" SUCCINCT STATEMENT OF THE LATE NEGO- [Extracted from " Papers relative to the Negociation with France, presented by His Majesty's Command, to both Houses "of Parliament, 22d December, 1806."] Panorama Office, Dec. 23, 1806. The importance of the following information to the Public, has induced us to unusual exertions, with intent to communicate an or derly and clear view of the conduct of that pacific Negociation which during the last summer exercised the expectations of the British Nation, and of the world, at large. Having been favoured with a Copy of the Papers relative to the subject, which yesterday were presented, by His Majesty's command, to both Houses of Parliament, we have carefully abstracted these documents. They are, as usual, given both in French and English, in 159 folio pages. As the proportion, of English is at least 100 pages, it must be evident that a sketch, though a faithful one, is all which our limits can possibly admit. It appears from these papers that a proposal to assassinate Bonaparte, was made to Mr. Secretary Fox, by an adventurer, in the course of the month of February, 1806. Of this proposal, Mr. Fox gave speedy notice to M. Talleyrand, Minister in France for Foreign Affairs: expressing at the same time, the aversion of Britain from all such conduct. Bonaparte directed Talleyrand to return Mr. Fox his thanks for this communication. This official note was accompanied by another in which M. T. writes thus: « Paris, 5th March, 1806.-It may be agreeable to you to receive news from this country. I send you the Emperor's Speech to the Legislative Body. You will therein see that our wishes are still for peace. I do not ask what is the prevailing inclination with you; but if the advantages of peace are duly appreciated, you know upon what basis it may be discussed.” "Extract from the Speech above referred to, March 2, 1806.-I desire peace with England. On my part, I shall never delay it for a moment. I shall always be ready to conclude it, taking for its basis the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens.” Mr. Fox replied to this hint, by stating the readiness of Britain to concur in the desirable attempt of terminating hostilities: waving all reference to past misunderstandings, and adopting such bases in this undertaking, as the present situation of affairs demanded. His words are, "March 26.-The true basis of such a negociation between two great powers, equally despising every idea of chicane, would be the reciprocal recognition of the following principle; viz. That the object of both parties should be a peace, honorable for both, and for their respective Allies; and at the same time, of a nature to secure, as far as is in their power, the future tranquillity of Europe. England cannot neglect the interests of any of her Allies; and she is united to Russia by such close connections, that she would not in concert with the Emperor Alexander; but treat, still less conclude upon any thing, but whilst awaiting the actual intervention of a Russian Plenipotentiary, some of the principal points might however be discussed, and even provisionally arranged." M. Talleyrand's answer considers Mr. Fox as referring to the "mediation," the "intervention" of Russia. He thereupon writes, 66 April 1.-The Emperor covets nothing that England possesses. Peace with France there is no interference in her internal affairs, is possible, and may be perpetual, provided and that no attempt is made to restrain her in the regulation of her custom duties; to cramp her commercial rights; or to offer any insult to her flag." He afterwards adds, "Two enlightened and neighbouring nations would be wanting in the opinion they ought` should they call for the intervention of foreign to entertain of their power and wisdom, and distant powers, in the discussions of the great interests which divide them: Thus, Sir, peace may be treated upon and concluded immediately, if your Court really entertains the desire of attaining it. "Our interests are reconcileable, inasmuch as they are distinct. You are the rulers of the ocean, your naval forces are equal to those of all the sovereigns of the world united. We are a great Continental power; but there are many who equal our power by land, and your maritime preponderance will always place our commerce at the mercy of your squadrons, immediately after your declaring war. Do you think it reasonable to expect that the Emperor should ever consent to submit himself to your discretion, in continental affairs also? If, masters of the sea through your own power, you propose being masters of the land likewise by a combined force, peace is imposible; for in that case you will be striving for an object which you can never attain.” I conclude, by declaring that his Majes ty fully adopts the principle laid down in your dispatch, and offered as the basis of the negociation, "that the peace proposed should "be honourable for the two courts, and for "their respective allies." Mr. Fox, to