Book I. Properties, which taken together, are different from those of every other Species, the Conformation of Parts, on which thofe Properties depend, muft in like manner be different; and this, as we have faid, conftitutes the Effence. Iron and Glats are evidently diftinét Kinds of Body, their perceivable Qualities have little or nothing common; and therefore the inward Structure or Conflitution from which thefe Qualities flow, cannot be the fame in both. But after all, this is the only thing we can with Certainty affirm concerning these Effences, which lying fo wholly in the Dark, we fhall do well to lay them afide in our Reafonings about Things, and stick to those more intelligible and fettled Ideas, got by joining together their various Properties and Powers. For thus only is true Knowledge promoted, when we argue from known Qualities, and not from a fuppofed internal Conftitution, which however real in itself, yet comes not within the Reach of our Faculties, and therefore can never be a Ground to us, for any Discoveries or Improvements.

By relat
Steps que ar-

rive at the
Nation of
immaterial

VIII. MATERIAL Subftance, as I have faid, includes the Idea of folid, cohering, extended Parts, and is divided into different Claffes, according to the different Impreffions made upon the Organs of Senfe. But befides thefe fenfible Ideas received from with

Subfances. out, we also experiment in ourselves Thinking and

Volition.

Thefe Actions have no Connection with the known Properties of Body; nay, they feem plainly inconfiftent with fome of its moft effential Qualities. For the Mind not only difcovers no Relation between Thinking, and the Motion or Arrangement of Parts; but it alfo perceives that Confcioufnefs, a fimple individual Act, can never proceed from a compound Subftance, capable of being divided into many. Let us fuppofe for Inftance, a Syftem of Matter endowed with Thought; then either all the Parts of which this Syftem is compofed muft think, which would make it not one, but a Multitude of diftinct confcious Beings; or its Power of thinking muft arife, from the Connection of the Parts one with another, their Motion and Difpofition, &c. which all taken together, contribute to the Production of Thought. But it is evident that the Motion of Parts, and Manner of combining them, can produce nothing but an artful Structure, and various Modes of Motion. All Machines of human Compofition, as Watches, Clocks, &, however artfully their Pacts are fet together, however complicated their Structure, though we conceive innumerable different Motions,

variously

variously conjoined, and running one into another with an endlefs Diverfity, yet never produce any thing but Figure and Motion. If a Clock tells the Hour and Minute of the Day, it is only by the Motion of the different Hands, pointing: fucceffively at the Figures marked on the Hour-Plate for that Purpofe. We never imagine this to be the Effect of Thought or Intelligence, nor conceive it poffible by any Refinement of Structure, fo to improve the Compofition, as that it fhould become capable of Knowledge and Consciousness. The Reafon is plain: Thought is fomething altogether, different from Motion and Figure, there is not the leaft Con-. nection between them; and therefore it can never be fuppofed to refult from them.

Wich, we
oth ravife call.
Spirits.

IX. Tais then being evident, that Intelligence cannot arife from an Union or Combination of unintelligent Parts; if we fuppofe it to belong to any Syftem of Matter, we muft neceffarily attribute it to all the Parts of which that Syftem is compofed; whereby instead of one, we fhall, as was before obferved, have a Multitude of diftinct confcious Beings. And becaufe Matter, how far foever we puriue the Minutenefs of its Parts, is fiil capable of repeated Divifions, even to Infinity; it is plain, that this. Abfurdity will follow us, through all the Suppofitions that make Thought inherent in a material Subftance. Finding therefore Confcioufnefs incompatible with the Cohefion of folid feparable Parts, we are neceffarily led to place it in, fome other Substance, of a diftinct Nature and Propertics, which we call Spirit.

X. AND here it is carefully to be obferved, Indy and Spithat the feveral Species of corporeal Subftances, rit, difinct Subflances. tho diftinguished one from another, and rank'd under different Names; yet agreeing in fome commou _Properties, which taken together, make up the Notion of Body, are thence all conceived to partake of this general Nature, and to differ only as different Modifications of the fame Subftance. Whatever confifts of folid extended Parts, is called Matter; and as all the various Species of Body, however diftinguished from one another by their feveral Properties, have yet this in common, that they are made up of fuch folid feparable Parts, hence they fall naturally under the general Denomination of material Beings, and are not conceived to differ but in their Form. Thus Gold, Antimony, Wood, &c. alike partake of the Notion of Body, they are all equaly material Subftances, and have no other Difference, but what

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what arifes from the different Structure and Conformation, &c. of Parts, as we have fhewn above. But Spirit is fomething altogether diftinct from Body, nay and commonly placed in Oppofition to it; for which Reafon, the Beings of this Clafs are called immaterial, a Word that implies not any thing of their Nature, but merely denotes its Contrariety to that of Matter.

There may be

many warious!

Species of Subfantes, befides thofe

that come within the

Reach of our

Faculties.

