DE LOLME. dent to obtain; and the outward forms of consent would have been left to the people only as additional means of oppressing them without danger. Parliament always vindi cated the right of granting or refusing subsidies. Edward VI. Abolition of the But the King of England continued, even in the time of the Tudors, to have but one assembly before which he could lay his wants and apply for relief. How great soever the increase of his power was, a single parliament alone could furnish him with the means of exercising it; and whether it was that the members of this parliament entertained a deep sense of their advantages, or whether private interest exerted itself in aid of patriotism, they at all times vindicated the right of granting, or rather refusing, subsidies; and amidst the general wreck of everything they ought to have held dear, they at least clung obstinately to the plank which was destined to prove the instrument of their preservation. Under Edward VI.', the absurd tyrannical laws tyrannical laws against high treason" (instituted under Henry VIII.) against high treason. Mary, Elizabeth. The courts of Star Chamber and High Commission. were abolished. But this young and virtuous prince having soon passed away, the blood-thirsty Mary" astonished the world with cruelties, which nothing but the fanaticism of a part of her subjects could have enabled her to execute. 12 Under the long and brilliant reign of Elizabeth 12, England began to breathe anew: and the Protestant religion, being seated once more on the throne, brought with it some more freedom and toleration 13. The Star Chamber", that effectual instrument of the tyranny of the two Henries, yet continued to subsist: the inquisitorial tribunal of the high commission 15 was even instituted; and the yoke of arbitrary power lay still heavy on the subject. But the general affec 9 Vide ante, 208-252. 10 Ibid. 209, 210. 12 Ibid. 262-311. 14 Ibid. 151, 264. 15 Ibid. 294-296. tion of the people for a queen, whose former misfortunes DE LOLME. had created such a general concern, the imminent dangers which England escaped, and the extreme glory attending that reign, lessened the sense of such exertions of authority as would, in these days, appear the height of tyranny, and served at that time to justify, as they still do to excuse, a princess whose great talents, though not her principles of government, render her worthy of being ranked among the greatest sovereigns. Under the sway of the Stuarts, the nation began to recover from its long lethargy. James I.", a prince James L. rather imprudent than tyrannical, drew back the veil which had hitherto disguised so many usurpations, and made an ostentatious display of what his predecessors had been contented to enjoy. He was incessantly asserting, that the authority of kings was not to be controlled any more than that of God himself. Like Him, they were omnipotent; and those privileges to which the people so clamorously laid claim as their inheritance and birthright, were no more than an effect of the grace and toleration of his royal ancestors*17. Those principles, hitherto only silently adopted in the cabinet, and in the courts of justice, had maintained their ground in consequence of this very obscurity. Being now announced from the throne, and resounded from the pulpit, they spread an universal alarm 18. Commerce, besides, with its attendant arts, and, above all, that of printing, diffused more salutary notions throughout all orders of the people; a new light began to rise upon the nation; and the spirit of * See his declarations made in parliament, in the years 1610 and 1621. The doctrine of the uncon trolkings,diffused an lable authority of universal alarm. Printing, dissenotions through minated salutary out all orders of the people. 16 Vide ante, 312-366. 17 Ibid. 321-334, 350-353. 18 Ibid. 321-323. VOL. II. 3 DE LOLME. opposition frequently displayed itself in this reign, to which the English monarchs had not, for a long time past, been accustomed. Charles I. Notions of reli the love of liberty. But the storm, which was only gathering in clouds, during the reign of James, began to mutter under Charles I.; and the scene which opened to view, on the accession of that prince, presented the most formidable aspect. The notions of religion, by a singular concurrence, gion united with united with the love of liberty; the same spirit which had made an attack on the established faith, now directed itself to politics: the royal prerogatives were brought under the same examination as the doctrines of the Church of Rome had been submitted to; and as a superstitious religion had proved unable to support the test, so neither could an authority, pretending to be unlimited, be expected to bear it. The commons, sensible of their own strength, determined to repress that of the crown. The commons, on the other hand, were recovering from the astonishment into which the extinction of the power of the nobles had, at first, thrown them. Taking a view of the state of the nation, and of their own, they became sensible of their whole strength: they determined to make