generations of much-suffering and self-sacrificing monkeys to have been continually violating the fundamental law of the non-survival of injurious variations, that they might attain certain high mental qualities for the benefit of a community of whose future coming they could have no knowledge, but which, in fact, ought to have existed in advance, in order to make their preservation among so many dangers and privations a conceivable possibility.

Science, in its true acceptation, is the doctrine of established facts and universal laws, and as such, is one mode of God's reve lation of Himself to man. But to call this kind of postulating of facts, and imagining of proof, science, is simply a perversion of the name, and a degradation of its principles.

But finally, Mr. Darwin, in his DESCENT OF MAN, has put forth a series of assertions, and examples of teleologic purpose in certain organic structures, which are surpassed in the completeness of their admission of design, only by their utter inconsistency with the whole tenor of what he has elsewhere put forth upon the principles of growth. The only difference between his teleology and that ordinarily held, is that the adaptation in his system is self-caused, and the desired result is undirected and spontaneous, yet always surely and unerringly effected. One of these cases relates to the double moulting of certain classes of birds, (D. M II. 173) of which he says, after some considerable elaboration of details, "I conclude that the habit of moulting twice a year was in most or all cases acquired for some distinct purpose; perhaps for gaining a warmer winter covering." What kind of "purpose" can there be in the mere happening of variations? And if a "purpose," so distinctly one of provision as here involved be implied, how can this be effected without some foreseeing intellect to provide for it.

very

But this case does not stand alone; the same thought is still more fully expressed, in regard to the characteristics of certain curious insects in South America. He is endeaving to account for the great variety of coloring in different members of the insect world; why some are brilliantly tinted, and some of duller shades; and why some species are one color in one country and differently marked in another.

The reasons that he gives are many, and not easily reconcilable.

Some are dull colored, that the birds may not see them, and so they have the better chance to survive; and some are brilliantly painted, because they have a nasty taste when bitten by the bird, and so have got high-colored that the birds may see them from afar, and conscious of their nastiness, perhaps poison, may keep away from them; a sort of "mutual-beneficial" arrangement; while others are good looking that they may stimulate the amorous search of lustful suitors, and thus have a better chance of being wooed and won by high, æsthetic butterflies. How all this comes to be, is very elaborately descanted on through many fascinating pages.

But we must pass these by, to give his reasons for the color of certain large families, which we have above referred to, in some parts of South America.

Rapacious birds abound throughout these regions, and the poor insects in those districts have a very evil time. There is one family, however, the Heliconidæ, one of those brilliant, nasty breeds, which the wise birds will never touch, and lo, (here comes the wonder, remember his continually repeated premise, [O. S. 84] Natural Selection does not induce variability, it implies only the preservation of such variations as occur,") he says:

It had been observed that certain quite distinct families of butterflies resembled the Heliconidæ so closely in every stripe and shade of color, that they could not be distinguished except by an experienced entomologist; and as the Heliconidæ have their usual color, and the others depart from the coloring of the groups to which they belong; it is clear that the latter are imitators of the Heliconidæ and acquired their present marvellously deceptive appearance by variation and natural selection in order to be mistaken for the protected kinds, and thus escape being devoured.

Nor is this wonderful power of self-transformation for a specific purpose, by providential variations, confined to a single set of changes, for he assures us "if the imitated form was gradually modified, the imitating would be led along the same track and thus modified to almost any extent."

But even this does not meet all the difficulties of these strange and varied adaptations for the purposes in view.

*

Hence, forgetful of his former dictum (O. S. 52)" that it may be doubted whether sudden and great variations of structure are ever permanently propagated in a state of nature," he

*

*

goes on to add:

As slight variations would not in many cases suffice to render one species so like another protected kind as to lead to its preservation, it should be remembered that many species of butterfly are liable to considerable and abrupt changes of color."

And thus either by slow changes which must happen just when and where needed, or sudden variations ever ready in precisely the right kind and juncture as desired, the marvellous imitator is always working alterations in his color "in order" to avoid the dangers which surround him, and to keep himself in "every stripe and shade" so like his highly favored rivals that even the sharpeyed birds should never by any chance mistake the one of them for the other.

And all this is to be done by the mere happening of incidental variations, sometimes abrupt and wide, sometimes minute and slow; never with any law, yet always to concur to just this one result; without control or order, yet "in order" to a definite, constant adaptation. No guidance, immanent or Divine, to shape them, yet invariably imitating the one only model which could give their possessor safety.

