Contrivance to remind us of it is fufficient. When we say for inftance, that a Clock is an Inftrument by which we meafure the Hours of the Day; it is plain, that the Idea anfwering to the Word Clock, is not here unfolded; but we being before-hand fuppofed to have an Idea of this Inftrument, are only taught by what Name it is called. Now in this Senfe, the Names of even fimple Ideas may be defined. For by faying that White is the Colour we obferve in Snow or Milk, Heat the Senfation produced by approaching the Fire, we fufficiently make known what Ideas we connect with the Terms White and Heat, which is the true Purpose of a Definition of the Name. Hence it appears, that many of those Explanations of Words, which Logicians call Definitions of the Name, are not Definitions in a true and proper Senfe, that is, fuch Defcriptions of Ideas, as would ferve to excite them in the Mind of another, even fuppofing him before wholly unacquainted with them, but merely Contrivances to remind us of known Ideas, and teach us the Names by which they are called.

But only when they

coincide with the Definition of the Thing.

V. But where the Ideas we join with our Words, are new and of our own Formation, there they are to be laid open by a Defcription. Becaufe being fuppofed unknown to others, we muft firft raise them in their Minds, before they

can learn to connect them with any particular Names, And here it is, that the Definition of the Name coincides with what Logicians call the Definition of the Thing, as in either Cafe we proceed, by unfolding the Idea itself, for which the Term defined ftands. And indeed this alone is what conftitutes a Definition, in the true and proper Senfe of the Word, as will appear more fully afterwards, when we come to confider the Terms we use, as referred to the real Objects of Nature. We shall therefore poftpone this Confideration of the Definition of the Name, till we come to treat of the Definition of the Thing, when it will more naturally fall in our way. It may not however be amifs to observe, that when we fay the Definitions of the Name are arbitraгy, we mean not that the Defcriptions of Ideas are fo too, For every Idea having a peculiar Appearance of its own, by which it is diftinguished from all others, nothing is more evident, than that the Defcription must be fuch, as to exhibit that precife Conception. But then the Connection of any Idea, with the Name by which it is exprefled, being as we have faid wholly arbitrary, the contidering the Defcription of that Idea, as the Definition of that peculiar Name,

muft

must be fo too. So that although Definitions confidered as Descriptions of our Ideas, are fteddy and invariable, yet the Application of them to particular Sounds, (which is all that we understand by the Definition of the Name) is wholly a Work of our own free Choice.

Definitions of Words ace

cording to the commonLife of Language not arbitrary.

VI. BUT fecondly, befides confidering Words as the Signs of our own Ideas, we are alfo very apt on many Occafions, to refer them to the Ideas in the Minds of other Men. Now to define a Term in this View, is to investigate its Meaning or Acceptation, according to the common Ufe of Speech. Here then it is plain that Definitions are not arbitrary. For although in regarding Words as the Marks of our own Ideas, we may give them what Meaning we please; yet when we confider them in reference to the thoughts of others, they have a fixed and fteddy Signifi'cation; namely, that which Custom, and the Propriety of Language, has affigned them. The Words Ability, and Genius, may by any Man be made to ftand for one and the fame Idea in his own Mind, and if he takes care to advertise us of this, he is at liberty to use them promiscuously. But if the common Course of Language, hath confined the Word Genius, to exprefs the natural Strength and Talents of the Mind, and the Word Ability to denote those which are "acquired, whoever pretends to explain the proper Acceptation of thefe Terms, is bound to take notice of this Difference. As Propriety of Speech makes our Language intelligible, and gives our Thoughts a ready Entrance into the Minds of others, it well deferves our Application and Care. The beft way to acquire it is from the Writings and Difcourses of those, who feem to have had the cleareft Notions, and to have applied their Terms with the exactest Choice and Fitness.

Definitions of theThings re fer to ike real Objects of Nature.

VII. WE come now to the third and laft Species of Definitions, that namely which confiders Words as referred to Things themselves. And here it is plain we are not at liberty to feign and fashion our Explications at pleasure, but being tied down to the real Objects of Nature, muft ftudy a Conformity to Things themselves. When we define for inftance the Sun, confidered as that Being, who poffelles the Center of our Syftem, and diffufes Heat and Light to the Planets around him; it is not enough that we give an Account of the Idea, anfwering to that Word in our Minds. We must further take care, that the Idea itself, car

Ground of the Diftinction between the

Definition of

the Name and of the Thing.

2

ries in it a real Conformity to the Object it is fuppofed to reprefent. And hence it is, that all Definitions of this kind, when juftly made, are in reality Pictures or Reprefentations, taken from the Being and Exiftence of Things. For they are intended to express their Nature and Properties, fo as to diftinguish them from all others, and exhibit them clearly to the View of the Mind. 'Tis for this Reafon that Logi cians call them Definitions of the Thing, because they are fuppofed to refer not fo much to the Ideas in the Underftanding, as to the Things themfelves reprefented by thofe Ideas. VIII. AND this alfo lets us into the Ground of that Diftinction fo univerfally received, between Definitions of the Name and of the Thing. The firft are arbitrary, and not liable to Debate or Contradiction. The fecond are Propofitions capable of Proof and Illuftration, and which may therefore be contefted. The Reafon is obvious. Definitions of the Name ferve only to mark, what Ideas we connect with our Words. And as Sounds are of themselves indifferent to fignify any Ideas, we are entirely at liberty to affix to them what Notions we pleafe. But it is otherwife in the Definition of the Thing. For here our Words ferving to denote certain particular Beings in Nature, cannot be the Signs of any Ideas at pleasure, but of fuch only as carry in them a Conformity to the feveral Objects to which the Words refer. A Man may ufe the Term Square to exprefs that Idea, which others denote by the Word Triangle, and define it accordingly. In this Cafe indeed he recedes from the common Forms of Speech, but his Definition cannot be charged with Falihood. He tell us that by a Square he means a three-fided Figure, and who can difpute the Truth of this, if he really all along ufes the Word in that Senfe? I would only obferve, that by changing thus the Meaning of Words, we change not Things themselves, or their Relations and Habitudes one towards another. Thefe are at all times the fame and invariable, nor have any Dependence upon the Fancy and Caprice of Men. It is true the Properties of the Triangle may after this Definition, be affirmed of the Square; but as in either Cafe, the Ideas to which thefe Properties belong, is the fame, the Propofitions only expreffing our Judgments, and not our Judgments themfelves, fuffer a feeming Variation.

