attention to the opinion of Sir Philip Yorke and Mr. Talbot in the year 1729, by which they pledged themselves to the British Planters for the legal confequences of bringing Negroe-flaves into this kingdom, or their being baptized;" which opinion was repeated and recognized by Lord Hardwicke, fitting as Chancellour, on the 19th of October 1749, to the following effect: He faid, "that Trover would lay for a Negroe-flave: that a notion prevailed, that if a slave came into England, or became a Chriftian, he thereby became emancipated; but there was no foundation in law for fuch a notion: that when he and Lord Talbot were Attorney and Solicitor General, this notion of a flave becoming free by being baptized prevailed fo strongly, that the planters induftrioufly prevented their becoming Christians: upon which their opinion was taken; and upon their beft confideration they were both clearly of opi nion, that a flave did not in the least alter his fituation or ftate towards his Mafter or Owner, either by being chriftened, or

coming to England: that though the statute of Charles II. had abolished tenure fo far, that no man could be a Villein regardant; yet if he would acknowledge himself a Villein engroffed in any Court of Record, he knew of no way by which he could be entitled to his freedom, without the confent of his Mafter. We feel the force of the inconveniences and confequences that will follow the decifion of this question: yet all of us are fo clearly of one opinion upon the only queftion before us, that we think we ought to give judgment without adjourning the matter to be argued before all the judges, as ufual in the Habeas Corpus, and as we at first intimated an intention of doing in this cafe. The only queftion then is, Is the caufe returned fufficient for the remanding him? If not, he must be discharged. The Caufe returned is, the flave abfented him, felf and departed from his master's service, and refused to return and ferve him during

*

his ftay in England; whereupon, by his

master's orders, he was put on board the

fhip by force, and there detained in fecure cuftody, to be carried out of the kingdom and fold. So high an act of dominion must derive its authority, if any fuch it has, from the law of the kingdom where executed. A foreigner cannot be imprisoned bere on the authority of any law exifting in his own country. The power of a master over his fervant is different in all countries, more or less limited or extenfive; the exercise of it therefore must always be regulated by the laws of the place where exercifed. The ftate of flavery is of such a nature, that it is incapable of being now introduced by Courts of Juftice upon mere reafoning, or inferences from any principles natural or political; it must take its rife from pofitive law; the origin of it can in no country or age be traced back to any other fource. Immemorial ufage preferves the memory of positive law. long after all traces of the occafion, reafon, authority, and time of its introduction, are loft; and in a Cafe

a Cafe fo odious as the condition of flaves must be, taken strictly, the power claimed by this return was never in ufe here: no master ever was allowed here to take a flave by force to be fold abroad because he had deferted from his fervice, or for any other reason whatever; we cannot say, the Caufe fet forth by this return is allowed or approved of by the laws of this kingdom, and therefore the man must be discharged."

I must confess, I have been greatly puzzled in endeavouring to reconcile this judgement with this state of it, and with my comprehenfion.

"We pay due attention to the opinion of Sir Philip York and Mr. Talbot," are the words of the Noble Lord who delivered the judgment of the Court; and yet this judgment is, in operation and effect, directly fubverfive of this opinion. Now I must take for granted that this opinion would not have been cited, especially in so affirmative a manner, if it had had nothing at all to do with the Cafe then before the

Court because fuch citation would have been unmeaning and unneceffary. This' being admitted, it follows; that the law laid down in this opinion was either the law of the Cafe, or it was not. If it were the law of the Cafe, the judgment would have been governed by that law, and confequently contrary to what it is. If it were not the law of the Cafe, in order to fhew what the law is, and that the law and the judgment might correspond with each other, as caufe and effect, it would feem, ex neceffitate rei, that the doctrine advanced in this opinion fhould have been fet afide by the fuperior force of legal argumentation and authority. But the reasoning upon the judgment ftands thus: In the Premifes this opinion is cited as authority; then, without any middle term denying that authority, the conclufion is, by the judgment, that it is no authority at all. Under these problematical circumstances the only folution