our idea of inheritance? And how does the fettlement of the crown in the Brunswick line derived from James the first, come to legalize our monarchy, rather than that of any of the neighbouring countries? At fome time or other, to be fure, all the beginners of dynasties were chofen by those who called them to govern. There is ground enough for the opinion that all the kingdoms of Europe were at a remote period, elective, with more or fewer limitations in the objects of choice; but whatever kings might have been here or elfewhere, a thousand years ago, or in whatever manner the ruling dynasties of England or France may have begun, the king of Great Britain is at this day king by a fixed rule of fucceffion, according to the laws of his country: and whilft the legal conditions of the contpact of fovereignty are performed by him (as they are performed) he holds his crown in contempt of the choice of the revolu tion fociety, who have not a fingle vote for a king amongst them, either individually or collectively; though I make no doubt they would foon erect themselves into an electoral college, if things were ripe to give effect to their claim. His majesty's heirs and fucceffors, each in his time and order, will come to the crown with the fame contempt of their choice with which his majefty has fucceeded to that he wears.

Whatever may be the fuccefs of evafion, in explaining

plaining away the grofs errour of fact, which fupposes that his majefty (though he holds it in con currence with the wishes) owes his crown to the choice of his people, yet nothing can evade their full explicit declaration, concerning the principle of a right in the people to choofe,, which right is directly maintained, and tenaciously adhered to. All the oblique infinuations concerning election bottom in this proposition, and are referable to it. Left the foundation of the king's exclusive legal title fhould pafs for a mere rant of adulatory freedom, the political divine proceeds dogmatically to affert,* that by the principles of the revolution the people of England have acquired three fundamental rights, all of which, with him, compofe one fyftem, and lie together in one fhort fentence; namely, that we have acquired a right

I.

2.

"To choose our own governours."

"To cafhier them for misconduct."

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3. "To frame a government for ourselves." This new, and hitherto unheard-of bill of rights, though made in the name of the whole people, belongs to those gentlemen and their faction only. The body of the people of England have no share in it. They utterly difclaim it. They will refift the practical affertion of it with their lives and

* P. 34, Difcourfe on the Love of our Country, by Dr. Price. fortunes.

VOL. V.

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fortunes. They are bound to do fo by the laws of their country, made at the time of that very revolution, which is appealed to in favour of the fictitious rights claimed by the fociety which abuses its name.

These gentlemen of the Old Jewry, in all their reasonings on the revolution of 1688, have a revolution which happened in England about forty years before, and the late French revolution, fo much before their eyes, and in their hearts, that they are conftantly confounding all the three together. It is neceffary that we should separate what they confound. We muft recall their erring fancies to the acts of the revolution which we revere, for the discovery of its true principles. If the principles of the revolution of 1688 are any where to be found, it is in the ftatute called the Declaration of Right. In that moft wife, fober, and confiderate declaration, drawn up by great lawyers and great statesmen, and not by warm and inexperienced enthufiafts, not one word is faid, nor one fuggeftion made, of a general right" to choose "our own governours; to cafhier them for miscon“duct; and to form a government for ourselves."

This declaration of right (the act of the 1ft of William and Mary, feff. 2. ch. 2.) is the cornerftone of our conftitution, as reinforced, explained, improved, and in its fundamental principles for

eyer.

ever fettled. It is called "An act for declaring "the rights and liberties of the fubject, and for "fettling the fucceffion of the crown." You will obferve, that these rights and this fucceffion are declared in one body, and bound indiffolubly together.

A few years after this period, a fecond opportunity offered for afferting a right of election to the crown. On the profpect of a total failure of iffue from king William, and from the Princefs, afterwards Queen Anne, the confideration of the settlement of the crown, and of a further fecurity for the liberties of the people, again came before the legiflature. Did they this second time make any provifion for legalifing the crown on the fpurious revolution principles of the Old Jewry? No. They followed the principles which prevailed in the declaration of right; indicating with more precision the perfons who were to inherit in the proteftant line. This act alfo incorporated, by the fame policy, our liberties, and an hereditary fucceffion in the fame act. Inftead of a right to choose our own governours, they declared that the fucceffion in that line (the proteftant line drawn from James the firft) was abfolutely neceffary "for "the peace, quiet, and fecurity of the realm," and that it was equally urgent on them " to main“tain a certainty in the fucceffion thereof, to which "the fubjects may fafely have recourfe for their 66 pro

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"protection." Both thefe acts, in which are heard the unerring, unambiguous oracles of revolution policy, inftead of countenancing the delufive, gipfey predictions of a "right to choose our gover"nours," prove to a demonftration how totally adverse the wisdom of the nation was from turning a case of neceffity into a rule of law.

Unquestionably there was at the revolution, in the perfon of king William, a small and a tempo+ rary deviation from the ftrict order of a regular hereditary fucceffion; but it is against all genuine principles of jurifprudence to draw a principle from a law made in a special cafe, and regarding an individual perfon. Privilegium non tranfit in exemplum. If ever there was a time favourable for establishing the principle, that a king of popular choice was the only legal king, without all doubt it was at the revolution. Its not being done at that time is a proof that the nation was of opi nion it ought not to be done at any time. There is no person so completely ignorant of our history, as not to know, that the majority in parliament of both parties were fo little difpofed to any thing refembling that principle, that at first they were determined to place the vacant crown, not on the head of the prince of Orange, but on that of his wife Mary, daughter of king James, the eldest born of the iffue of that king, which they acknowledged as undoubtedly his. It would be to repeat