repell the idea of Russia being omitted in this negociation, writes explicitly, "That in whatever relates to peace and war between England and France, Russia can never be considered a foreign power, inasmuch as she is in actual alliance with England, and at war with France. For which reason the interposition of the Emperor Alexander was proposed in my letter, not as a mediator but as a party, April 8." The next letter from the French Minister, April 16, is of considerable length, and creditable to his abilities: it shews his perception of things, but he cautiously avoids the intention of the English Statesman. He concludes by abstracting the question into short propositions. "I see in the proposed negociation, only three possible forms of discussion: Negociation with England and the Allies which she acquired at the time of the formation of the third coalition: "Negociation with all the powers of Europe, with the addition of America: 6 Negociation with England alone. "The first of these forms is inadmissible, because it would subject the Emperor to the influence of the third coalition, which no longer exists. The second form of negociation would eternalize the War..... The third therefore is the only one which can be desired by those who really wish for peace." .... Mr. Fox's answer is extremely important. "April 20.-Your Excellency mentions that, in the proposed negociation, you know but of three possible forms of discussion. "The first appears to you inadmissible. "According to what I have had the honour to write to you, you must be convinced, Sir, that the third is incompatible, both with our fundamental ideas of justice and honour, and with our conception of the interests of our country. The second is not perhaps bad, so far as regards its principle; but besides the delays which it would occasion, it would scarcely be practicable in the present conjuncture. "It is therefore with much regret, that I am obliged to declare frankly to your Excellency, that I see no hope of peace at this moment, if you should not be disposed to negociate in the manner which we have proposed..... The affair, in fine, is reduced to one single point. Will you negociate conjointly with Russia? We answer, yes: But if you require us to negociate separately, we answer, no." The clear and decisive tone of this language, it might have been thought, could never have been misunderstood or evaded, by anycrafty politicians excepted. M. Talleyrand does not in his next letter, June 9, give up his point, or employ language equally frank; but renounces the ridiculous idea of excluding Britain from the continent, by alliances, or otherwise; and thinks it his duty to propose, for their object that the peace be honour◄ "able for them and their respective allies, "and at the same time of a nature to se cure, as far as is in their power, the fu "ture tranquillity of Europe." The second principle shall be, an acknowledgement on the part of the two powers of their mutual right of intervention and guaranty in continental and in maritime affairs. His Majesty, far from being unwilling to make this avowal, delights in raising it to a principle; and, in thus explaining his real intentions, I think I have given you a decisive proof of his pacific disposions. To this Mr. Fox replies, June 14. "After the open disavowal which you have made of the intention falsely imputed to you with respect to our continental connections, no doubt can exist upon that essential point, and it would be the more distressing that difficulties in form rather than substance, should prolong a war which the two goveṛnments equally desire to terminate. "Let us come to what your Excellency proposes. 66 The form of negociation which took place during Lord Rockingham's administration is more particularly present to my memory, as I then held the same office with which His Majesty has lately been pleased to honour me. Let France and England change situations, and the form you mention is exactly similar to that which I proposed. We then treated with France and her allies; let France now treat with us and our allies. The basis offered in your second proposition is exactly conformable to the views of our government, provided it be well understood, that, whilst we mutually acknowledge our respective rights of intervention and guaranty with regard to the affairs of Europe, we also mutually agree to abstain from all encroachment upon the greater or lesser states which compose it." So far the intercourse between the minister of the respective countries was direct; but, in the month of June, Lord Yarmouth being released from the depôt of British prisoners at Verdun, and visiting Paris, was sent for by M. Talleyrand; and commissioned to pass over into England, with a confidential mies sage to Mr. Fox. His lordship, much to "M. Talleyrand then broke off the conversation, desiring me to return the third day after. At the expiration of this time I waited upon him again, when he informed me that, considering