DE LOLME. but her people, parcelled into so many different dominions, were destined to remain subject to the arbitrary yoke of such of her different sovereigns as should be able to maintain their power and independence. In a word, the feudal tyranny which overspread the Continent did not compensate, by any preparation of distant advantages, the present calamities it caused; nor was it to leave behind it, as it disappeared, anything but a more regular kind of despotism. The spirit of liberty and re sistance arose in England on the dissolution of the feudal system. But in England, the same feudal system, after having suddenly broken in like a flood, had deposited, and still continued to deposit, the noble seeds of the spirit of liberty, union, and sober resistance. So early as the time of Edward, the tide was seen gradually to subside: the laws which protect the person and property of the individual began to make their appearance; that admirable constitution, the result of a threefold power, insensibly arose*; and the eye might even then discover the verdant summits of that fortunate region that was destined to be the seat of philosophy and liberty, which are inseparable companions. "Now, in my opinion," says Philippe de Comines, in times not much posterior to those of Edward I., and with the simplicity of the language of his times," among all the sovereignties I know in the world, that in which the public good is best attended to, and the least violence exercised on the people, is that of England.”—Mémoires de Comines, liv. v. chap. xviii. CHAPTER III. The Subject continued. THE representatives of the nation, and of the whole nation, were now admitted into parliament: the great point therefore was gained, that was one day to procure them the great influence which they at present possess; and the subsequent reigns afford continual instances of its successive growth. DE LOLME. Representatives admitted into of the nation parliament. Edward II. Under Edward II.', the commons began to annex petitions to the bills by which they granted subsidies: nexed to subsidy this was the dawn of their legislative authority. bills. not Commons de not Edward III. clare they will not acknowledge Under Edward III., they declared they would in future acknowledge any law to which they had expressly assented'. Soon after this, they exerted a privilege, in which consists, at this time, one of the great balances of the constitution: they impeached*, and procured to be condemned, some of the first ministers of state. Under Henry IV.', they refused to grant subsidies before an answer had been given to their petitions. In a word, every event any consequence was attended with an increase of the power of the commons ;-increases indeed but slow and gradual, but which were peaceably and legally effected, and were the more fit to engage the attention of the people, and coalesce with the ancient principles of the constitution. of any law, unless sented to it. they have as Under Henry V., the nation was entirely taken up Henry V. with its wars against France; and in the reign of 1 Vide ante, 102-110. 4 Ibid. 117. Ibid. 117-121. 3 Ibid. 119. 5 Ibid. 129-137. 6 Ibid. 138, 139. Henry VI. DE LOLME. Henry VI.' began the fatal contests between the Houses of York and Lancaster. The noise of arms alone was now to be heard; during the silence of the laws already in being, no thought was had of enacting new ones and for thirty years together England presents a wide scene of slaughter and desolation. Country desolated by faction. Henry VII. had promises to fulfil, as well as injuries to avenge. History of the princes resemble the relation of Tiberius and the Roman senate. At length, under Henry VII., who, by his intermarriage with the House of York, united the pretensions of the two families, a general peace was reestablished, and the prospect of happier days seemed to open on the nation. But the long and violent agitation under which it had laboured, was to be followed by a long and painful recovery. Henry, mounting the throne with sword in hand, and in great measure as a conqueror, had promises to fulfil, as well as injuries to avenge. In the mean time, the people, wearied out by the calamities they had undergone, and longing only for repose, abhorred even the idea of resistance; so that the remains of an almost exterminated nobility beheld themselves left defenceless and abandoned to the mercy of the sovereign. The commons, on the other hand, accustomed to act only a second part in public affairs, and finding themselves bereft of those who had hitherto been their leaders, were more than ever afraid to form, of themselves, an opposition. Placed immediately, as well as the lords, under the eye of the king, they beheld themselves exposed to the same dangers. Like them, therefore, they purchased their personal security at the expense of public liberty; and in reading the history of the first two kings of the House of Tudor, we imagine ourselves reading the relation given by Tacitus of Tiberius and the Roman senate*. Quanto quis illustrior, tanto magis falsi ac festinantes. The time, therefore, seemed to be arrived, at which DE LOLME. England must submit, in its turn, to the fate of the other nations of Europe. All those barriers which it had raised for the defence of its liberty, seemed to have only been able to postpone the inevitable effects of power. But the remembrance of their ancient laws, of that great charter so often and so solemnly confirmed, was too deeply impressed on the minds of the English to be effaced by transitory evils. Like a deep and extensive ocean, which preserves an equability of temperature amidst all the vicissitudes of seasons, England still retained those principles of liberty which were so universally diffused through all orders of the people; and they required only a proper opportunity to manifest themselves. England, besides, still continued to possess the immense advantage of being one undivided state. Had it been, like France, divided into several distinct dominions, it would also have had several national assemblies. These assemblies, being convened at different times and places, for this and other reasons, never could have acted in concert; and the power of withholding subsidies, a power so important when it is that of disabling the sovereign, and binding him down to inaction, would then have only been the destructive privilege of irritating a master who would have easily found means to obtain supplies from other quarters. The different parliaments, or assemblies of these several states, having thenceforth no means of recommending themselves to their sovereign, but their forwardness in complying with his demands, would have vied with each other in granting what it would not only have been fruitless, but even highly dangerous, to refuse. The king would not have failed soon to demand, as a tribute, a gift he must have been confi The franchises contained in Magna Charta transitory evils. were ineffaced by The advantage of England being one undivided state. |