Sot hat we have as this new bit of teleology, the conclusion, that the innumerable chance variations in these marvellous imitators, whether by slow change or sudden modification, have all concurred with a spontaneous certainty "in order" to produce the absolute necessary alterations, which no one knew were necessary, and to work out a definite result towards which they had all been aimlessly and yet unerringly self-directed.

Absurd as this may sound it is after all only a coherent statement of the contradictions between Mr. Darwin's premises and his modes of reasoning. Place the two side by side, divest them of their verbiage and you can make nothing more consistent and rational out of them.

It is just this loose and unscientific method of dealing with scientific questions we have chiefly had in view in these studies into Darwin. His isolated conclusions here and there are of compar atively little moment. If they are proven true we stand pledged and willing to adopt them. But when such modes of reasoning are allowed to pass for science, then are we losing hold of the first and highest principles of scientific truth; and instead of the true method of rigid induction as our law, we are substituting assertion for fact, imagination for reasoning, and authority in place of demonstration. J. F. GARRISON.

THE ILLINOIS CASE

IN THE GENERAL CONVENTION OF 1874.

The Illinois Case we say advisedly, for whatever wrong may have been done to an individual, the real question is the rights, duties, and obligations of a Diocese. The question of who shall be Bishop in any particular case is of small importance. With any Bishop a Diocese may get on and grow, after a fashion, as we have had examples. But whether a Diocese is to be permitted to have free choice of its Bishop, unembarrassed by interference from any other body, is a question of vital importance not only to the Diocese of Illinois, but to every Diocese in the American Church. We propose then to discuss the Constitutional and Canonical rights of Dioceses in the election of their Bishops; to show how these rights were invaded by the House of Deputies of the last General Convention in the case of Illinois, as indeed the rights of this Diocese had once before been invaded in the same way. We wish to say here that such invasion at once of the Constitution, the Canons, and the rights of the Diocese was not intentional, and came from not considering carefully what were the precise duties they had to perform under the Canons. In was the less remarkable in the House of Deputies when we consider that the friends and representatives of the Diocese never raised the question of their Constitutional and Canonical rights. Certain it is, they did not raise it at the only proper time, in the debate as to going into secret session on the testimonials of Bishops elect. The whole debate on the 17th rule of order indicated the most utter confusion of thought on the subject, and the most astonishing ignorance of the Constitution and Canons in relation to it, that we ever remember to have seen. It is not too much to say, that if any member of the Convention had but called

the attention of that body to the law of the Church on the subject, there would have been no secret session in the case of the Bishop elect of Illinois, and he would have taken the seat in the House of Bishops to which the Diocese was entitled by that election, and the Church in Illinois would have had that full representation to which it was entitled, and of which it was unconstitutionally, uncanonically, and unjustly deprived.

The first element of law on the subject is found in Article IV. of the Constitution in these words: "The Bishop or Bishops in every Diocese shall be chosen agreeably to such rules as shall be fixed by the Convention of that Diocese." By the third paragraph of Article V. of the Constitution, six clergy "qualified to vote for a Bishop," must be in the Diocese. This is all the Constitution has to say on the choice of Bishops. Under the Constitution every Diocese is left wholly free, not only in the choice of its Bishop, but what is more to the point, it is free in the method of its choice. If by Canon or other rule it chooses to do so, the Convention may elect by clergy only, or by laity only, or by a committee only, or on nomination of some one person. In fine, the whole matter of choice of a Diocesan Bishop is in the hands of the Convention of the Diocese and in that only.

Our first remark on this is, that a right expressly conceded to a Diocese by the Constitution, cannot be taken away by Canon. Any Canon in conflict with the Constitution is null and void, and here we might rest the whole case. The Constitution does not admit. any partnership in electoral rights to any party. It grants no privilege of concurrence or non-concurrence, of approval or disapproval, of allowance or disallowance, of confirmation or non-confirmation of an election. The whole authority is conceded to the Diocese. What is thus given to the Diocese by the Constitution, no Canon can withdraw, or distribute among Bishops, House of Deputies, and Standing Committees. Any attempt to do it is violation of the covenants of the Constitution, as well as invasion of rights. As violation of Constitutional covenants, like other violations of covenant, it releases other parties from the terms of the covenant, and leaves all parties to it free to act on their judgment, as expediency and justice may demand.

One invasion of this Constitutional right has before taken place