the extreme stress which appeared to be laid upon this point, Hanover should make no difficulty. "Authorised by the concession of that in which the honour of the King and that of the nation appeared most interested, I inquired whether the possession of Sicily would be demanded, it having been so said, "Vous “l'avez, nous ne vous la demandons pas; si nous la possédions elle pourroit augmen"ter de beaucoup les difficultés." [You are in possession of it; we do not ask it of you; if we possessed it, it might very much augment our difficulties.] Considering this to be very positive both from the words and the manner of delivering them, I conceived it improper to make further question. "Nous ne vous demandons rien" [We ask nothing from you] amounting to an admission of the uti possidetis as applicable to His Majesty's conquests." In the mean while, Bonaparte, as it should seem, was informed by his brothers, that the kingdoms of Holland and Naples were not worth their holding. Concerning Holland the French plenipotentiary afterwards writes, 66 Supposing that the Cape, Surinam, and other Dutch possessions could have been finally detached from the kingdom of Holland, is it not certain that its existence as a nation would become from that very cause impossible; and that its incorporation with the French empire would have been the necessary consequence of a refusal given by England to restore to it its colonies? What, in fact, could be the means of maintaining a nation which would have nothing but debts, and from which the total deprivation of all commerce would take away the possibility of paying them? Whatever their excellencies the plenipotentiaries of His Britannic Majesty may alledge, it is impossible that they should not be convinced, that it is a very different thing for Great Britain, to see the Texel and the mouths of the Rhine and of the Meuse in the power of the French revenue officers, or to see them in the power of the Dutch. Thus, therefore, Holland, without the restitution of its colonies, would necessarily become a province of the French empire; for, on accepting the crown of Holland, Prince Lewis formally declared his intention of renouncing it, if the Dutch colonies were not restored at the general peace." Neither could Naples exist without also possessing Sicily. [The reason of this importance of Sicily to Naples, may probably be explained in a future number of our work.] Sicily in fact, proved to be a great obstacle; as Lord Yarmouth very sensibly foresaw. Mr. Fox's directions, June 26, in reply to his lordship, are of great consequence, in exposing the fallacies of the statement published by France, purporting to be the history of this negociation. "I have no conception on what ground M. Tallevrand can recede from what he said so distinctly to your lordship before, upon the subject of Sicily: "Vous l'avez, nous e vous demandons rien," [You are in posses sion of it; we ask nothing from you.] are words that made the more impression on me, because, those contained in the latter clause of the sentence had been used by his Excellency in one of his letters to me. It was on the faith of the uti possidetis being to be strictly observed as the basis, and particularly Sicily, on which satisfaction had been given to your lordship, that His Majesty was induced to authorize your lordship to hold further conferences with M. Talleyrand. Any tergiversation or cavil therefore on that article, would be a breach of the principle of the proposed basis in its most essential part. Your lordship should fairly state to M. Talleyrand, that you are not authorised to make any use of them [your full powers] formally. until M. Talleyrand returns to his former ground with respect to Sicily. Your lordship is directed further, to acquaint that minister, that, if Russia offers to treat separately, it is only in the way in which we do; that is to say, separately in form, but in substance, in concert with each other. And here you will recollect that this very circumstance was canvassed in your former conversations with M. Talleyrand, when that minister expressed himself clearly that there would be no objection on the part of France to such preThe result of what I have stated to your lordship is this: 1st, That Sicily is a sine quà non; on which subject, if the French minister recedes from his former answer, it is in vain that any further discussion should take place." concert.... On being charged with equivocation, in expressing his hopes of obtaining Sicily, M. T. communicated Buonaparte's expectations of taking that island by force; which the battle of Maida, not known at this time, happily frustrated. The discussion concern. ing Sicily continued: but the British negociator refused to open his powers, till he had satisfaction on this point. He writes, July 1, midnight. ThatTalleyrand had again seen him; and proposed the Hanse Towns, as an estabishinent for the King of Naples, in lieu Their urgency did not give his Lordship time