or the establishment of political control by European nations.54 The danger is increased by the possibility that in extreme cases, according to the accepted standards of international law and international ethics, permanent occupation might be justified and even necessary. For example, in a future case of intervention against a republic which may have been a constant source of trouble, an exasperated European Power might claim that the republic had forfeited its legal right to freedom from foreign control and interference, and its moral right to independent existence. Were there no Monroe Policy, the prevailing standards of international morality might not condemn that attitude. It would be clearly unjust to other nations to insist that a government which shows incapacity to maintain its obligations should continue its course unchecked.55

If we continue to admit the right of European Powers to intervene to punish American republics for illegal or immoral acts, conditions may arise under which permanent occupation of territory or political control will be the only means of effective punishment.

The question is, therefore, whether the Monroe Policy should be "enforced"-whether we should so act as to prevent acts by American nations that would justify intervention resulting in political control. Certain doctrines have emanated from South America, where "enforcement" is naturally regarded with suspicion and distrust, advocating the extension of the rule of non-intervention to cases of claims. Dr. Calvo, the Argentinian publicist and diplomat, in his work on international law published in 1868, took the ground that neither diplomatic nor armed intervention should be recognized as legitimate methods for

54 As in the case of France in Mexico 1863-65. Moore's Digest, sec. 957.

55 Sovereignty is limited by: "The rules, principles and customs of international law. For a violation of those rules, which are binding upon all nations, a state is internationally responsible." Hershey, p. 100. Dr. Hershey says elsewhere that the right of sovereignty is relative, depending upon the circumstances. In the most severe cases it would seem that extinction of the sovereignty that fails to perform its international obligations is defensible.

Roosevelt, Message of 1904: "It is a mere truism to say that every nation, whether in America or elsewhere, that desires to maintain its freedom, its independence, must ultimately realize that the right of such independence cannot be separated from the responsibility of making good use of it." Moore's Digest, sec. 968. See Message of 1905, Moore's Digest, sec. 962.

collecting private claims based upon contract or torts. Under the name of the Calvo Doctrine, this idea has become very popular with certain South American republics, and it has long been urged that the United States should give its sanction to the principle and act in accordance with it.56 In 1902, when the allied fleets were blockading the ports of Venezuela to force the payment of the public obligations of that republic, Dr. Luis Drago, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Argentina, urged that the United States act with the Argentine Republic upon the basis that the principles of international law do not justify one nation in exacting by force of arms the payment by another nation of public debts due to citizens of the former.57 This has become known as the Drago Doctrine.

The advocates of these doctrines would solve the difficulty by denying the right of intervention for the collection of debts, public or private, or of damages for torts committed upon citizens of the intervening Power. If these doctrines were generally accepted as international law, certainly there would be no need for enforcement, and very little chance for justifiable intervention by any European Power. But the difficulty with our acting upon these principles is that they have not been so accepted. 58 We should be guilty of "international impertinence" indeed, were we to take a position that departs so radically from the generally accepted rules governing intervention.

Neither is it sufficient to insist upon arbitration after the point has been reached at which intervention is legally justified. Arbitral boards, being human, are not a certain means of obtaining a just decision. Moreover, an arbitration by its very nature would be confined to an examination of the justice or injustice of the claims themselves, and a decision that they were just would not change the means of enforcing those claims and collecting the award. If the republics concerned were still unwilling or unable to pay the award, the result might be occupation

56 See Calvo's work, Vol. 3, sec. 1280 et seq.

57 Dec. 29, 1902. Text of the note is cited in Moore's Digest, sec. 967.

58 See Hershey's Essentials and Moore's Digest as to justifiable grounds for intervention. The Porter Resolution (see infra, note 66) was not considered as an adoption of the ideas of these doctrines, inasmuch as the provisos reduced it simply to a rule requiring arbitration first. The Porter Resolution was unsatisfactory to Dr. Drago himself, and he opposed its ratification.

of customs-houses or even the occupation of territory to compel payment, just as if no arbitration had taken place.59 In the last analysis, while arbitration is a fairly good means of settling the question of the justice of a dispute, it is in no sense a means of preventing such disputes, and we have seen that it is dangerous to us to permit conditions under which such disputes can arise.

We cannot escape the conclusion, therefore, that the only safe policy for the United States to pursue is not alone to assert the Monroe Policy, but to enforce it; not alone to resist European aggression, but whenever possible to eliminate the conditions that would invite European aggression and control. As President Roosevelt said in his message of 1905: "It is incompatible with international equity for the United States to refuse to allow other Powers to take the only means at their disposal of satisfying the claims of their creditors, and yet to refuse itself to take any such steps." 60

The necessity of some form of prevention or enforcement was recognized by this government as early as 1850. In this year the United States joined with Great Britain and France to bring to an end a bloody strug"Roosevelt, Message of 1905: "As a method of solution of the complicated problem arbitration has become nugatory inasmuch as in the condition of its finances an award against the republic is worthless unless its payment is secured by the pledge of at least some portion of the customs revenues. This pledge is ineffectual without actual delivery over of the customs-houses Moore's Digest, sec. 965.

