any other book; or mentioned the name of the author whose thoughts, and sometimes, possibly, whose very expressions, I have adopted. My method of writing has constantly been this to extract what I could from my own stores and my own reflections, in the first place; to put down that, and afterward to consult upon each subject such readings as fell in my way; which order, I am convinced, is the only one whereby any person can keep his thoughts from sliding into other men's trains. The effect of such a plan upon the production itself will be, that, whilst some parts in matter or manner may be new, others will be little else than a repetition of the old. I make no pretensions to perfect originality: I claim to be something more than a mere compiler. Much, no doubt, is borrowed; but the fact is, that the notes for this work having been prepared for some years, and such things having been from time to time inserted in them as appeared to me worth preserving, and such insertions made commonly without the name of the author from whom they were taken, I should, at this time, have found a difficulty in recovering those names with sufficient exactness to be able to render to every man his own. Nor to speak the truth, did it appear to me worth while to repeat the search merely for this purpose. When authorities are relied upon, names must be produced; when a discovery has been made in science, it may be unjust to borrow the invention without acknowledging the author. But in an argumentative treatise, and upon a subject which allows no place for discovery or invention, properly so called; and in which all that can belong to a writer is his mode of reasoning, or his judgment of probabilities; I should have thought it superfluous, had it been easier to me than it was, to have interrupted my text, or crowded my margin, with references to every author whose sentiments I have made use of. There is, however, one work to which I owe so much, that it would be ungrateful not to confess the obligation; I mean the writings of the late Abraham Tucker, Esq., part of which were published by himself, and the remainder since his death, under the title of "The Light of Nature pursued, by Edward Search, Esq." I have found in this writer more original thinking and observation upon the several subjects that he has taken in hand, than in any other, not to say, than in all others put together. His talent also for illustration is unrivalled. But his thoughts are diffused through a long, various, and irregular work. I shall account it no mean praise, if I have been sometimes able to dispose into method, to collect into heads and articles, or to exhibit in more compact and tangible masses, what, in that otherwise excellent performance, is spread over too much surface *.

The next circumstance for which some apology may be expected, is the joining of moral and political philosophy together, or the addition of a book of politics to a system of ethics. Against this objection, if it be made one, I might defend myself by the example of many approved writers, who have treated de officiis hominis et civis, or, as some choose to express it, "of the rights and obligations of man, in his individual and social capacity," in the same book. I might allege also, that the part a member of the commonwealth shall take in political contentions, the vote he shall give, the counsels he shall approve, the support he shall afford, or the opposition he shall make, to any system of public measures, is as much a question of personal duty, as much concerns the conscience of the individual who deliberates, as the determination of any doubt which relates to the conduct of private life: that consequently

* Abraham Tucker, the author of "The Light of Nature," was born in 1705, received his education at the Grammar School of Bishop Stortford, and at Merton College, Oxford. He was originally intended for the Bar, and was for that purpose entered of the Inner Temple, but he possessed an independent fortune, and lived the life of a country gentleman, at his seat in Surrey, where he died

in 1774. Paley, who in the text does ample justice to his talents, was much indebted to his "Light of Nature;" but he honourably acknowledges, on most occasions, his obligation, and he has so very much improved upon the original authority that it is not always easy to detect the plagiarism. Gen. Bio. Dict.-ED.

political philosophy is, properly speaking, a continuation of moral philosophy; or rather indeed a part of it, supposing moral philosophy to have for its aim the information of the human conscience in every deliberation that is likely to come before it. I might avail myself of these excuses, if I wanted them; but the vindication upon which I rely is the following: In stating the principle of morals, the reader will observe that I have employed some industry in explaining the theory, and shewing the necessity of general rules; without the full and constant consideration of which, I am persuaded that no system of moral philosophy can be satisfactory or consistent. This foundation being laid, or rather this habit being formed, the discussion of political subjects, to which, more than to almost any other, general rules are applicable, became clear and easy. Whereas, had these topics been assigned to a distinct work, it would have been necessary to have repeated the same rudiments, to have established over again the same principles, as those which we had already exemplified, and rendered familiar to the reader, in the former part of this. In a word, if there appear to any one too great a diversity, or too wide a distance, between the subjects treated of in the course of the present volume, let him be reminded, that the doctrine of general rules pervades and connects the whole.