to cool and instead of asking advice of his court, in this new and very delicate conjuncture, with the best intentions in the world, he produced his powers, July 21; and thus gave to the negociation the appearance of being conducted by Britain solely; unconnected with any ally. General Clarke, confidential secretary to Buonaparté, was appointed to confer with him; and talked a great deal about various possessions: "the King of Prussia was to have the Hanse Towns"-refused decidedly: then he was to have some smaller ports." The French negociator also tempted the British, with the idea, that Britain " might occupy some of the Portuguese foreign possessions." Lord Yarmouth writes, "in discussing for many hours these demands, I never for an instant admitted the possibility of his Majesty consenting to the cessions required." of Sicily. This offer being refused: he afterwards, July 9, proposed Dalmatia, Albania, and Ragusa, as an indeninity for the loss of Sicily, to his Sicilian Majesty. This also met with insurmountable objections: and though it was considered by the British ministry, yet they deemed the very consideration of it, a favour. About this time, M. D'Oubril, the Russian negociator, opened his commission at Paris; and being very desirous of concluding a peace, fell into the snare laid for him by the French ministers, to induce him to sign a separate peace. Lord Yarmouth writes, July 19,-12 o'clock at night, that " remonstrating with M. D'Oubril, both upon his conduct and the impropriety of disguising his intention, I drew from him these words, which I wrote down in his presence. Que voyant le danger immédiat de l'Autriche, s'il pouvoit la sauver il croiroit de son devoir de le faire, même par une paix par"ticulière." [" That being aware of the immediate danger of Austria, if it was in "his power to save it, he should think it his duty to do so, even by a separate peace."] All he now appears to claim is the return of "In writing to your Lordship, it is not the troops from Germany; and if he is will-necessary to dwell on the humiliating condiing to make peace on receiving an assurance that orders to that effect shall be sent, nobody can doubt, but that it will be signed, and probably not a battalion make a retrograde inovement of fifty miles." The British ministry now felt the embarrassments of their situation: and Mr. Fox thus writes to Lord Yarmouth: tions to which M. d'Oubril has thought proper to bind his sovereign. Of that minister's misconduct your Lordship appears fully sensible; and I doubt not you exerted yourself to the utmost to prevent it. When this was "I have used every argument to dissuade M. found impracticable, your Lordship was nad'Oubril from so unadvised and unwise a mea- turally placed in circumstances of considerable sure, I hope more than I believe, with suc- difliculty, and for which every allowance is cess. Indeed, I feared, from the first hour to be made. But it is necessary for me to say, I met him, that he was come determined to frankly, that it would on the whole have been make a peace, good or bad, with or without more satisfactory to the King's servants if Great Britain. I may perhaps gain a day, your Lordship had waited to know the im which may be a great deal, if that day should pression which this new event might create produce dispatches from M. de Strogonoff. here before you had produced your full powers. On the 17th, at night, the new arrangements..... Even as the matter now stands, it does for Germany were finally determined upon. The princes and the ministers who signed were scarce allowed time to read the deed. "There is a considerable army forming at Bayonne; thirty thousand men are there already. This army is ostensibly destined against Portugal, but will take Spain likewise." It appears that one of the conferences of this negociator with the French, lasted fourteen hours. The suddenness of d'Onbril's conduct, in signing the peace, appears to have perplexed Lord Yarmouth extremely; as it seemed, that Britain now was left to terminate the war by herself; and all further debates about treating as allies, Russia and Britain in conjunction, were superseded. The French pushed the success they had obtained over d'Oubril, by instantly demanding Lord Yarmouth's fuil powers: displaying the evils he might prevent, by immediate compliance. not certainly preclude discussion. But this might have been continued unofficially. And it is apprehended that, by producing your powers on the very day after the signature of the Russian treaty, an impression may have been created very unfavourable to the further progress of the negociation." It is but just that we should give Lord Yarmouth's reasons for his conduct. They open a view of projects, which is at once curious, and interesting. July 30. "The fate of Holland and Naples were settled before I was honoured with his Majesty's confidence, My conversation here with M. Talleyrand soon convinced me that these were only preludes to still