erally acknowledged both by southern statesmen and theologians, and church assemblies, as a great social evil, which might be mitigated, but must be allowed to exist for fear of the consequences. In recent publications of eminent theologians, and in resolutions of ecclesiastical assemblies, the ground is taken "that the holding of slaves, so far from being a sin in the sight of God, is nowhere condemned in his holy word; that it is in accordance with the example, or consistent with the precepts, of patriarchs, prophets, and apostles."* The same change of sentiment was implied in the words of the senator from South Carolina, when he declared, that "many in the South once believed that slavery was a moral and political evil; that folly and delusion are gone. We see it now in its true light, and regard it as the most safe and stable basis for free institutions in the world." Now we do not believe that the sound sense and right feeling of the southern people have undergone such a change; we take it to be confined to the most conspicuous champions of the cause. But that these should have changed their ground so as to reduce the whole controversy to one of principle only, the abolitionists consider a great gain. For it applies to the statesmen, as well as the southern church, what Mr. Birney says of the recent pro-slavery professions of the latter. "To drive the slaveholding church and its members from the equivocal, the neutral position, from which they had so long successfully defended slavery, to compel them to elevate their practice to an even height with their avowed principles, or to degrade their principles to the level of their practice, was a preliminary, necessary in the view of abolitionists, either for bringing that part of the church into the common action against slavery, or as a ground for treating it as confederate with oppressors."

وو

It has been said that individuals have undoubtedly a right to express their thoughts and feelings freely on the subject of slavery; but that abolitionists have no right to spread over the country a host of affiliated societies, and keep up a system of agitation. Now with regard to the right in question it is sufficient to remark, that the right of forming associations extends just as far as that of individual action. Whatever object the individual has a right to pursue by his single exertions, he is justified in attempting to accomplish by associate effort. The

* The Charleston (S. C.) Union Presbytery.

only question then remains, whether the object of emancipation is more likely to be effected in one way, or the other. Now the great body of abolitionists are persuaded that this philanthropic enterprise, which recommends itself to the simplest feelings of justice and compassion in the child, as truly as to the benevolent wisdom of the man, requires a combination and concentration of all the intelligence and goodness that exists amongst us; and that but for the constant agitation of this subject the public sentiment would relapse into the same torpor from which, but for the anti-slavery societies, it would never have awaked, unless it be by the horrors of a servile war, which they are striving to avert. It is a fact, that, among those engaged in this cause of simple humanity, all distinctions of sect and party are merged; that there is as little of the mere machinery of associated action as possible; that those, who are agreed on the fundamental principles laid down in the constitution of the Society, do not hesitate to express their own individual opinions, without fear of not being thought orthodox by their associates, or of presenting to the public the appearance of division in the camp; and that no individual member thinks himself, or is thought to be, responsible for any resolutions passed by the majority, any farther than they seem to him consistent with the constitution.

We are well aware of the dangers that beset all associations; and are thankful to those who have pointed them out. But with regard to that which is perhaps the greatest, the danger of cramping individual talent and energy, there is as little of it in the Anti-Slavery Society, as in any existing association. And then it ought not to be overlooked, that where a cause is carried on only by individual effort, men of uncommon talents or pretensions alone will bring forward their ideas, without the aid of free and various consultation; while an association brings into action the moderate or diffident powers of many, who would otherwise have remained silent and inactive.

We have offered some considerations in defence of the object and the means pursued by the abolitionists. We have said nothing of the "danger of dissolving the Union," because we do not believe it in danger. The only cause that creates in this country a radical opposition of principle and interest, the only real cause of disunion, is Slavery. The threats of the South are made fearful only by the fears of the North; for it must be evident to every reflecting man, that, if it were but for

the purpose of preserving the institution of slavery, the South cannot dissolve the Union.

We would gladly have added some words of praise and gratitude to those who have aided this cause by their single efforts, without being members of an Anti-Slavery Society. If it be true, that those who are associated for this purpose have suffered in the estimation of others from the fact, that some of the most eminent friends of freedom have not joined the Society, this should not prevent the former from appreciating the noble exertions of the latter. We wished to have paid some adequate tribute to what has been done for the cause of the enslaved, more particularly by the writings of Dr. William E. Channing, and Miss Martineau. But we forbear. This only would we say. We respect, we admire the man and the woman who deserve their extraordinary popularity; we venerate them for being ready to sacrifice it in defence of unpopular truth.

With regard to other points included in the inquiries of Mr. Elmore, we refer the reader to the answers of Mr. Birney. In conclusion, we would offer to the people of the free States, in behalf of the abolitionists, this consideration. If the Chairman of the Committee of the Southern Delegation in Congress did not think it derogatory to himself to inquire of their antagonists, in respectful terms, what this new doctrine is, — may we not be allowed to hope that here at the North, among their neighbors, kindred, and friends, the abolitionists may find a patient and respectful hearing, and kind and courteous treatment?

