ambitious military Power should attack us. We may safely lay down the principle that so long as Krupp continues to manufacture 42 centimetre guns, and DuPont continues to produce powder, these munitions will be used for the purpose for which they were made, and that until the world supply of plough shares is glutted by the transmutation of swords and sabres, we must not neglect the precautions of safety in time of war that common sense would direct and naval strategy demand. We cannot afford, therefore, to discontinue a policy that prevents European Powers from acquiring naval bases near our coasts and harbors. We must not put into the hands of possible enemies powerful weapons to use against us. We have made the Monroe Policy all the more necessary because of the construction of the Panama Canal, the neutrality of which we are compelled to enforce. It would be the height of folly for the United States to allow ambitious naval Powers to acquire territory that could be used as a basis of operations against the Canal itself, or against our own coasts and harbors. The day has not yet arrived when we can safely neglect these obvious naval precautions. 43 We cannot escape the conclusion, therefore, that the United States would put itself in great and needless danger were it to abandon the Monroe Policy and permit European nations to pursue colonial policies in South and Central America. For our own protection in time of war and to preserve our character as a neutral nation, it is necessary that the western hemisphere should continue to be occupied by self-governing states, in whose quarrels we should not be likely to be embroiled, and where, if our interests compelled us to interfere, we could do so with authority. Dr. Amos S. Hershey said:

* * *

As long as the leading states of Europe continue their present policy of aggression and colonization the United States, for the sake of her own interests as well as for those of her weaker sister republics, must remain the principal bulwark against such spirit of aggression and policy of colonization. 44

Aside from considerations of our peace and safety, there are some critics of the Monroe Policy who assert that by prohibiting European

43 See the Outlook, 79:366. See also Keasbey, The Nicaragua Canal and the Monroe Doctrine.

44 Annals, 11:362. See also W. H. Taft, Independent, 76:530, and F. Garcia Calderon, Atlantic, 113:301.

domination in South and Central America, we are impeding the progress of civilization. Were these countries to be colonized and governed by nations of superior power and "superior" civilization, say these critics, South and Central America would be better governed, industrial and commercial progress would be accelerated, and civilization generally improved. 45 Stripped of its gloss of "civilization" and the thin veneer of altruism, the argument is reduced to the contention that a strong Power by virtue of its strength, has the right to subjugate and control weaker Powers, acting as the judge of its own warrant in so doing. It is only the strong Power, superior or inferior in civilization as the case may be, that could force its particular brand of civilization upon other states. We have no warrant for believing that a Power which would be strong enough to subjugate a South American state would necessarily bring in its train a superior type of civilization. War as a civilizing medium, moreover, usually tears down more than it builds up.

Let us not be deceived by the assumption that the strong is necessarily the righteous. Let civilization pursue its stately course unimpeded by clanking sabres. The governments of South and Central America have the right to develop their own distinctive civilization.46 If their military power were great, we should hear no talk of conquering them for the purpose of forcing a "superior" civilization upon them. Their non-military character does not make their right to independence and freedom any the less valid.

The progress which the republics of the south have made during the last century has been made under the protecting wing of the United States. It has developed under the tacit assumption that continued protection was to be relied upon. These republics have a certain "vested right," as it were, to our continued protection until they are strong enough to fight their own battles. We should be shirking a plain duty were we now to abandon them at this stage of their development. So long as aggressive military Powers await only the opportunity to crush out the budding national civilizations of the south, we must continue to

45 See Walter Wellman, No. Am. R., 173:838, and Sydney Brooks, Fortn., 76:102. * Roosevelt, Message of 1901: "The peoples of the Americas can prosper best if left to work out their own salvation in their own way." Cited in Moore's Digest, sec. 594. See also the Outlook, 74:372, and Harp. W., 47:771.

defend them, not only for the sake of our own peace and safety, but in the performance of a sacred international obligation. 47

This is the traditional policy of the United States. Being traditional, in these times of rapid change it is suspected of being out of date, simply because it was articulated in a bygone age. The Monroe Policy is not out of date, however, because the considerations that have made it necessary in the past, while appearing to-day in somewhat different form, are no less pressing than in 1823. So long as these conditions. continue to exist, the United States can never abandon the policy that the Latin American republics must be independent of European political control. To the superficial glance this may appear a war policy, but in reality it is a peace policy. If we must fight in its defense, it will be to prevent greater and more destructive wars. If attempts are made to violate the Monroe Policy, we must bend all our national energies to defeat them, content that in so doing we shall best serve the true interests of ourselves, of Latin America and of the world.