It may not be improper, however, to admonish the reader, that, under the name of politics*, he is not to look for those occasional controversies, which the occurrences of the present day, or any temporary situation of public affairs, may excite; and most of which, if not beneath the dignity, it is beside the purpose, of a philosophical institution to advert to. He will perceive that the several disquisitions are framed with a reference to the condition of this country, and of this government: but it seemed to me to belong to the design of a work like the following, not so much to discuss each altercated point with the particularity of a political pamphlet upon the subject, as to deliver those universal principles, and to exhibit that mode and train of reasoning in politics, by the due application of which every man might be enabled to attain to just conclusions of his own. I am not ignorant of an objection that has been advanced against all abstract speculations concerning the origin, principle, or limitation of civil autnority; namely, that such speculations possess little or no influence upon the conduct either of the state or of the subject, of the governors or the governed; nor are attended with any useful consequences to either: that in times of tranquillity they are not wanted; in times of confusion they are never heard. This representation, however, in my opinion, is not just. Times of tumult, it is true, are not the times to learn; but the choice which men make of their side and party, in the most critical occasions of the commonwealth, may nevertheless depend upon the lessons they have received, the books they have read, and the opinions they have imbibed, in seasons of leisure and quietness. Some judicious persons, who were present at Geneva during the troubles which lately convulsed that city, thought they perceived, in the contentions there carrying on, the operation of that political theory, which the writings of Rousseau, and the unbounded esteem in which these writings are holden by his countrymen, had diffused amongst the people. Throughout the political disputes that have within these few years taken place in Great Britain, in her sister kingdom, and in her foreign dependencies, it was impossible not to observe, in the language of party, in the resolutions of public meetings, in debate, in conversation, in the general strain of those fugitive and diurnal addresses to the public which such occasions call forth, the prevalency of those ideas of civil authority which are displayed in the works of Mr. Locke. The credit of that great name, the courage and liberality of his principles, the skill and clearness with The original title of this work was "Principles of Morality and Politics."

which his arguments are proposed, no less than the weight of the arguments themselves, have given a reputation and currency to his opinions, of which I am persuaded, in any unsettled state of public affairs, the influence would be felt. As this is not a place for examining the truth or tendency of these doctrines, I would not be understood by what I have said, to express any judgment concerning either. I mean only to remark, that such doctrines are not without effect; and that it is of practical importance to have the principles from which the obligations of social union, and the extent of civil obedience, are derived, rightly explained, and well understood. Indeed, as far as I have observed, in political, beyond all other subjects, where men are without some fundamental and scientific principles to resort to, they are liable to have their understandings played upon by cant phrases and unmeaning terms, of which every party in every country possesses a vocabulary. We appear astonished when we see the multitude led away by sounds; but we should remember that, if sounds work miracles, it is always upon ignorance. The influence of names is in exact proportion to the want of knowledge.

These are the observations with which I have judged it expedient to prepare the attention of my reader. Concerning the personal motives which engaged me in the following attempt, it is not necessary that I say much; the nature of my academical situation, a great deal of leisure since my retirement from it, the recommendation of an honoured and excellent friend, the authority of the venerable Prelate to whom these labours are inscribed, the not perceiving in what way I could employ my time or talents better, and my disapprobation, in literary men, of that fastidious indolence which sits still because it disdains to do little, were the considerations which directed my thoughts to this design. Nor have I repented of the undertaking. Whatever be the fate or reception of this work, it owes its author nothing. In sickness or in health I have found in it that which can alone alleviate the one, or give enjoyment to the other-occupation and engagement.

MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

BOOK I.

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS.

CHAPTER I.

DEFINITION AND USE OF THE SCIENCE.

MORAL PHILOSOPHY, Morality, Ethics, Casuistry, Natural Law, mean all the same thing: namely, that science which teaches men their duty and the reasons of it *.

The use of such a study depends upon this, that, without it, the rules of life, by which men are ordinarily governed, oftentimes mislead them, through a defect either in the rule, or in the application.

These rules are, the Law of Honour, the Law of the Land, and the Scriptures.

Moral Philosophy, therefore, is constituted of the answers to one constantly recurring question, What is the reason why such an action is right?

of his duty is to every man, in every situation of life, the most important of all knowledge."

It is true, that for instruction in that duty the Scriptures, rightly understood and applied, are sufficient; but let no one say that he needs no help, no guide, no instructor, to enable him rightly to understand and apply their precepts. Those precepts are general; but their application is individual, and the object of Moral Philosophy is to assist every one in that application for by showing the reasons on which they are based, each precept is more fixed in the mind, and rendered more adaptable to daily life.

