The relations of this order of thought to philosophic scepticism remain to be noted, and may be comprehensively stated in a few words. The difference between the affirmations of the reason, which Dr. Hickok propounds, and the dicta of common sense, as declared by Reid and the Scottish school, is simply this: the "common sense" utters what it universally believes, but for which it knows no ground; the reason declares what it beholds and knows in its own ground. The principles which the reason sees, do not need anything other than themselves for their support. They do not need to be proved, therefore, but only to be shown. To demand a proof, would be the absurdity of requiring a reason for reason. Reason affirms, declares, supports itself. If, therefore, anything can be shown as revealed in the clear rational insight, this is sufficient, and we neither can gain, nor do we really ever seek any other ground than this. It is not simply because our powers are so weak that we cannot go beyond this; rather are they so lofty that they see in this the true ultimate, the self-supporting ground of all the rest. It is because we are reason, that we rest in what is reasonable, and it would be to deny that selfknowledge which is our crown and royalty, could we look for anything beyond. It is only necessary, therefore, that the sceptic see a truly rational principle, and his scepticism is, so far as this principle reaches, for ever overthrown. If Dr. Hickok's principles are true, and can be clearly shown as such, no farther scepticism is possible in philosophy. A mind deeply imbued with this order of thought, could be no more sceptical than it could be unthinking.

In every system of philosophy, the relation of the subjective mind to the objective world, has furnished a prominent theme of regard. How shall the two be brought into any such connection, that the thought of matter shall be true, and the knowledge of it real? Upon this question the attention of every great thinker has been so diligently exercised, that the different answers that have been given, may afford a desirable method of classifying the different systems which the history of philosophy reveals. All the forms of simple philosophical Scepticism centre in the doubt that any connection of mind and matter is possible. All philosophical Mysticism may be referred to the

conviction that while such a connection is both possible and actual, it is also inexplicable. But, while philosophers generally have neither doubted the fact of this connection nor failed to propound their methods of explaining it, it is quite obvious that every possible explanation must assume one of three general forms. I. Mind and matter are intrinsically alike, and there is thus no difficulty in their relation. But this intrinsic likeness is liable to a twofold appearance according as we view it in the resolving of mind into matter, or of matter into mind. In the one case there arises Idealism, which declares that matter is only mind degenerated, and in the other Materialism, which affirms that mind is only matter refined. II. Mind and matter are intrinsically diverse, and can be brought in contact only through a third somewhat. Here also we have a specific diversity of explanation. (1.) This bond of connection. may be God, who brings the two together, (a) only by his almighty power, (Descartes); or, (b) by the intervention of his will in occasional causes, (Geulinex); or, (c) by spiritualizing the matter, so that we can see it in him, (Malebranche); or, (d) by a preëstablished harmony, (Leibnitz). (2) Mind and matter may be attributes of one infinite substance, (Spinoza). (3) They may be opposite poles of the Absolute, (Schelling). (4.) They are brought together by a superior principle, which unites them as matter and form, (Aristotle, Kant). III. Though intrinsically diverse, they have that in common by which they are related. On this ground stands Plato with his ideas, and here also, in a classification of philosophical systems, is Dr. Hickok's position. Spirit is, with him, essentially self-activity, with self-knowledge and self-determination; matter is essentially action and reaction, i. e., force. Matter may thus be the product of spirit and cognizable by it. Such a conception removes the gulf, in other systems impassable, between the Creator and the creature, between the knowing mind and the material objects of its knowledge. But the two are not identified. The Creator is distinct from the creature, though He is in a true sense All in All, and all things live and move and have their being in Him. The mind is different from its objects, though its activity and their agency meet in the common point of the mind's knowledge.

ART. II.-Remarks on the foregoing, and other recent Vindications of Dr. Hickok's Philosophy.

THE preceding article, from one of the most distinguished supporters and representative expounders of Dr. Hickok's philosophy, we have cordially welcomed. We are glad to have,

in a short compass, a clear exposition of that philosophy from an authorized source. It is something gained as the result of our strictures, that we have this system at length rendered to us in idiomatic and facile English, in a form, not only authentic, but as intelligible as the nature of the topics discussed allows. If it fails in its main object, this is not, in our judgment, so much the fault of the advocate, as of his cause. We think it confirms, instead of invalidating our past strictures.

