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QUESTIONS REGARDING THE LENTEN FAST.

THE following Letter has been received from a Corres

pondent:

"To the Editor of the IRISH ECCLESIASTICAL RECORD. "REV. DEAR SIR,

"May I trouble you with a few questions on a subject which appears to me of much practical importance, especially now when Lent is approaching. There seems to be a rather wide-spread and still-extending laxity in practice with regard to the observance of Fasting and Abstinence, particularly in the higher classes. It can scarcely have escaped the notice of many priests to find very many of those who pass as practical Catholics not observing even abstinence on Fridays. Few, if indeed any, of those persons, I am confident, undertake to dispense themselves. In almost every instance, no doubt, they act upon the authority of a physician. Now, after giving the theological point with regard to the monitio poenitentis laborantis ignorantia circa aliquam obligationem, due consideration-(1) Are such leaves from physicians to be let pass unchallenged by the pastor or the confessor? (2) Should not the subject be re-considered at certain intervals, say at the commencement of each Lent, to ascertain if the cause for the dispensation may not have ceased; (3) Is it not to be urged, at least (if not enjoined), on those lawfully dispensed, in order to guard against grave scandal, that they should use their privilege as much as possible in private; and, consequently, that they should not dine at public table d'hôtes, nor accept invitations to dinner on days of abstinence; (4) When a Catholic entertains a Protestant on a day of abstinence, can he, without sin, provide him with meat?

"I remain, Dear Rev. Sir,

"Yours faithfully,

"MISSIONARY PRIEST."

In connection with this letter, we may take that of another esteemed correspondent, who writes as follows:

"In theological treatises on Fasting, a number of excusing causes are set forth as sufficient to exempt the faithful from the observance of the law: among these, of course, are mentioned dispensations granted by competent ecclesiastical authority, and also, as a totally distinct ground of exemption,

illness or bodily infirmity, and the like. See, for instance, GURY, De Fejunio, chapter second.

"Now, dispensations are not granted except when some sufficient cause exists, such, for instance, as illness; indeed, it is usually set forth in the Lenten Regulations of each diocese, that dispensations granted by parish priests and others in cases where no sufficient cause exists, are of no avail.

"How can this be reconciled with the theological statement which I have quoted above? The theologians, unless, indeed, their language be strangely misleading, decidedly teach that dispensation and illness, or the like, are totally distinct and independent grounds of exemption. Does not this imply that even in the absence of such causes as illness, a dispensation may be granted? And does it not also imply, that where such excusing causes exist, a dispensation is nothing more than a useless formality?"

I shall, in the first place, deal with the question raised in this second letter.

The writer of it is unquestionably correct in stating that according to the teaching of all writers on the subject, persons may be exempted from the obligation of Fasting in either of the two ways which he has indicated. But there is no inconsistency between this unanimous teaching of the theologians and the local regulations referred to. Both are in full harmony with the principles which regulate all matters of ecclesiastical obligation, and which are laid down in the Treatise De Legibus, in the sections, respectively, on Epieikeia and on Dispensations.

By the former of these terms-it is hardly necessary to explain-theologians and canonists designate the principle of equity, by which the rigour of strict law is tempered in certain cases, so as to exempt these from the obligation of a law within the terms of which they are comprised.1 The word, as is obvious, is of Greek origin: the theological acceptation of it is strictly in accordance with its etymology, and also with its ancient usage, for, as Suarez observes in his Treatise on Laws, the word is used by Aristotle in a precisely similar signification.3

The basis of this equitable principle of interpretation is twofold. In the first place the circumstances of a case may be

Epieikeia definiri solet : Benigna interpretatio, casum aliquem particularem, ob suas circumstantias, lege universaliter lata non esse comprehensum"-LAYMANN, Theol. Moral., Tract. 4 De Legibus, cap. xix. n. 2.

