policy by Great Britain. From Austria and Russia, once the leading Powers of the Holy Alliance, there is no longer any danger. The interests of Russia are focused elsewhere, and Austria is obviously not inclined to undertake aggression in South America on her own account. The German Empire, however, is a young and ambitious power, filled with the military spirit, possessed of the most perfect military machine and the greatest power of organization in the world, and greatly desirous of colonial empire. South and Central America would offer a fertile field for her ambitions. Bismarck himself regarded the Monroe Policy as a "dog in the manger" policy, as a "piece of international impertinence."30

25 Harper's Weekly, editorial, 47:139: "In the 20th Century we have as much cause to fear a league for territorial aggression and for spheres of influence as in the 19th Century there was reason to fear the Holy Alliance."

26 Independent, 61:1119.

27 Treaties and Topics, p. 423.

28 19th Century, 52:553. See also his book, The Monroe Doctrine.

29 Harp. W., 47:139. See also Edgington, p. 286. The Duke of Devonshire said in 1903: "Great Britain accepts the Monroe Doctrine unreservedly." Proc. Am. Soc. Int. Law, 1914, p. 9.

30 The best discussion of this subject is in Edgington, Ch. 17 and 18.