III. SHOULD THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE MONROE POLICY BE ABANDONED?

We have seen that the United States must continue to maintain the Monroe Policy, and to refuse to permit the slightest act that would lead to any violation of that policy by non-American nations. We shall now discuss the relations between the United States and the western republics, that are necessary in order that the policy should be a logical and consistent one. We must so act that the policy we pursue will be in accord with international law and international public morality. If, under any circumstances, European aggression would be justified as a means of enforcing international rights or generally accepted rules of international morality, we must adopt a policy that will prevent, as far as possible, those circumstances from arising. 48

There are three issues upon which European intervention in America

47 See the Outlook, 72:871, 79:367 and 79:711.

48 Cleveland, Message to Congress of Dec. 17, 1895: “* when the United States is a suitor before the high tribunal that administers international law, the question to be determined is whether or not we present claims which the justice of that code of law can find to be right and valid." Moore's Digest, sec. 966.

Cf. note of Secretary Seward, June 2, 1866, cited in Moore's Digest, sec. 948.

might be undertaken and defended: (1) intervention by a European Power under the so-called "right of conquest;" (2) intervention by a European Power for the purpose of furthering in its own interests, rebellion against an American republic by provinces largely inhabited and controlled by former citizens of that Power; (3) intervention by a European Power for the purpose of collecting claims based upon private or public contract debts or upon torts committed upon its nationals. To oppose intervention based upon the right of conquest would not be in conflict with the legal rights of any nation, for there is no legal right of conquest. International law neither denies nor affirms such a right. To be valid in international law, a principle must be generally sanctioned, and the whole body of American republics has formally gone on record as repudiating the right of conquest. Since conquest pure and simple cannot be legally undertaken, the United States would be legally justified in opposing acts of intervention based upon the right of conquest, if her interests were involved.

Intervention for the purpose of assisting rebellion, under ordinary circumstances, is a flagrant violation of the rights of a nation.50 The situation is not essentially different because the rebels are former citizens or subjects of the intervening Power. By settling in foreign territory and becoming the citizens of another state, they have waived all right to the protection or interference of their former government. By assenting, expressly or tacitly to their naturalization, the European Power has waived all political interest in or for the colonists. The issue, then, would be simply one of high-handed interference with the internal affairs of a friendly state, a flagrant breach of the legal rights of that state, and an act that the United States would be legally justified in intervening to oppose.51

The Monroe Policy, then, squares with the legal rights of other nations, so far as the first two grounds of intervention are concerned. We are legally correct in defending the Monroe Policy by opposing

49 "Respecting this so-called right of conquest, it would seem that modern international law neither denies nor affirms." Hershey, p. 181, note 8.

so It is an interference with that nation's sovereignty, which is illegal, as already cited in Chapter I.

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51 "Intervention may be said to be legally justifiable to prevent or terminate an illegal intervention on the part of another State." Hershey, p. 150.

intervention undertaken on such grounds. We may also conclude that the intervention for the purpose of assisting rebellion against a friendly State would be as wrong morally as it would be improper legally. The so-called right of conquest, moreover, which has no legal existence, morally is but the assertion of the right of the strong as against the weak, and as such is indefensible. Unless conquest is undertaken as a punishment for corresponding violations of international right by the weaker Power, and unless such violations are sufficiently flagrant to forfeit legal rights and defy international morality and justice, we have a moral right, indeed in this hemisphere a moral obligation, to resist intervention for conquest. The disregard of international obligations, however, presents a new and more complex problem, and it is here that the necessity for prevention or enforcement appears.

What are the acts of an American republic that would justify military intervention by a European Power? In the past they have assumed three forms: (1) denial of justice to foreign nationals within its territory in cases of torts committed upon them; (2) refusal of effective legal redress in its courts for the private contract claims of foreign nationals against its citizens; (3) non-payment of its public debts due to citizens or subjects of foreign Powers.52

The Monroe Policy does not commit the United States to oppose military intervention by European Powers as a punishment for offenses of this character. We have repeatedly asserted that such conflicts do not concern the Monroe Policy at all, so long as the intervention stays within certain limits. The Monroe Policy simply demands that such intervention shall not result in permanent occupation of territory or the establishment of European political control over the offending republic. In interventions of this sort foreign nations have taken pains to assure us that they were acting simply to punish the offending republic for certain definite acts, and that permanent occupation or political control was not contemplated.53

What brings these interventions within the scope of the Monroe Policy is the danger that they will result in permanent occupation of territory

52 For discussion and citation of cases on Claims, see Moore's Digest, secs. 986 et seq.

53 This is true without exception. See Moore's Digest, secs. 927-969.