fprings of action in beings endowed with fenfibility. Even amongst the motives which incite men to acts of religion, the invifible legiflator has ordained rewards and punishments. From a partial diftribution of thefe, will arife that contradiction, fo little obferved, becaufe fo common; I mean, that of punishing by the laws, the crimes which the laws have occafioned. If an equal punishment be ordained for two crimes that injure fociety in different degrees, there is nothing to deter men from committing the greater, as often as it is attended with greater advantage.

The foregoing reflections authorife me to affert, that crimes are only to be measured by the injury done to fociety.

They err, therefore, who imagine that a crime is greater, or lefs, according to the intention of the perfon by whom it is committed; for this will depend on the actual impreffion of objects on the fenfes, and on the previous difpofition of the mind; both which will vary in different perfons, and even in the fame perfon at different times, according to the fucceffion of ideas, paffions, and circumftances. Upon that fyftem, it would be neceffary to form, not only a particular code for every individual, but a new penal law for every crime. Men, often with the best intention, do the greatest injury to fociety, and with the worst, do it the moft effential fervices.

to be punished with infinitely more feverity, than the affaffination of a monarch.

In short, others have imagined, that the greatness of the fin fhould aggravate the crime. But the fallacy of this opinion will appear on the flighteft confideration of the relations between man and man, and between God and man. The relations between man and man, are relations of equality. Neceffity alone hath produced, from the oppofition of private paffions and interefts, the idea of public utility, which is the foundation of human juftice. The others are relations of dependence, between an imperfectcreature and his Creator, the moft perfect of beings, who has reserved to himfelf the fole right of being both lawgiver, and judge; for he alone can, without injuftice, be, at the fame time, both one and the other. If he hath decreed eternal punishments for thofe who disobey his will, fhall an infect dare to put himself in the place of divine juftice, or pretend to punish for the Almighty, who is himself all-fufficient; who cannot receive impreffions of pleasure, or pain, and who alone, of all other beings, acts without being acted upon ? The degree of fin depends on the malignity of the heart, which is impenetrable to finite beings. How then can the degree of fin ferve as a ftandard to determine the degree of crimes? If that were admitted, men may punish when God pardons, and pardon when God condemns; and thus act in oppofition to the Supreme Being.

though

though evident to the meaneft capacity, yet, by a combination of circumftances, are only known to a few thinking men in every nation, and in every age. But opinions, worthy only of the defpotifm of Afia, and paffions, armed with power and authority, have, generally by infenfible and fometimes by violent impreffions on the timid credulity of men, effaced thofe fimple ideas, which perhaps conftituted the first philofophy of infant fociety. Happily the philofophy of the prefent enlightened age feems again to conduct us to the fame principles, and with that degree of certainty, which is obtained by a rational examination, and repeated experience.

The opinion, that every member of fociety has a right to do any thing, that is not contrary to the laws, without fearing any other inconveniences, than thofe which are the natural confequences of the action itself, is a political dogma, which fhould be defended by the laws, inculcated by the magiftrates, and believed by the people; a facred dogma, without which there can be no lawful fociety; a juft recompence for our facrifice of that univerfal liberty of action, comto all fenfible beings, and only limited by our natural powers. By this principle, our minds become free, active, and vigorous; by this alone we are infpired with that virtue which knows no fear, fo different from that pliant prudence, worthy of thofe only who can bear a precarious existence.

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I do not know of any exception to this general axiom, that Every member of fociety should know when he is criminal, and when innocent. If cenfors, and, in general, arbi

trary magiftrates, be neceffary in any government, it proceeds from fome fault in the conftitution. The uncertainty of crimes hath facrificed more victims to fecret tyranny, than have ever fuffered by public and folemn cruelty.

What are, in general, the proper` punishments for crimes? Is the punifhment of death really useful, or neceffary for the fafety, or good order of fociety? Are tortures and torments confiftent with justice, or do they anfwer the end proposed by the laws? Which is the best method of preventing crimes? Are the fame punishments equally useful at all times? What influence have they on manners? These problems fhould be folved with that geometrical precision, which the mift of fophiftry, the feduction of eloquence, and the timidity of doubt are unable to refift.

If I have no other merit than that of having first prefented to my country, with a greater degree of evidence, what other nations have written, and are beginning to practife, I fhall account myself fortunate; but if, by fupporting the rights of mankind, and of invincible truth, I fhall contribute to fave from the agonies of death one unfortunate victim of tyranny, or of ignorance, equally fatal; his bless. ing and tears of tranfport, will be a fufficient confolation to me for the contempt of all mankind."

We wish that the extent of our plan could admit of our giving more extracts from this favourite writer; his unbounded philanthropy, and the eloquence and tendernefs with which he pleads the caufe of humanity, muft always procure him the moft favourable reception.

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