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on reflection, to attribute to a practice many of them have of applying their pencil, charged with pigments frequently prepared from poisonous minerals, to their lips, while ftudying their fubject. This fufpicion receives confirmation from a cafe here related, which occurred to Baron Dimfdale, of a child eight years old affected with an obftinate complaint in his bowels, which no medicines were able to remove, till a habit he had acquired of continually fucking the pencils with which he painted for amufement was difcovered and obviated. That the painted toys which children are fo apt to put in their mouths when given them to play with, may be a cause of some of their complaints, is mentioned as fuggefted by Dr. Heberden to the Author of this paper.
An Appendix, containing fome cafes communicated by Monf. Raymond, Phyfician at Marseilles, which, by accident, were not inferted into the body of the work, is added to this volume. The two first are of the bite of a mad dog: one of which, notwithstanding the ufe of almost every prophylactic, terminated in a fatal hydrophobia; the other, treated in a very fimilar manner, was not fucceeded by any complaint. The most probable caufe of this difference was, that the latter person was bitten through a leather fhoe, the former through a stocking. Mention is just made in this paper of a fact which, from its fingu. larity, would feem to deserve a more circumftantial relation, an hydrophobia confequent upon a phrenetic attack, without having been preceded by the bite of any animal.
The latter feries of cafes relate to the Cure of Suppreffion of Urine in the Kidneys, by the Application of Blifters to the Loins.
On a retrospect of the materials of which this volume is compofed, we cannot doubt of its favourable reception from the faculty in general; and we hope that a fenfe of the high reputation which the publications of this Society have justly acquired will animate its members to continue to enjoy, and to deferve, the approbation of their brethren.
ART. II. Conclufion of the Account of Three Dialogues concerning Liberty. See our laft.
N the fecond Dialogue, the two friends refume the subject of their difcourfe; and the Gentleman who sustains the inquiring part begins with obferving, that fome things, which all writers on political queftions fpeak much of, were unnoticed in the preceding evening : fuch as, the State of Nature, the Rife of civil Government, a Compact, Religion, &c. in all which things the liberty of mankind is thought, with abundant reafon, to be very much concerned. With regard to these things, therefore, he wishes to demand fome explanation.
This being readily undertaken by the principal Speaker, it is remarked, that a tolerable notion of the fate of nature may formed from what has been faid in the first converfation; for in that was contained a defcription of the fate of nature in its earliest period; and writers ufually chuse to distinguish the earlieft period, as that, in which they conceive man to be in the fate of nature.
As for those, continues our Author, who are so very curious in their researches, concerning the fate of nature, as to confider man as a being abstracted from fociety, and naturally unfociable; as an individual totally unconnected with his fellow creatures; we may leave them to the enjoyment of their own fpeculations; which, notwithstanding the difcovery of a wild boy or two, are entirely vain and chimerical; because men never have, naturally, exifted in fuch a ftate at any time whatever.
• When we discourse of men, as being in the fate of nature, to diftinguish their manner of existence, before their entering into any formal government; it is a phrafe, which may ferve very well for that purpose: but if we conceive (and it is generally fo conceived) that as foon as men fubmit themfelves to government, they are no longer in their natural state, it is a very great mistake.—It is true, they have varied the ftate they were in, before their fubmiffion to government, but that variation does not induce an annihilation of the laws of nature; or, in other words, it does not make void the fate of nature, confidered as a ftate, in which men lived obedient to the true laws of nature, not enforced by political government: it is the injurious part of the fate of nature (which arifes from the want of fome certain and fufficient power, to enforce an equal and due obedience to the laws of nature) that men mean to get rid of, by fubmiffion to political government.-All the other parts of the fate of nature, they mean to preferve by that very fubmiffion.-So that when men enter into political government (if upon right principles) they are as much in the state of nature, as they were before they entered, with this difference only; that by the force of a good government, the laws of their nature will be preferved in much greater purity, than they could be in the ftate of nature for the want of that force. So much for the ftate of nature, confidered in this particular light.