"ETIEίkela, Equity, as opposed to strict law."-(Aristol. Ethic, n. 5, 10-8 &c.) LIDDELL AND SCOTT, Greek-English Lexicon, in voc.

3 SUAREZ, De Legibus, Lib. 6, cap. vi. vii. passim. See also LAYMANN, loc. jam cit.

such as to place it altogether outside the authority of the legislator to include it within the obligation of his law; or secondly, they may at least be such as to furnish reasonable grounds for presuming that he did not intend to include it.1 Under both aspects, cases for the application of the principle arise where the observance of a law becomes a matter of great and special difficulty. Thus-to take the example, very appropriate to the question with which we are dealing, given by Suarez in illustration of this point-a person may, in cases of illness, be exempt by epieikeia from the observance of the ecclesiastical fast; and this not only when the illness is so severe that the ecclesiastical legislator should be regarded as altogether incompetent to impose so stringent an obligation, but also in cases of less serious illness, in which, although the Church should be regarded as fully competent to impose the obligation, it is, nevertheless, to be presumed, from the mild spirit of her legislation, that she does not intend so stringent an exercise of her authority.2

The detailed application of this principle to several laws of the Church, such, for instance, as the obligation of reciting the Divine Office, the obligations of hearing Mass and of refraining from servile work on Sundays and holidays of obligation, is to be met with in every manual of Moral Theology see, for instance, the chapters on the causae excusantes, in the treatises on those obligations in the Moral Theology of St. Alphonsus, or in Gury's Compendium. And it is in the application of this same principle to the obligation of Fasting, that the theologians, in the passages referred to by our correspondent, set down illness or bodily infirmity as one of the causes sufficient to excuse the faithful from the observance of the law.

But, outside the class of cases in which the difficulty or inconvenience of observing a law is such as thus to furnish sufficient grounds for reasonably presuming that the Church does not regard such cases as falling within its obligation, there are, as is manifest, others in which the difficulty or in

1" Constat epieikeiam.. habere locum quando alias lex in tali casu praeciperet ultra potestatem legislatoris. Addo vero ulterius habere locum epieikeiam in casu in quo non deesset potestas in legislatore ad obligandum, sed ex circumstantis judicatur non fuisse hanc mentem ejus."-SUAREZ, loc. jam cit., cap. vii., n. II.

Non semper Praelatus vult obligare cum toto suo rigore et in omni eventu in quo posset obligare; ut, verbi gratia, non solum censetur quis excusari a praecepto jejunii propter aegritudinem gravem in qua non posset superior obligare, sed etiam propter minorem debilitatem, qua non obstante potuisset Ecclesia obligare, sed nihilominus creditur ex benignitate noliusse; quae intentio' legislatoris colligi potest ex aliis circumstantiis temporis, loci et personarum, et ex ordinario modo praecipiendi cum illa moderatione subintellecta, licet non exprimatur.”— ID. ibid.

convenience, although not so great as to justify the presumption that the case is altogether exempt, is yet sufficient to influence the competent ecclesiastical authority, when applied to for the purpose, to relax the law in such a case, or, in other words, to grant a dispensation. This distinction is thus stated by Suarez :-"On the one hand the cause may be such as of itself to excuse the person from the obligation of the law, or it may be such as will justify the superior in removing the obligation."

The same distinction is made by all the theologians who touch upon this point.2 Viva's remarks in reference to it are especially appropriate for our present purpose, as, like Suarez, he begins by proposing to himself the very difficulty which has embarrassed our correspondent. "It may be objected," he says, "that even in the absence of a justifying cause, a superior is competent to dispense, inasmuch as a justifying cause being sufficient of itself to excuse the subject from the obligation of the law, the intervention of the authority of the superior seems to be needless if such a cause be present." But," he replies, "it is not so: the cause may be such as will justify the superior in granting a dispensation, though not such as of itself to exempt from the operation of the law; since a less weighty reason is sufficient in the former case than in the latter. And, consequently," he concludes, "infirmitas gravior requiritur ut aliquis excusetur a jejunio quam ut posset dispen

sari."3

Thus, it is obvious that there is no inconsistency between the statements referred to by our correspondent. Some cause, such as ill-health, or the like, is undoubtedly required, as stated in the Diocesan Regulations to which he refers, to warrant the granting of a dispensation. On the other hand, ill-health and other causes of a like nature, are, as stated by the theologians, not unfrequently sufficient, even in the absence of a dispensation, to exempt a person from the obligation of the law. But excusing causes of this nature