This leads to the primary inquiry, What is right? What is virtue? Aristotle, Zeno, Clarke, and others, reply that it is propriety of conduct, liking and disliking suitably, putting proper actions in their proper places. Plato, Pythagoras, Cudworth, Hutcheson, &c., say that virtue is benevolence. Mr. Grove and others maintain it is acting rationally. Mr. Wollaston says the answer is acting according to the truth of things. Lord Shaftesbury, in maintaining a just balance of the affections. Epicurus, Some persons ignorantly have thought that the study Waterland, Rutherford, &c. considered it as being the of Moral Philosophy was intended as a substitute for the prudent pursuit of pleasure, and a wise regard to self-study of the Scriptures; whereas it is only their humble, interest. Paley's definition is, that it is "doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness."

This final definition sems to comprehend all the preceding; for if the advocates of the other replications are pressed to explain what is propriety-why should you be benevolent? what is acting rationally? what is truth? why should you regulate your affections? what is pleasure and self-interest ?-they must all make replies that blend and agree in Paley's answer.

Of the utility of Moral Philosophy, it seems scarcely necessary to insist. It is a conviction that must come unanswerably upon the heart and mind of every man, that he cannot, ought not, to live for mere temporary gratification. None but those degraded in their nature, do not feel with Dr. Reid, "that moral excellence is the true worth and glory of man, and, therefore, that the knowledge

yet useful ally. A commentary does not supersede its text; but illustrates and enforces it. The best argument we can produce, that Ethics are the friends of Christianity, is the work to which this note is affixed. Every page is in agreement and maintenance of its doctrines. It may be safely admitted that in its system there are some defects; for no human invention is free from thesethey infect every theory of ethics that has been promulged; "but," observes Dr. Adam Smith, "notwithstanding these defects, the general tendency of each is to encourage the best and most laudable habits of the human mind: and it were well for society if either mankind in general, or even those few who pretend to live according to any philosophical rule, were to regulate their conduct by any one of them. We may learn from each of them something that is both valuable and peculiar." (Theory of Moral Sentiments.) -ED.

CHAPTER II.

THE LAW OF HONOUR.

THE Law of Honour is a system of rules constructed by people of fashion, and calculated to facilitate their intercourse with one another; and for no other purpose.

Consequently, nothing is adverted to by the Law of Honour, but what tends to incommode this intercourse.

Hence this law only prescribes and regulates the duties betwixt equals; omitting such as relate to the Supreme Being, as well as those which we owe to our inferiors.

For which reason, profaneness, neglect of public worship or private devotion, cruelty to servants, rigorous treatment of tenants or other dependants, want of charity to the poor, injuries done to tradesmen by insolvency or delay of payment, with numberless examples of the same kind, are accounted no breaches of honour; because a man is not a less agreeable companion for these vices, nor the worse to deal with, in those concerns which are usually transacted between one gentleman and another.

Again: the Law of Honour, being constituted by men occupied in the pursuit of pleasure, and for the mutual conveniency of such men, will be found, as might be expected from the character and design of the law-makers, to be, in most instances, favourable to the licentious indulgence of the natural passions.

Thus, it allows of fornication, adultery, drunkenness, prodigality, duelling, and of revenge in the extreme; and lays no stress upon the virtues opposite to these *.

CHAPTER III.

THE LAW OF THE LAND.

THAT part of mankind, who are beneath the Law of Honour, often make the Law of the Land their rule of life; that is, they are satisfied with themselves, so long as they do or omit nothing, for the doing or omitting of which the law can punish them.

Whereas every system of human laws, considered as a rule of life, labours under the two following defects :

I. Human laws omit many duties, as not objects of compulsion; such as piety to God, bounty to the poor, forgiveness of injuries, education of children, gratitude to benefactors t. The law never speaks but to command, nor commands but where it can compel; consequently those duties, which by their nature must be coluntary, are left out of the statutebook, as lying beyond the reach of its operation and authority.

II. Human laws permit, or, which is the same thing, suffer to go unpunished, many

One fact recorded in our national annals will illustrate the inefficiency and inapplicability of the Laws of Honour for regulating and guiding men in their duty. George Villiers, duke of Buckingham, killed the earl of Shrewsbury in a duel; his countess, disguised as a page, holding the horse of her husband's slayer while they fought. That very night she passed with the duke, he having on the shirt stained by her late husband's blood. It is true this was in a licentious age, the reign of our second Charles; but it was an age celebrated for the observance of points of etiquette, courtly manners, and the rules of honour.

What did they dictate in this instance? What consequences did they bring upon these detestable criminals? Were they banished, hunted from society, spit upon? No; the duel had been conducted fairly-this was the only inquiry: so the duke continued a favoured courtier and the countess, marrying one of the Bridges family, was admitted into the first circles in society.-ED.

The law of England, if enforced, compels a man to attend duly at church. But that does not succeed in making him pious. It cannot compel him to pray.