*

*

Lord Salisbury, Note to the British Ambassador at Washington in 1895: “* but it is not free from defects which often operate as a serious drawback on its value. It is not always easy to find an arbitrator who * is wholly free from bias, and the task of insuring compliance with the award is not exempt from difficulty." Moore's Digest, sec. 966.

"Cited in Moore's Digest, sec. 962. See also message of 1904: "In the western hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power." Moore's Digest, sec.

968.

Premier Balfour in a speech at Liverpool, Feb. 1903: "It would be a great gain to civilization if the United States were more actively to interest itself in making arrangements by which these constantly recurring difficulties between European Powers and certain states in South America could be avoided." Lord Salisbury in note already cited: "The United States have a right, like any other nation, to interfere in any controversy by which their own interests are affected, and they are the judge whether those interests are touched and in what measure they should be sustained." Moore's Digest, sec. 966.

gle between Hayti and San Domingo. In his instructions to Mr. Walsh, the American representative for the purpose, Secretary Webster gave as one of the reasons for the endeavor the fact that the French Government had claims against Hayti that could not be satisfied unless peace was restored. A desire was shown to prevent circumstances from arising under which an American state would be unable to pay its claims.61

President Buchanan in his message to Congress of 1860 advocated intervention by the United States against the Miramon Government in Mexico, in order to prevent a European intervention, which, it was feared, might endanger Mexican independence. Congress did not follow the President's suggestion, being so absorbed in more engrossing domestic problems that the interests of the United States abroad did not receive much consideration. The intervention of Great Britain, France and Spain actually occurred, and as had been feared, soon assumed a political form, in the setting up of the Mexican Empire under the protection of France.62

In 1880-81, when Venezuela was threatened with a French intervention to force payment of overdue claims, Venezuela requested the United States to act as receiver of the Venezuelan customs, and the United States agreed. It was impossible for the United States to settle the question of the priority of the French claims over others, and the project was dropped. Conditions became steadily worse until the joint intervention of 1902.63

The reason that enforcement was not adopted as the consistent policy of the government was probably the fact that, with the exception of the Mexican cases of 1859-65,64 in which the United States, by reason of an overwhelming military force, was able to maintain the Monroe Policy without enforcement, military interventions for the purpose of forcing payment of claims were infrequent and unimportant. With the growing importance of Latin America, the increasing intercourse between Latin America and other nations, and the growing territorial and colonizing ambitions of European Powers, however, it soon became important that

61 Moore's Digest, sec. 960.

62 Moore's Digest, sec. 956.

63 Moore's Digest, secs. 967 and 995. 64 Moore's Digest, secs. 955 and 956.

some measure of enforcement should be carried out. The emergence of the United States from her diplomatic isolation and her growing influence and importance as a world Power after the Spanish War of 1898 forced upon the United States the necessity for formulating a more consistent policy of enforcement.

President Roosevelt actively embarked upon such a policy, and the emphasis which he gave to enforcement has led French writers on the Monroe Policy to speak of enforcement as the Roosevelt Doctrine. The most striking example of enforcement during his administration was the Dominican protocol of 1905, in which, by arrangement with the Dominican Government, the United States undertook to collect and disburse to foreign creditors the customs receipts of the republic. In his message to Congress at the time President Roosevelt said: "This protocol affords a practical test of the efficiency of the United States Government in maintaining the Monroe Doctrine." 65 The results have abundantly justified the action of the President. The arrangement has added to the stability of the Dominican Government, has greatly reduced internal disorder, and has put the finances on a firm basis.

Along with prevention, however, should go the demand for arbitration of the difficulties in accord with the Porter Resolution, if they occur in spite of the efforts of the United States to prevent them. Whatever the defects of arbitration may be, the United States would not be justified in allowing intervention by force to occur without insisting that the Porter Resolution should be followed.66 This is necessary, partly to eliminate fraudulent and unjust claims and partly to give time for the intervening Power to consider its action more calmly and for the republic involved to come to reasonable terms without being forced to do so. Prevention and arbitration, therefore, in the light of past history and future prob65 See text of message and other data in Moore's Digest, sec. 962. The recent attitude of the United States toward Haiti is a case in point.

"The Porter Resolution adopted by the Hague Conference of 1907 and ratified by most of the important Powers reads: "The Contracting Powers agree not to have recourse to armed force for the recovery of contract debts claimed from the government of one country by the government of another country as being due to its nationals. This undertaking is, however, not applicable when the debtor state refuses or neglects to reply to an offer of arbitration, or, after accepting the offer, renders a compromis impossible, or after the arbitration, fails to submit to the award." 2 H. C. (1907) Art. I.