conclude that the firft Field is larger than the fecond. Here the two first Perceptions are plainly intuitive, and gained by an immediate Application of the Meature of a Yard to the two Fields, one after another. The Conclufion, though it produces no lefs certain Knowledge, yet differs from the others in this, that it is not obtained by an immediate Comparifon of the Ideas contained in it one with another, but is a Deduction from the two preceding Judgments, in which thefe Ideas are feverally compared with a third, and their Relation thereby difcovered. We fee therefore, that Reafoning is a much more complicated Act of the Mind than fimple Judgment, and neceffarilly prefuppofes it, as being ultimately founded on the Perceptions thence gained, and implying the various Comparifon of them one with another, This is the great Exercife of the human Faculties, and the chief Inftrument by which we pufh on our Difcoveries, and enlarge our Knowledge. A Quicknefs of Mind to find out intermediate Ideas, and apply them fkilfully in determining the Relations of things, is one of the principal Diftinctions among Men, and that which gives fome fo remarkable a Superiority over others, that we are apt to look upon them as Creatures of another Species.

Methed.

VIII. THUS far we have traced the Progrefs of the Mind in Thinking, and feen it rifing by natural and eafy Steps, from its firft and fimple Perceptions, to the Exercife of its highest and most diftinguishing Faculty, Let us now view it in another Light, as enriched with Knowledge, and ftored with a Variety of Discoveries, acquired by the due Application of its natural Powers. It is obvious to confider it in thefe Circumftances, as taking a general Survey of its whole Stock of intellectual Acquifitions, difpofing them under certain Heads and Claffes, and tying them together, according to thofe Connections and Dependencies it difcerns between them. It often happens, in carrying on our Enquiries from Subject to Subject, that we ftumble upon unexpected Truth, and are encountered by Difcoveries, which our prefent Train of Thinking gave no Profpect of bringing in our way. A Man of clear Apprehenfion, and diftinct Reafon, who after due Search and Examination, has maftered any Part of Knowledge, and even made important Discoveries in it, beyond what he at first expected, will not fuffer his Thoughts to lie jumbled together, in the fame confufed manner as Chance offered them; he will be for combining them into a regular System,

B3

where

where their mutual Dependence may be eafily traced, and the Parts feem to grow one out of another. This is that Operation of the Mind, known by the Name of Difpofition or Method, and comes in the laft in order, according to the Divifion of the Logicians, prefuppofing fome tolerable Mcafure of Knowledge, before it can have an Opportunity of exerting itself in any extenfive degree.

Perception and
Judgment,
Terms of a
very extenfive

IX. WE fee then that this fourfold Distinction of the Powers of the Mind into Perception, Judgment, Reasoning and Difpofition, as well as the Order in which they are placed, have a Signification. real Foundation in Nature, and arife from the Method and Procedure of our own Thoughts. It is true, there are many other Actions and Modifications of the Underftanding, befides thofe above-mentioned, as Believing, Doubting, Aflenting, &c. but these are all implied in the Act of Reafoning, in the like manner as Compounding, Abftracting, Remembering, may be referred to the firft Operation of the Mind, or Perception. This will appear more fully in the Sequel, when we come to handle the feveral Parts of Logick feparately; at prefent we fhall content ourselves with this general Account of Things; only it feems neceffary to obferve, that Perception and Judgment, in the Propriety of the English Tongue, have a much more extenfive Signification than Logicians commonly allow them. We not only perceive the Ideas in our own Minds, but we are faid alfo to perceive their Agreement or Difagreement; and hence arife the common Phrafes of intuitive Perceptions, Perceptions of Truth, and of the Juftnefs of Arguments or Proofs; where it is manifeft, that the Word is applied not only to our Judgments, but also to our Reasonings. In a word, whatever comes under the View of the Mind, fo as to be diftinctly reprefented and taken notice of, whether an Idea, Propofition, Chain of Reafoning, or the Order or Connection of Things, is thereby rendered an Object of Perception, and gives Employment to this firft and moft fimple of our Facultics. In like manner the Word Judgment is feldom in common Difcourfe confined to obvious and felf-evident Truths. It rather fignifics thofe Conjectures and Gueffes that we form, in Cafes which admit not of undoubted Certainty, and where we are left to determine by comparing the various Probabilities of Things. Thus a Man of Sagacity and Penetration, who fees far into the Humours and Paffions of Mankind, and feldom mistakes in the Opinions he frames of