But for my part, I cannot but think it a very unphilofophical diftinction, to fuppofe men to be out of a state of nature, when they fubmit themselves to government; or indeed ever to fuppofe them to be out of their natural ftate at all, unless when they violate the true laws of their nature; and that we know they frequently do, under government, as well as before their fubmiffion to government.
Now if the violation of the true laws of human nature, do (as being an anti-natural thing) put men into an unnatural state; and if to correct and reform fuch violations, be to reduce men to their natural fate again; and if that can only be effectually done by the help of good government, must we not conclude, that the true end of government is to keep men in their natural flate? And that men,
under fuch government, are really much more in a natural state than they were, when under no government at all?'
Much ambiguity, our Dialogift thinks, would have been avoided, if, inftead of the words, in the fate of nature, or not in the fate of nature, the terms, man in his natural flate, or not in his natural fate, had been employed. This point he properly illuftrates, and then proceeds to a farther explanation of his fubject as follows:
Man in his rudeft state bears a nearer resemblance to other animals; other animals, we allow, are kept in their natural ftate by laws which act inftinctively upon them, and partake but very little, if at all, of the rational faculty: fo that we think ourselves certain, that they are true to the laws of their nature: and thus making them a measure for man, we fuppofe him to be more truly in his natural ftate, the nearer he approaches to the condition of other animals and that may be true, as far as concerns his animal functions merely. But it ought to be confidered, that the peculiar and diftinguishing faculties of the human mind, which feem to infer a power of judging of the propriety of human actions, and a power of chufing or refufing to obey the dictates of nature, make a very confiderable difference between the nature of man and of other creatures, and prove him to be intended for another and a much higher sphere of action. I fee no cause therefore to conclude, that the rudeft and least cultivated is more properly the natural state of man, on account of its approximation to the condition of brutes; but rather the contrary. There is no doubt indeed, as I faid before, that man, in the animal or inftinctive part of his nature, hath a great fimilarity to other creatures: but to pass away a life in the exercise of the animal faculties only, would hardly be deemed natural in a human creature: yet fuch nearly is the favage ftate. Now what other conclufion can be justly drawn from all this, but that man in a favage or uncultivated state is in the lowest and leaft improved state of human nature; and in that which approaches the nearest to the brute creation ?— It is, no doubt, the proper place to commence at, in the hiftory of human nature; and that is the only use that ought to have been made of it. But to fuppofe men to be out of their natural fate, as foon as they begin to form plans of government, and to invent the useful and ornamental arts of life, is as irrational as to suppose ants out of their natural ftate, when they ftore up their hoards againft winter; or bees, when they construct combs for their honey.'
Our ingenious Writer, after having fhewn, with great precifion and good fenfe, that a creature formed as man is, with fuch faculties, fenfes, and mental powers, is by nature moved, according as particular circumstances arife, to form and to fubmit himself to political inftitutions, and to invent and cultivate arts useful and ornamental to life, and necessary to his well-being; comes to the origin of civil government, which he thus briefly delineates :
If the principles of nature have exifted at all times, in all men, (and to believe otherwife muft furely be very unphilofophical) is it not easy to perceive, that the paffion which impels us to the propagation of our fpecies, together with its confequent affections; that the neceffitous itate of men without reciprocal affiftance; that the mutual ftrength and fecurity, which the union of numbers gives to a body of men, and the attracting pleasures of converfation and fociability; do all feverally and unitedly draw men, neceffarily, into fociety Why may we not believe then, that a fmall number of men, in a state of pure fimplicity, might live amicably together, under the fole influence of the laws of their nature, at leaft for fome time; and that fmall irregularities might be corrected by fhame, by fear, and by reproof?Greater crimes, from the dread all men would have of their extending to themselves, would naturally excite them to think of the means of prevention. They would, doubtless, congregate, and confult for the general fafety; and, in their defence, would form rules, inftitutes, or civil laws, by the energy of which they might hope to fecure themselves from fuch enormities in future. As crimes increased, so would civil inftitutes; and fo a body politic would as naturally be produced, as any other effect in nature.'