use of it, and to repress a power which seemed, for so long a time, to have levelled every barrier. Finding among themselves men of the greatest capacity, they undertook that important task with method, and by constitutional means; and thus had Charles to cope with a whole nation put in motion and directed by an assembly of statesmen. And here we must observe how different were the effects produced in England, by the annihilation of the power of the nobility, from those which the same event had produced in France. In France, where, in consequence of the division of the people, and of the exorbitant power of the DE LOLME. nobles, the people were accounted nothing,-when the nobles themselves were suppressed, the work was completed. the union of the preserved from people. In England, on the contrary, where the nobles had Public liberty ever vindicated the rights of the people equally with their own,-in England, where the people had successively acquired most effectual means of influencing the motions of the government, and, above all, were undivided,-when the nobles themselves were cast to the ground, the body of the people stood firm, and maintained the public liberty. The unfortunate Charles, however, was totally ignorant of the dangers which surrounded him. Seduced by the example of the other sovereigns of Europe, he was not aware how different, in reality, his situation was from theirs: he had the imprudence to exert, with rigour, an authority which he had no ultimate resources to support; an union was at last effected in the nation; and he saw his enervated prerogatives dissipated with a breath*, By the famous act, called the Petition * It might here be objected, that when, under Charles I., the regal power was obliged to submit to the power of the people, the king possessed other dominions besides England, viz., Scotland and Ireland, and, therefore, seemed to enjoy the same advantage as the kings of France, that of reigning over a divided empire or nation. But to this it is to be answered, that, at the time we mention, Ireland, scarcely civilized, only increased the necessities, and, consequently, the dependance of the king; while Scotland, through the conjunction of peculiar circumstances, had thrown off her obedience. And though those two states, even at present, bear no proportion to the compact body of the kingdom of England, and seem never to have been able, by their union with it, to procure to the king any dangerous resources, yet the circumstances which took place in both, at the time of the Revolution, or since, sufficiently prove that it was no unfavourable circumstance to English liberty, that the great crisis of the reign of Charles I., and the advance which the Constitution was to make at that time, should precede the period at which the king of England might have been able to call in the assistance of two other kingdoms. Charles I. ignogers with which rant of the dan he was sur rounded. T Petition of Constitution freed from the DE LOIME. of Right", and a posterior act, to both which he assented, the compulsory loans and taxes, disguised under the name of benevolences, were declared to be contrary to law"; arbitrary imprisonments, and the exercise of martial law, were abolished"; the court of high commission", and the Star Chamber", were suppressed*; and the constitution, freed from the appadespotic powers, ratus of despotic powers with which the Tudors had obscured it, was restored to its ancient lustre. Happy had been the people, if their leaders, after having executed so noble a work, had contented themselves with the glory of being the benefactors of their country. Happy had been the king, if, obliged at last to submit, his submission had been sincere, and if he had become sufficiently sensible that the only resource he had left was the affection of his subjects. with which it had been obscured by the Tudors. But Charles knew not how to survive the loss of a power he had conceived to be indisputable: he could not reconcile himself to limitations and restraints, so injurious, according to his notions, to sovereign authority. His discourse and conduct betrayed his secret designs; distrust took possession of the nation; certain ambitious persons availed themselves of it to promote their own views; and the storm, which seemed to have blown over, burst forth anew. The contending fanaticism of persecuting sects" joined in the conflict tween the crown between regal haughtiness and the ambition of individuals; the tempest blew from every point of the The fanaticism of persecuting sects, joined in the disputes be and the people. * The Star Chamber differed from all the other courts of law in this: the latter were governed only by the common law, or immemorial customs, and acts of parliament; whereas the former often admitted for law the procla mations of the king and council, and grounded its judgments upon them. The abolition of this tribunal, therefore, was justly looked upon as a great victory over regal authority. 22 Ibid. 329, 393. 24 Ibid. 393. 25 Ibid. 382-385, 393. 21 Vide ante, 377, 393-395. 26 Ibid. 390, 396-400, 407-409. |