IX.

our

Aprevious

Connection betsveen

Names and Things, cats of all arbitrary Expli

cations

Why Mathenitions bave,

matical Defi

been account'ed mere Defi

nitions of the

IX. BUT where Words are made to denote particular Objects, previous to any Definitions. given, there arbitrary Explications cannot have place. For in this Cafe, we are not put upon explaining what Ideas we connect with Words, but a Connection being already fuppofed, between the Name and the Thing fignified, our Bufinefs is, to unfold that Idea, by which the Ob ject itself is most clearly and diftinctly reprefented. Thus the Word Gold denotes that Metal, which is of highest Value among Men, and goes fartheft in the way of Commerce. This Connection being once fettled, we are no longer left to arbitrary Definitions, but muft defcribe it by fuch Properties as are really to be found in it, and will beft ferve to diftinguifh it when it comes in our way; as by faying that it is a Subftance yellow, very heavy, malleable, fufible, &c. X. FROM what has been faid it appears, that in the Language of Logicians, Definitions of the Thing refpect only Subftances, and Beings that have a real Exiftence in Nature, ferving to defcribe them by their Properties and Attributes. And this I doubt not is the Reafon, that the Definitions of the Mathematicians, are not confidered as Definitions of the Thing, but of the Name; because the Ideas therein defcribed, are mere Creatures of the Understanding, and not fuppofed to be copied from Patterns exifting without. A Circle, a Triangle, a Square, c. fuch as Mathematicians conceive them, are no where to be found in Nature, that we know of. Hence it might justly be accounted abfurd, to call our Definitions of thefe Definitions of the Thing, when they ferve not to defcribe any real Objects of Nature, but merely to unfold the Conceptions of the Mind. And yet if we look into the Matter narrowly, we fhall find, that the Rules followed in thefe Definitions, are precifely the fame, with those which Logicians have laid down for the Definition of the Thing. All the feveral Species of Figures are defcribed by their Proper ties, fome of which are common to different Ranks, others peculiar to the Tribe defined. The common Properties con ftitute what Logicians call the Genus, and thofe that are pecu liar the Difference. Now the Genus and Difference make up the Logical Definition of the Thing, as will be more clearly understood from what follows.

XI.,

When yet they coincide with the Logical Definition of the Thing, and therefore ought not to be accounted arbitrary.

XI. I AM therefore apt to think, that Mathematical Definitions, as they are of the fame general Form with the Definitions of Substances, and fubject to the fame Rules, have been improperly confidered as mere Definitions of the Name, in which we are left wholly to arbitrary Explications, For however we may change the Name of one Figure for another in Difcourfe or Writing, ufing the Term Square to denote a Triangle, or the Word Triangle to exprefs a Square, it is certain the Ideas themselves are invariable, and no lefs capable of being diftinguished by their Properties, than the feveral Species of Subftances. Thus if we fuppofe the Word Square, to denote that Species of Figures, whofe Sides severalJy fubtend Quadrants of a circumfcribed Circle, we fhall find ourselves equally fhut out from arbitrary Explications, as in the Definition of the Names of Subftances. For as this happens in no Figures but thofe which are bounded by four equal Sides, joined together at right Angles; it follows evidently, that the true and proper Definition of a Square, is that which exhibits the precife Idea here mentioned, and no other, to the Mind. And thus it appears, that the common Divifion of Definitions, into thofe of the Name and Thing, is not fufficiently calculated to give us right Apprehenfions, as to what is and what is not arbitrary in the Explication of Words. It may not therefore be improper, if we here endeavour to clear up this Matter a little, and free it from those Obscurities in which it has hitherto been involved. To this end we fhall premife the following Obfervations.

Definitions properly Speaking never regard Things, but merely our own Ideas.

XII. 1. FIRST, that whatever Logicians may pretend about the Definition of the Thing, it is yet certain, that none of our Definitions when purfued to their Source, regard immediately Things themselves, but merely the Ideas in our own Minds. This I doubt not will appear a Paradox to many, who will be apt to enquire, whether the Definition of Gold, be not taken from that Metal, independent of the various Conceptions of Men about it. To this I anfwer, that indeed in framing our Idea of Gold, we regard chiefly the Thing itself, uniting in our Conception fuch Properties as are moft confpicuous, and ferve beft to diftinguish it from other Metals, to which it may bear any Refemblance. But as it is by this Idea alone that Gold is known to us, so in defcribing it to others, we aim at nothing more than to

transfer