arrival of Gen. Reno, with 8,000 men from the forces of Gen. Burnside (Ninth Corps), which had arrived at Falmouth. The army was then advanced, taking a favorable position, with its right, under Sigel, resting on Robertson's river; the center, under McDowell, occupying both flanks of Cedar mountain, and the left, under Reno, taking position near Raccoon Ford, covering the road thence to Stevensburg and Culpepper Court House. The cavalry, meanwhile, continued to operate on the communications of the enemy, who was receiving heavy reënforcements from Richmond. A cavalry expedition sent toward Louisa Court House, on the 16th, captured the Adjutant General of Stuart, and, among other papers, an autograph letter from Gen. Robert E. Lee to the latter, showing the plans of the enemy to mass an overwhelming force in Pope's front, and to fall upon him before he could be reënforced from the Army of the Potomac. Despairing of such assistance in holding his present strong position, Pope made the best dispositions in his power for withdrawing behind the Rappahannock, which movement was executed with great skill and expedition, on the night of the 18th, and during the day of the 19th.

It now becomes necessary to return to the Army of the Potomac, the presence and coöperation of which had become so essential to success at this critical juncture.

!

During the first days of July, Gen. McClellan had been endeavoring to render his new position as secure as possible. It was early manifest that a withdrawal of his force, to aid in the operations before Washington, did not accord with his individual views. To the last, he was extremely loath to abandon the Peninsula. On the 4th of July, McClellan had said, in a dispatch to the President: "Our communications by the James river are not secure. There are points where the enemy can establish themselves with cannon or musketry and command the river, and where it is not certain that our gunboats can drive them out." At the same date, before receiving the dispatch just quoted from, the President, still anxious in regard to the preservation of McClellan's remaining force, and without having definitely determined on the course to be pursued with regard to it, wrote him as follows:

WAR DEPARTMENT,

WASHINGTON CITY, D. C., July 4, 1862.

}

I understand your position as stated in your letter, and by Gen. Marcy. To re-enforce you so as to enable you to resume the offensive within a month, or even six weeks, is impossible. In addition to that arrived and now arriving from the Potomac, (about ten thousand men, I suppose), and about ten thousand I hope you will have from Burnside very soon, and about five thousand from Hunter a little later, I do not see how I can send you another man within a month. Under these circumstances, the defensive, for the present, must be your only care. Save the army, first, where you are, if you can, and, secondly, by removal, if you must. You, on the ground, must be the judge as to which you will attempt, and of the means for effecting it. I but give it as my opinion, that with the aid of the gunboats and the re-enforcements mentioned above, you can hold your present position; provided, and so long as you can keep the James river open below you. If you are not tolerably confident you can keep the James river open, you had better remove as soon as possible. I do not remember that you have expressed any apprehension as to the danger of having your communications cut on the river below you, yet I do not suppose it can have escaped your attention.

Yours, very truly,

Maj.-Gen. MCCLELLAN.

A. LINCOLN.

P. 8.-If at any time you feel able to take the offensive, you are not restrained from doing so.

A. L.

McClellan replied, on the 7th: "My position is very strong, and daily becoming more so. If not attacked to-day, I shall laugh at them. I have been anxious about my communications. Alarm yourself as little as possible about me, and don't lose confidence in this army." At the same date, he wrote a long letter to the President, volunteering a statement of his "general views concerning the existing state of the rebellion." He reminds Mr. Lincoln that "the Rebel army is in the front, with the purpose of overwhelming us by attacking our positions or reducing us by blocking our river communications." He "can not but regard" his "condition as critical." The singularity of one sitting down, under such circumstances, to write a political disquisition, as if he were the veriest gentleman of leisure, is more striking than any thing

in the document itself. Two or three paragraphs in this letter (dated July 7, 1862, and published at length in the writer's last official report) will serve to show its quality:

Our cause must never be abandoned; it is the cause of free institutions and self-government. The Constitution and the Union must be preserved, whatever may be the cost in time, treasure, and blood. If secession is successful, other dissolutions are clearly to be seen in the future. Let neither military disaster, political faction, nor foreign war shake your settled purpose to enforce the equal operation of the laws of the United States upon the people of every State. The time has come when the Government must determine upon a civil and military policy, covering the whole ground of our National trouble.

This rebellion has assumed the character of a war; as such it should be regarded, and it should be conducted upon the highest principles known to Christian civilization. It should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the people of any State, in any event. It should not be at all a war upon population, but against armed forces and political organizations. Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organization of States, or forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for a moment.