greater changes in the system of Europe, I saw at the same time a great desire of negotiation, bee fore the final execution of some of the Emperor's schemes should have removed any hope of its being attended with success. "This opinion, not preconceived or lightly taken up, but gradually formed from a variety of circumstances, was confirmed by the nature of the offers held out, unofficially indeed, but in such clear and unequivocal terms, that it was impossible to entertain any doubt of the intention of this government to adhere to them. "The point which of all others was the most essential, and that on which satisfaction was due to the national honour and to that of his Majesty, Hanover, would, I was assured, be given up without restriction; for I did not then know we should be asked to allow the King of Prussia to obtain the sovereignty of some of the lesser principalities. "I received similar assurances about Malta, and the Cape of Good Hope; nor have I any reason to doubt but that before Russia had made her peace separately, these terms might have been obtained, and the treaty have had solely for its basis the uti possidetis, with the sole exception in our favour of Hanover restored, and latterly indeed of some arrangements tolerable to all parties in exchange for Sicily. assurance we give you that Hanover, Mal"ta, and the Cape, shall not be contested, "sufficient to induce you to do so? Must we lay before the British government our "exact terms, before they will even avow negotiation with so great a power as that " of France? or shall we execute our other projects, as we did those in Holland and Naples? 66 Undoubtedly, Sir, conversations of this sort, confirmed even as they were by the events passing under my eyes, could never have induced me to commit his Majesty's confidential servants upon any point upon which I had not received their instructions, and which left no time to receive them; but I did not think myself at liberty to shift from myself the responsibility thus thrown upon me, share the same fate which Germany has just at the risk of seeing Portugal and Switzerland. experienced, and Hanover confirmed to Prus. sia, until such time as his Majesty's arms should recover the possession of it. "The mode of proceeding of this government left me no alternative. Either to avow negotiation, or shut up every opening to it, was my only option. "M. Talleyrand held the same language to me, with respect to Russia, which he had before held with regard to the affairs of Germany. "You have now been here a "month; we have been willing to converse "with you, to give you an insight into our "views, and to communicate them to the "British government. We told you, that if you had the powers, and would enter "into negotiation, we would not sign the arrangement of Germany. A reasonable "time was left for you to consult your gnothing except the fact of negotiation, alI felt that I pledged his Majesty to vernment; we had no answer. The arrangement was signed, et nous n'en reready privately known to every court in Eu "viendrons jamais, [and we will never recede rope. from it]. We now ask you whether I carefully forbore giving any written "will treat before Russia has signed, which paper, or admitting even the possibility of any "will not pass two days." other basis than that of the uti possidetis. 66 you "It cannot be necessary to state my answer to such a proposition. I will only add, that the treaty with Russia was signed within the time mentioned, and then commenced the difficulty of my situation. Switzerland," I was told by the same authority, is on the eve of undergoing a great change." This cannot be averted "but by a peace with England; but still less "can we alter, for any other consideration, "our intention of invading Portugal. The "army destined for that purpose is already "assembling at Bayonne. This is for the "determination of Great Britain." "But I confess the point of all others the most decisive in inducing me to produce my full powers, was the language held respecting Prussia. Prusia demands from us a declaration "respecting Hanover; we cannot consent I have ascertained the real extent of the pretensions of France; and I did consider myself to have prevented a great evil at a small expense by having given time to yourself and his Majesty's other confidential servants, to provide by the further instructions you might judge proper, for the interest of powers, thus, for the moment at least, saved from the grasp of France." the The step taken by the British cabinet was, perhaps the most prudent that could be; they publicly joined lord Lauderdale in commission with lord Yarmouth, and gave their commissioners instructions to bring the adversary to the point at once, either to treat on the principle of each party holding what it was in possession of," which included the admission of Sicily, that being held by Britain for her ally; or of closing discussions which were perfectly useless, as to any good purpose or |