It being here afked, whether it is not hard to conceive, how, from fo fimple an origin, fo great a diverfity of governments could arife, the Author endeavours to remove the difficulty; and then proceeds to the confideration of the original compact, with regard to which he makes a number of acute and judi cious obfervations.-Granting the exiftence of a formal or an implied compact in every ftate, what may one naturally suppose to be the foundation and object of fuch a compact ?—The abject must be general good or happiness; and if fo, the foundation must be on juftice.-It cannot otherwife be a fair compact: for if the intereft and advantage of one, or a few only, be aimed at and obtained, to the oppreffion of the reft, it is nothing lefs than deceiving and over-reaching the oppreffed party; and therefore fuch a compact must be, in its nature, void. There can be no juft political compact made contrary to the true principles of human nature; because if the foundation of fuch compact must be on justice, the determinations of justice must be regulated by thefe principles. Men, from a fenfe of the excellence of these principles, being moved with a defire of preterving them as pure as poffible, firft formed civil polities.-No compact can, therefore, be fuppofed of any force or validity, which would oblige men, in any manner not confonant to these principles. And thus we find the juft measure of every formal or implied political compact to be the true principles or laws of human nature.
But it has been ufual to view this matter in another light, in which it is prefumed that a people can ftipulate away the rights and privileges of their nature, in favour of their prince,
or rulers ;-fo that the people are never supposed to have any right to abolish the authority of their governors, even if it fhould be judged abfolutely neceffary for the general welfare of the community.-To talk of a compact on fuch a foundation as this, must be efteemed, as the Writer juftly observes, an impudent mockery of the common fenfe of mankind. He endeavours, therefore, farther to explain the nature of this political compact, and to fix it in its true point of view, in the following manner :
When men firft began to difregard the impulfes or laws of their nature, and their irregularities and vices pointed out the neceflity of political-inftitutions; at the commencement of thofe inftitutions, the first probable appearances of a compact are difcovered. But here we do not perceive any appearance of a compact between parties, whofe rights, interefts, or views are diftinct or oppofite: it is rather a general union or agreement of a fociety of men, in defence of the rights of human nature. It is an agreement to fubmit to fuch inflitutes, laws, and regulations, as may be deemed adequate to the purposes of reducing men to, and of retaining them in, a proper fubjection to the laws of their nature: and the obligations of this agreement, to be juft, muft be equal on every member of the fociety. Will the advocates for unjuft authority, interrogated he, be able to derive much advantage from a compact of this fort ?
But it has been affirmed that when men enter into a political fociety, they make a formal, or a tacit, furrender of their natural rights to that fociety; and, as it were, compact or agree fo to do. The drift and tendency of this affirmation is to establish the authority of all ruling powers, juft or unjust, and to debafe and enflave mankind. But no maxim was ever more falfe, or lefs founded in nature. Men neither do, nor can mean, by entering into government, to give up any of their effential natural rights: they mean, by the aid of government, to maintain and fecure them. They do not mean to fubjugate themfelves to the will of tyrannical mafters, nor even to political laws, when diffonant and repugnant to the principles of their nature. Their intention, as well as the true end of government, is quite the contrary. For, if men had paid a punctual obedience to the laws of their nature, the inftituting of civil laws, and confequently of civil magiftrates, would have been quite unneceffary. Civil laws were inftituted to enforce obedience to the true laws of human nature. Therefore civil laws, which contradi& or are repugnant to the true laws of human nature, are not in conScience binding. And all civil laws, and all civil magiftracies, ought to be formed, altered and corrected, confirmed or abolished, according as they agree with, or are repugnant to, the true laws of human nature.'
But were we to grant, that under government some of our natural rights must neceffarily be waved for the supposed advan tage of the community at large; it must also, as our Author fhews, be allowed, at the fame time, that, in justice, no part