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Buddha dominate all processes of becoming. The latter, however, recognizes Nirvana, a state of pure Being into which the law of Karma does not enter. Fragment 20 (Heraclitus) runs, "This world always was and is and will be an ever-living fire, kindled and quenched according to law."

Buddhism, contrary to the doctrine of Krishna, does not at all depend upon the individuality of its founder, though I feel certain that the Buddhist is more influenced by the character of his teacher than is the follower of Krishna by that of his God. In fact, it is to be hoped that this is so, for Krishna is typical of the highly exalted, infinitely powerful personal God, that should be, and in Krishna's case is, beyond all good and evil, though including them both. Krishna acted in perfect accord with his doctrine as viewed from an intellectual and intuitional standpoint. Those people who are capable of interpreting his doctrine in these lights understand that nothing he does is to be taken as a measure of his character or nature. But do not those who are limited to an emotional understanding of the doctrine have to make exceptions for Krishna? And is it logical to expect that they can rightly comprehend the infinite nature of the God, and also their own limited nature that requires them to act rightly until they have at last merged themselves in him? Krishna says himself (Gita 3:21), "Whatever the best man does, that also the other people do. Whatever example he sets the world follows after." After saying this and realizing its full significance, it seems a slight flaw in his otherwise most practical doctrine that his own conduct was not altogether exemplary.

If the founder of any religion wishes that religion to be really practical, he should be perfect in conduct. The Buddha as well as Krishna had passed beyond good and evil and all the other pairs of opposites, but he did not proclaim the fact by transgressing any of the laws

of conduct that would apply to ordinary mankind, but by rigid conformity to them.

The Buddha lays claim, of course, to no sort of divinity, for divinity does not exist except in a relative sense. Anyone may become a god if he try long and hard enough. Through good works and right contemplation he may attain to a term of life in some of the bright spheres, and if he does so, men on earth will call him a god. But there is no particular virtue in becoming a god. Man's true aim in life is to get rid of every sort of becoming, that is, to attain Nirvana. But since man is attached to this stream of becoming because he believes that there is some abiding principle that takes on different forms, the greatest obstacle to the attainment of Nirvana is just this idea of a soul. So the Buddha proceeds in true scientific fashion to inquire closely into what is meant by a soul in order to prove that it is not a permanent entity.

Almost every other religion admits that there is some sort of abiding spiritual principle. It may or may not have had a temporal beginning, but the one attribute that is agreed upon is its everlasting life. Beyond that it is true that the properties of the soul are only very vaguely conceived.

3

The Buddha's denial of the true existence of the soul is almost precisely like Locke's denial of the true existence of secondary qualities. "Just as the word 'chariot' is but a mode of expression for axle, wheels, chariotbody, pole, and other constituent members placed in a certain relation to each other, but when we come to examine the members one by one, we discover that in the absolute sense there is no chariot-in exactly the same way the words 'living entity' and 'ego' are but a mode of expression for the presence of the five attachment groups, but when we come to examine the elements of being one by one, we discover that in the absolute

3 Warren, Buddhism in Translations, 133.

sense there is no living entity there to form a basis for such figments as 'I am' or 'I'; in other words that in the absolute sense there is only name and form.”

Man gets his idea of an ego from watching other beings and objects working in such a way as to seem to be directed by an ego. If he analyzes himself carefully he will find that this idea of an ego proceeds merely from certain experiences of his. There is really no necessity for an ego, for the constituents of Being-form, sensation, perception, the predispositions and consciousnessaccount for all the activities that may be assigned to an ego.

If Locke had wanted to disprove the existence of the self, his procedure would have been precisely the same. He would have said that the idea of the existence of an ego was what most men called an innate idea. But in reality there are no such things, for an idea is never innate, but always comes from watching material objects in action and from cogitating and drawing conclusions from what we experience through any of our faculties. The idea of an ego is just such an idea and has no existence except in the mind of man. It is simply another secondary quality like color or justice.

Again, Hume's view of the soul is quite Buddhistic. In "A Treatise of Human Nature," Section VI, he says, "For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure." The rest of mankind "is nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement."

Compare this with the definition of the self given in a discourse between King Milinda and Bhante Nagasena. Nagasena says that the flame of a lighted lamp does not remain the same flame throughout the night, 4 Buddhism in Translations, 148-149.

but that it consists of a succession of flames, each arising from the one preceding it. Hence "through connection with the first light was there light all night." He goes on to say, "In exactly the same way do the elements of being join one another in serial succession: one element perishes, another rises, succeeding each other as it were instantaneously. Therefore neither as the same, nor as a different person do you arrive at your latest aggregation of consciousness."

Farther on King Milinda asks, "Is form Nagasena? Sensation? Perception? The predispositions? Consciousness?"

"Nay, verily, your majesty."

"Is it, then, bhante, something besides form, sensation, perception, the predispositions and consciousness, which is Nagasena?"

"Nay, verily, your majesty."

Just as a butcher after he has slaughtered a cow and cut it to pieces no longer thinks of it as a cow, but as meat, so one who has analyzed his own body according to the elements of which it is composed ceases to think of it as an ego, and considers it only as an aggregation of elements.

Now when one is speaking of a person doing anything, he finds it inconvenient to say, "The form, sensation, perception, predispositions and consciousness which we know as John went for a walk." It is far easier to say, 'John went for a walk," and to understand by "John" not an entity, but a certain combination of these elements. So man, like a householder, has taken this idea of an ego into his household as a servant. It has not remained his servant, though, and instead of being merely useful to him and affording him short cuts in speech, thought and action, it has become his comrade and equal, whom he finally seeks to please. Since the idea of an ego is essentially evil, hindering the attainment of Nirvana, it must sooner or later lead to the downfall of anyone who persistently caters to it.

It is natural for man to search continually for unchanging entities. He finds himself changing unceasingly, the body slowly, the mind, emotions, and consciousness very quickly at times. Each one of the infinite number of changes brings pain. After many years have passed, the eternal flux palls upon man, and he wishes that either there should be nothing but change, so that his poor, weather-beaten ego might be annihilated at death, or else that there should be some permanent entity guiding him which is never annihilated. Both such theories are extreme. In believing the first, man gives himself over to sensual pleasures, believing these to be true happiness without any evil after-effects, since there is no ego to which these last may fasten themselves. In believing the second, man adopts some sort of "fanatical conduct" to purify his ego.

But one who is conversant with the "Noble Doctrine" never subscribes to the heresy that the ego either possesses or is comprised in form, sensation, perception, the predispositions, or consciousness, for he realizes that all these are transitory, evil, and due to causes. To be really desirable an ego must be permanent, inherently either good or transcending both good and evil, and selfexistent. The understanding of the ego as merely an aggregation of evil, unstable elements, depending upon causes and subject to dissolution, precludes the possibility of attachment to anything pertaining to the ego.

In the Gita if the soul or ego were denied, the whole system of philosophy, ethics, and religion would tumble down like a house of bricks without mortar, as would nearly every other religion of any practical value. It is truly remarkable that any doctrine of life which has been so successful as Buddhism in point of adherents, true religious enthusiasm, and high practical moral standards should have for its main thesis a denial of what, for almost every other religion, seems a necessary requirement for true religious feeling, ethics, and even life itself.

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