Cha

Logick di

vided into four
Parts. Its
Ufefulness and
Excellency.

The

Characters and Actions, is faid to judge well, or think judiciously, For thefe Reafons, it might not be improper to change the common Names of the two firft Operations of the Mind, calling the one fimple Apprehenfion, and the other Intuition; which two Words feem better to exprefs. their Nature, and the Manner in which they are conver fant about their feveral Objects. This Accuracy of Diftinguifhing, where there is any the leaft Difference, is in a peculiar Manner neceflary in a Treatife of Logick, as it is the profefied Defign of that Science, to teach us how to form clear and diftinct Notions of Things, and thereby avoid being misled by their Similitude or Resemblance. X. HAVING thus given a general Idea of the four Operations of the Mind, and traced their Connection and Dependence one upon another, I would next obferve, that in confequence of this Divifion of the Powers of the Understanding, Logick is alfo divided into four Parts, which treat feverally of thefe Acts, and give Rules and Directions for their duc Conduct and Regulation. Operations themselves we have from Nature, but how to exert them juftly, and employ them with Advantage in the Search of Truth, is a Knowledge that may be acquired by Study and Obfervation. It is certain that we meet with falfe Reasonings as well as juft. Some Men are diftinguifhed by an Accuracy of Thinking, and a happy Talent of unravelling and throwing Light upon the most obfcure and intricate Subjects. Others confound the eaficft Speculations; their Understandings feem to be formed awry, and they are incapable of either conceiving clearly themfelves, or making their Thoughts intelligible to others. If then we fet ourfelves carefully to obferve, what it is that makes the one fucceed fo well, and how the others come to mifcarry, thefe Remarks will furnish us with an Art of the highest Use and Excellency in the Conduct of Life. Now this is the precife Bufinefs of Logick, to explain the Nature of the human Mind, and the proper Manner of conducting its feveral Powers, in order to the Attainment of Truth and Knowledge. It lays open thofe Errors and Mistakes we are apt through Inattention to run into, and teaches us how to diftinguish between Truth, and what carries only the Appearance of it. By this means we grow acquainted with the Nature and Force of the Understanding, fee what Things lie within its Reach, where we may attain Certainty and Demonftration, and when we must be contented with bare Probability.

B 4

Probability.

Thefe Confiderations fufficiently evince the Usefulness and Benefit of this Science, which ought to be established as the Foundation and Ground-work of all our other Knowledge, if we really wish to fucceed in our Enquiries. But we shall now proceed to treat of its Parts separately, according to the Divifion given of them above,

THE

THE

ELEMENTS

OF

LOG
LOGIC K.

BOOK I.

Of SIMPLE APPREHENSION, or

PERCEPTION.

"T

CHA P. I.

Of the Original of our Ideas.

Ideas.

HE first Thing we obferve, when we take a View of what paffes within Simple Apus, is, that we are capable of receiv- prebenfion and ing Impreffions from a Variety of Objects, that diftinct Notices are thereby conveyed into the Understanding, and that we are confcious of their being there. This Attention of the Mind to the Objects acting upon it, is what we call fimple Apprehenfion, and is in Fact the Mind itself, taking a View of Things, as reprefented to it by its own Confcioufnefs. It is by this means that we come to be furnished with all thofe Ideas about which our Thoughts are employed. For being fenfible of the Impreffions made upon us, and attending to the Perceptions they bring, we can renew them

again