M.

Dedicated,

WITH AFFECTION AND ESTEEM,

To

MY FRIEND AND COLLEAGUE

JOHN NICHOL.

b

PREFACE,

CONTENTS.

ix-xx

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL ACCOUNT OF COMTE'S PHILOSOPHY.

Comte's fundamental principles-Their bearing on his view of

history-Decay of theology and of the social system founded

on it-Metaphysic, its strength for destruction and weakness

for construction-It prepares the way for positive science, on

which the social system of the future must be based—Necessity

for a new religion based on science-Humanity the true object

of worship-The social system corresponding to the religion of

Humanity-Man's intellectual and moral powers evolved in

conflict with nature-The nature of the social organization

and the three forms of society, the Family, the State, and the

Church-The Priesthood of Humanity and its office, 1-55

CHAPTER II.

THE NEGATIVE SIDE OF COMTE'S PHILOSOPHY-HIS OPPOSITION

TO METAPHYSIC AND THEOLOGY.

Growth of a new view of the social organism opposed at once to

Individualism and Socialism-Comte and the German Idealists

-Meaning of his attack on Metaphysic—His real agreement

with modern metaphysicians—He adopts Locke's principles

as to knowledge, yet is opposed to the Individualism of Locke's

French disciples--He attacks Realism as a Nominalist and

Nominalism as a Realist, and is really guided by a higher

principle than either-His mistaken attitude towards the

Critical Philosophy-Relation of Philosophy to Science—It

makes men conscious of their guiding principles-Comte's un-

consciousness of the categories that guide his thought-Con-

sequent defects in his view of the development of Religion, of

Philosophy, and of Science-Mr. Spencer's criticism and

Littré's answer—.
-Ambiguity in the opposition between the

universal and the particular,

56-111

CHAPTER III.

THE POSITIVE OR CONSTRUCTIVE SIDE OF COMTE'S PHILOSOPHY

-HIS SUBSTITUTES FOR METAPHYSIC AND THEOLOGY.

His recognition of the need of substitutes for Theology and Meta-

physic-His assertion that his philosophy is relative and subjec-

tive-Double meaning of the relativity of knowledge as involving

the assertion or the denial of real or absolute knowledge-

Collision of Comte's earlier and later views on this point-

Comte's subjective synthesis not subjective in the sense of Indi-

vidualism, nor yet in the sense that a conscious subject is im-

plied in all objects—His compromise between these opposite

theories-His doctrine that man sees the world in ordine ad

hominem but not in ordine ad universum-Impossibility

of separating nature from man and of criticising the whole

system to which man belongs-Defects of Comte's religion

according to his own idea of religion-Schisms in the school of

Comte,

112-176

CHAPTER IV.

COMTE'S VIEW OF THE RELATION OF THE INTELLECT TO THE

HEART-ITS EFFECT ON HIS CONCEPTION OF HISTORY AND

OF THE SOCIAL IDEAL.

The necessity for unity in man's intellectual and moral life—

Nature of the conflict between the intelligence and the heart—

It is really a conflict of intelligence with itself—Criticism of

Comte's doctrine that the intelligence must be subjected to the

heart-Its effect upon his conception of history, especially of

the history of Christianity—The two elements in Christianity,

their conflict and reconciliation in its development—The nega-

tive tendencies of medieval Catholicism and the positive ten-

dencies of the modern era-Comte's imperfect conception of the

Reformation and the Revolution - His restoration of the

mediaval ideal-His general position as a Philosopher.

177-249