Unless the principles governing the future conduct of our struggle shall be made known and approved, the effort to obtain requisite forces will be almost hopeless. A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies. The policy of the Government must be supported by concentrations of military power. The National forces should not be dispersed in expeditions, posts, of occupation, and numerous armies, but should be mainly collected into masses, and brought to bear upon the armies of the Confederate States. Those armies thoroughly defeated, the political structure which they support would soon cease to exist.

From time to time, Gen. McClellan continued to urge the policy of preparing his army to advance on Richmond from its present position. He called for reënforcements, asking a concentration under his command of "every thing we can possibly spare from less important points, to make sure of crushing the enemy at Richmond, which seems clearly to be the most important point in rebeldom." The President visited Harrison's Landing on the 8th of July, and in company with the Com

manding General, reviewed the Army of the Potomac. For an entire month, scarcely so much as a reconnoissance in force occurred to break the monotony of life in that unhealthy locality. On the 30th, Gen. Halleck suggested that the enemy at Richmond be pressed, to ascertain the strength of his force. there. Finally, on the 4th of August, one day after being ordered to prepare for a prompt withdrawal to Acquia Creek, the divisions of Hooker and Sedgwick, by order of Gen. McClellan, advanced and turned Malvern Hill, causing the Rebel force which had occupied that position to retreat toward Richmond. Col. Averill, on the evening of the 5th, returned from a cavalry reconnoissance in the direction of Savage's Station, and McClellan announced: "Our troops have advanced twelve miles in one direction, and seventeen in another, toward Richmond to-day." Meanwhile, he had commenced sending off his sick and disabled soldiers, as directed by Gen. Halleck, on the 30th of July-the order being repeated, with emphasis, on the 2d of August. On the 6th, he was ordered to send, "immediately," a regiment of cavalry and several batteries of artillery to Burnside's command at Acquia Creek. Instead of promptly complying with this order, Gen. McClellan returned a dispatch offering reasons for non-compliance, and promising to "obey the order as soon as circumstances permit." It was partly complied with a day or two later.

From the 3d of August, when he was directed to take "immediate measures" for withdrawing his army from the Peninsula, Gen. McClellan earnestly resisted this order, until, on the 6th, he was definitively informed: "The order will not be rescinded, and you will be expected to execute it with all possible promptness." Gen. Halleck, who had not determined on this course, until he had visited Gen. McClellan in camp, respectfully considered the views presented against it, and wrote him at length, assigning the following, among other reasons, for the policy adopted:

You and your officers at our interview estimated the enemy's forces in and around Richmond at 200,000 men. Since then, you and others report that they have received, and are receiving, large re-enforcements from the South. Gen. Pope's army,

covering Washington, is only about 40,000. Your effective force is only about 90,000. You are thirty miles from Richmond, and Gen. Pope, eighty or ninety, with the enemy directly between you, ready to fall with his superior numbers upon one or the other, as he may elect; neither can re-enforce the other in case of such an attack.

If Gen. Pope's army be diminished to re-enforce you, Washington, Maryland and Pennsylvania would be left uncovered and exposed. If your force be reduced to strengthen Pope, you would be too weak to even hold the position you now occupy, should the enemy turn round and attack you in full force. In other words, the old Army of the Potomac is split into two parts, with the entire force of the enemy directly between them. They can not be united by land without exposing both to destruction, and yet they must be united. To send Pope's forces by water to the Peninsula is, under present circumstances, a military impossibility. The only alternative is to send the forces on the Peninsula to some point by water, say Fredericksburg, where the two armies can be united.

* *

But you will reply, why not re-enforce me here, so that I can strike Richmond from my present position? To do this, you said, at our interview, that you required 30,000 additional troops. I told you that it was impossible to give you so many. You finally thought you would have some chance of success with 20,000. But you afterward telegraphed me that you would require 35,000, as the enemy was being largely reenforced.

If your estimate of the enemy's strength was correct, your requisition was perfectly reasonable; but it was utterly impossible to fill it until new troops could be enlisted and organized, which would require several weeks.

To keep your army in its present position until it could be so re-enforced, would almost destroy it in that climate.

The months of August and September are almost fatal to whites who live on that part of James river; and even after you received the re-enforcements asked for, you admitted that you must reduce Fort Darling and the river batteries before you could advance on Richmond.

It is by no means certain that the reduction of these fortifications would not require considerable time-perhaps as much as those at Yorktown.

This delay might not only be fatal to the health of your army, but in the mean time Gen. Pope's forces would be exposed to the heavy blows of the enemy without the slightest hope of assistance from you.

In regard to the demoralizing effect of a withdrawal from