C. F.

ART. VII. GOOD SENSE AND ELOQUENCE.

THE nature, the connexion, the importance, the conditions of these two modes of thought and expression are not easy to be fully understood. The general distinction between them is obvious. Good sense addresses the judgment; Eloquence the feelings also. Good sense enlightens; Eloquence also moves. When listening to the one, you are pleased with its faithfulness; your commendation is that "the thing is just so; " truth, which you had per

ceived but vaguely or partially, is now exhibited complete and marked; you wonder you had not seen it as plainly before; you are sure that if you knew how to write so well, you would have said precisely the same thing. The understanding is never called to surrender itself to the conduct of the heart, but continually judges and commends, with calmness, but with satisfaction. When listening to Eloquence, on the other hand, the understanding is made to minister to the active powers; the mind is not left at leisure to affirm the truth of what is said, but is absorbed in contemplation and high purposes; "what shall I do?" you exclaim; you wonder that you have been so remiss and blind, and are kindled with a new admiration, or love, of the vast and the beautiful. Good sense in short presents things truly; Eloquence vividly. Good sense instructs; Eloquence affects.

Now there is nothing inconsistent in these two modes of mental action. When, indeed, we characterize a writer or speaker as one of strong sense, we mean to exclude higher qualities. Thus, John Foster, Paley, Tacitus are distinguished for their good sense, for their clear and strong judgment; and we should give neither of these the praise of eloquence. Yet there is nothing in their principles of composition condemnatory of it. To their good qualities a glowing copiousness, a fervid energy might be added, without detracting at all from their merit of judiciousness. It is very true that examples of a strong simultaneous and at the same time harmonious action of the judgment, imagination, and heart, are very rare. The affections are apt to cloud the truth which they adorn. But this is only because the affections are not true to nature. Rightly used, the heart helps the understanding, and receives excitement in

return.

But while Eloquence is perfectly consistent with good sense, it is not confined to the same limits. Good sense concerns itself with that alone which it can define; and of course is conversant only with what is subject to its close observation. But the mind, excited by the imagination, cannot content itself with that clearly intelligible truth which lies nigh at hand, but continually aspires, and looks up into the dim and undiscovered distance. Such is the law of the human mind. We are not made to occupy ourselves always with learning better what we have learned once already; but to exercise our faculties to the very limits of their tether, looking for new realities among the

appearances of the spiritual horizon, and soaring so as to extend that horizon itself. There are some men who are very impatient of these flights; who think that all writing and speaking is valuable only so far as it is distinct and scrupulous; who call everything nonsense, which is not exact sense. A man, glowing with sublime visions, discourses to them on what he sees, or thinks he sees, of the unexplored magnificence of the upper heaven of thought; and they do not suffer themselves to be moved. They receive only what appears to them to be accurate. "Tell us precisely what you mean by this. How is this expression of yours to be reconciled with that other? Make your ideas distinct to us." Thus they say, and any irreconcilable inconsistency, much more a confession on the speaker's part, that he does not know exactly what he means himself, (a confession which a man at once aspiring and sincere, will sometimes be called to make,) stamps the whole as worthless in the minds of these censors. Now is not this very narrow? Are any discoveries to be hoped for, if we limit our view to that clear field which lies immediately about us? Is not every truth, like every outward object, indistinct in proportion to its elevation? And is it not for the noble mind frequently to turn away from those accessible objects, which good sense pleases itself with illustrating, to the dim, and often obscured, but changeless orb of heaven ? Above all, the religious thinker, the true philosopher, is impatient of the bonds of logic. He knows that the highest objects of thought are those, the connexion of which with acknowledged truth is not yet clear. He knows that he can feel what he cannot prove. He spurns all bounds but those of his own nature; and is fond of sending his raised spirits up into the illimitable realms of space. And why scout such a man, because his vision is sometimes dim? It is none the less a new planet that he has discovered; because he is not able as yet to tell its diameter, or the number of its satellites. He sees a new star in the sky; and what he sees he tells. Let him be honored as a discoverer. But the worst of it is, that superiority and praise straightway beget conceit; the eye is obscured by vanity; and the next time that our philosopher announces a discovery to the world, the new star will, as likely as not, turn out to be only a glittering particle of earthy matter, which has been raised into his atmosphere by the shuffling of his own selfcongratulation. Such an error may fairly amuse us. But it is better to be sometimes mistaken than to be always dull.

VOL. XXV.-3D s. VOL. VII. NO. II.

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