1" Causa potest intelligi, una per se sufficiens ad excusandum alia per se non excusans, sufficiens tamen ut possit tolli obligatio."-SUAREZ, Tract. de Legibus, Lib. 6, cap. xviii. n. 14.

Thus, for instance, Mazzotta (Theol. Moral., Tract 1, Disp. 4, Quer. 1, cap. 4) writes:-"Causa sufficiens ad dispensationem non debet esse tanta, quanta requiritur ad excusationem ; nam sine dispensatione quilibet excusatur ab obligatione legis quando causa est per se certo sufficiens ad excusandum; sic qui febri laborat non indiget ut dispensetur a jejunið: at aliquando causa, quae non est ad excusandum, est sufficiens ad dispensandum, cum ad hoc non requiratur causa tam rigorosa, quam ad illud."-(Theologia Moralis, Lib. 1, Tract. 4, cap. xxii. n. I.) And Laymann :-" Ad dispensandum minore causa opus est quam ad epikeian; quia per epikeian declaratur tantam causam adesse, ut aliquis per se legis obligatione eximatur : ad dispensandum autem requiritur causa ob quam aliquis per auctoritatem Superioris eximi possit."

VIVA, Cursus Theol. Moralis, Pars prima, De Legibus.

may be present in a greater or a less degree: and, of course, for the granting of a dispensation it is not required that the excusing cause should be of such gravity as would of itself, and in the absence of a dispensation, suffice to exempt a person from the obligation of the law.

From this explanation of the principle of Epieikeia, and of the cases in which it is applicable to the interpretation of a law, it is plain that the act by which an ecclesiastical superior, if applied to on the subject, pronounces upon the sufficiency of an excusing cause, is of a nature totally different from that by which he grants a dispensation. The former is merely an exercise of judgment: the latter is an act of jurisdiction. "Non oportet,' says Suarez, in his treatise on Religion, "confundere aequitatem seu epieikeiam cum dispensatione sunt enim actus diversarum

potestatum, et longe diversos habent effectus, et ideo merito diversis vocibus significantur. Per dispensationem enim tollitur obligatio: per [epieikeiam] non tollitur, sed declaratur non Unde dispensatio per se est actus jurisdictionis: [epieikeia] vero per se est actus scientiae seu doctrinae."

esse.

And this brings us to the question raised by "A Missionary Priest."

Bearing in mind the principles we have just now laid down, we must, before directly answering his question, distinguish between two cases which he seems to regard as one.

If the state of a person's health be such as to bring him within any of the categories enumerated by Saint Alphonsus, or by other theologians of authority, under the head of Impotentia, in the chapter De Causis a Fejunio Servando Excusantibus, the question of Dispensation does not arise at all. For, as is obvious from what has been already explained, it would in those circumstances be a case for applying the principle of Epieikeia.

But if the case be one in which the observance of the fast would not involve a grave incommodum, as described by the theologians in that chapter, the obligation cannot be removed except by a dispensation granted by an ecclesiastical superior.

It is laid down by all theologians and canonists that such dispensations can be granted not only by the supreme authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, but also by each bishop within, of course, the limits of his own diocese, and, in like manner, by each parish priest within the limits of his parish.

For, although the obligation of the ecclesiastical fast is imposed by the Common Law of the Church, it is, nevertheless, 1 SUAREZ, Tract. De Virt. Relig., Lib. 6, cap. ix., n. 3.