XI. BODY and Spirit therefore, differ not as Species of the fame Subftance, but are really diftinct Kinds of Subftances, and ferve as general Heads, under which to rank all the particular Beings that fall within the Compafs of our Knowledge. For we having no Ways of Perception but Senfe and Confcioufnefs, can have no Notices of Things, but as derived from these two Inlets, By our Senfes we are informed of the Exiftence of folid extended Substances, and Reflection tells us, that there are thinking confcious ones. Beyond these our Conceptions reach not, and therefore, though there may be many other Kinds, as different from them as they are from one another, yet having no Faculties fuited to them, they are as remote from our Knowledge, as Light and Colours from the Apprehenfion of a Man born blind. I believe it will hardly be doubted, but the Subftance of the Creator, differs more from that of his Creatures, than any two created Subftances can from one another; and therefore when we call God a Spirit, we ought not rafhly to prefume, that he is fo in the fame Senfe, in which the human Soul is a Spirit. The Word is indeed used by us, to denote in general, all thinking intelligent Subftances, in which Senfe God is very fitly called a Spirit. But it were the Height of Folly to imagine, because this Name is applied, as well to the Mind of Man, as the Creator, that therefore they partake of one common Nature, and differ only as different Modifications of the fame Subftance. This I mentian here, to check the Prefumption of the human Mind, always forward to conclude that every thing comes within its Reach, and to deny Existence to whatever exceeds the Comprehenfion of its feanty and limited Powers. Beings of a fuperior Clafs, may enjoy many Ways of Perception unknown to us, from which they receive Notices as different from thofe in our Minds, as the Ideas we apply to Spirit, are from the Ideas we apply to Body. Solid and thinking Beings are, it is true, the only Ideas of Substance, that we are able to frame; but this is no more an Argument against the Existence

of

of other Kinds, than the want of the Ideas of Light and Colours, in a blind Man, would be a good Argument against the Reality or Poffibility of fuch Perceptions.

Difference in the Manner

of conceiving corporeat and Spiritual Sub ftances.

. XII. BEFORE I difmifs this Subject, it may not be improper to take Notice of a remarkable Difference, as to the Manner of our conceiving corporeal and fpiritual Subftances. Thofe of the first Kind convey themfelves into the Mind by Impreffions made upon the Organs of Senfe; and as thefe Impreffions are different in different Bodies, the Ideas they produce, muft of course vary in proportion. Thus we get Perceptions of diftinct Powers and Properties, and range Bodies into Claffes, according as we find them to agree or disagree in thefe their obfervable Qualities. But it is not fo in our Notion of Spirits; for having no Conception of their Powers and Operations, but what we feel and experience within ourselves, we cannot afcribe to them Properties or Ways of Knowledge, diftinct from thofe fuggefted to us by our own Consciousness. And hence it is, that though we readily own there may be various Ranks of fpiritual Beings, yet we are not apt to imagine them divided from one another, by any Diverfity of Powers and Operations, but merely by poffeffing the fame Powers, &c. in a higher or lower Degree. It is not however repugnant to Reafon, that they fhould be diftinguifhed by their feveral Properties, in like manner as fenfible Things are by the different Qualities obfervable in them; but Properties of intellectual Natures, diftinct from thofe of our own Minds, being altogether remote from our Conception, cannot ferve us as a Means, whereby to diftinguifh their different Orders. We are therefore neceffitated to conceive of them in a manner fuited to our Way of Knowledge, and when we would rank them into Species, according to the Degrees of Superiority they are imagined to poffefs in the Scale of Being, we afcribe to them what we find moft excellent in ourfelves, as Knowledge, Thinking, Forefight, &c. and thofe in different Measures, proportioned to the Station peculiar to each Rank or Species. But that this is a very imperfect Way of diftinguifhing the various Orders of intellectual Beings, will not, I think, need many Words to make appear; efpecially if we confider, that the Manner of communicating their Thoughts, without the Intervention of bodily Organs, is a Thing to us altogether incomprehenfible, and neceflarily leads us to fuppofe, that

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they

they have Ways of Perception and Knowledge, which our Faculties cannot give us any Notice of.

The Bounds of Knowledge in our prefent State very narrow.

XIII. BUT I fhall not purfue thefe Reflections, farther, what has been faid fufficing, to give us fome little Infight into the Extent, and Capacity. of our own Minds ; to convince, us, that our prefent State will not admit of a perfect and adequate Comprehenfion of Things; and to let us fce, that there may be other Ways of Knowledge, beyond the Reach of the Faculties we now enjoy; which yet in fucceeding Stages of our Existence, we may arrive at, when being freed from the prefent cumberfome Load of the Body, we fhall 1 mount up to Stations of greater Eminence, and advance by a perpetual Series of Approaches towards him, who is the Standard of Perfection and Happiness.

In framing many complex Ideas, the Mind is wholly attive, and

proceeds by a voluntary Choice

CHAP. IV.

Of Ideas framed by the Mind.

I. JITHERTO we have confidered only, fuch Combinations of our fimple Ideas, as have a real Union in Nature, and are fuggefted to the Mind by Things themselves, varioufly affecting our Perception; it is now Time to take a View of the other Clafs of our complex Notions; I mean thofe arbitrary Collections of different Ideas, which we on many Occafions bring together, by that Power which we find in ourselves, of uniting, com- 10 paring, and divertifying our Notices of Things. In the Re-.-. ception of fimple Ideas, and even in thofe of Substances, the Understanding is wholly paffive, and the Perceptions produced correfpond to the Impreffions made upon it. When we fee a Houle, or a Tree, they neceffarily appear each under its proper Form; nor is it in our Power to receive from thefe Ob jects, other Ideas than what they are fitted to produce. But in this fecond Clafs of complex Conceptions, the Mind acts voluntarily and of Choice; it combines only fuch Ideas as are fuppofed beft to fuit its prefent Purpose, and alters or changes thefe Combinations, by inferting fome, and throwing out others, according as the Circumftances of Things require their