This is not the only attempt to vindicate this philosophy, and parry the criticisms, more especially of this journal, upon it, which have been called forth more immediately by the review of the "New and Revised Edition of Dr. Hickok's Rational Psychology," published in our number for last October. That article, the present writer may be permitted to say, (as it came from another source, well known by all concerned, to be a distinguished divine in another branch of the church,) has been favoured with rare proofs of its extraordinary power. It is very seldom that any disquisition on abstruse philosophical questions commands such general attention from friend and foe, in our own and foreign countries. In this country, it not only received special attention in the usual notices which the religious weeklies give of the quarterlies, together with high encomiums from persons eminent in philosophy, to whom the author was wholly unknown, but it was read with keen interest and delight by a much larger number than usually give metaphysical articles a careful perusal. Beyond our own country, it was honoured with most laudatory notices, and was republished in Great Britain. But, beside all this, it broke the reticency which, so far as we know, Dr. Hickok has seen fit personally to preserve

in reference to previous criticisms. It brought forth operose rejoinders in the American Theological Review, one by Dr. Hickok himself in the April number, which had been preceded by one from his learned and accomplished coadjutor, Dr. Tayler Lewis, in the January number, and is now followed, in this journal, by the exposition already presented to our readers, from a hand which we have good reason to suppose Dr. Hickok would trust, as soon as any other, to discharge such an office. We refer to these unmistakeable proofs of the high power of that article, furnished as well by Dr. Hickok and his collaborators, as by manifold other demonstrations, for the purpose of showing that, whatever else he may see cause to do or not to do about it, he cannot afford to try to neutralize it by mere outbursts of irritation and contempt. Whatever he may accomplish in his search for the "subjective idea and objective law of all intelligence," or the necessary laws of world-building, he cannot afford such an attempt. To make it, is to confess that what is thus assailed cannot be refuted by argument. Whether Dr. Hickok has not placed himself in this predicament, we will shortly inquire. Meanwhile, we have a few words to offer in regard to the communication of our respected correspondent.

And first, we will premise some things, by way of clearing the status questionis, which are applicable in various degrees, not only to the article of our correspondent, but to those of Drs. Hickok and Lewis. The question is not, then, whether there are self-evident truths, above sense, which the mind has a faculty of seeing in their own light, intuitively, and without derivation by inference from any other truths. Nor is it, whether, especially in the mathematical, logical, and metaphysical, or what may be called in general the formal sciences, there are certain truths which are intuitively seen to be necessary, i. e., such that their non-existence cannot be conceived without mental suicide. To deny them is to contradict reason and derationalize ourselves. It might be inferred from some parts of these rejoinders to our criticisms, that these truths were generally ignored or questioned, especially by the critics of Dr. Hickok's philosophy in this journal, and that Dr. Hickok had been called to the high office of reclaiming for them a due

acknowledgment and authority in philosophy. We need not say that all such implications, whether intentional or not, are quite gratuitous. Self-evident and necessary truths, together with the faculty for knowing them, are neither overlooked nor denied by philosophers in general, outside of the Sensuous and Positive sect, nor by this journal, nor especially, by the critics of Dr. Hickok in this journal. On the contrary, they are most strenuously affirmed in the principal notices of his works in our pages, as examination will abundantly show. There is no special philosophical mission for Dr. Hickok in this department. Whether he has not thrown all certainty of knowledge by our intuitions into doubt, is another and real question in this matter, on which we may have something to say; and, in reference to difficulties alleged in regard to which, his defenders will do well to say something, if they mean to escape the discredit of evading the true issues.

Nor is the question, what Dr. Hickok meant to do. That he intended and endeavoured to correct the obliquities of Kant, to establish a real external world, a valid ontology, cosmology, psychology, and theology, may be well enough admitted. Certainly we have not denied it. Nor have we questioned his piety, nor the devoutness and sublimity of some of his religious and philosophico-religious meditations. But whether, in making his great attempt, he has not undermined what he sought to establish, and laid down principles logically subversive of all foundations, is another question. To that we have addressed ourselves. And to the difficulties expressed by some of the ablest thinkers on this point, his apologists will do well to address themselves. Dr. Hickok and his friends must not be too sensitive when we trace his system to pantheistic consequences. He does not hesitate to denounce modern philosophy, especially the prevalent religious philosophy, as "pantheistic."

Nor is the question, it is almost trivial to say, whether God acts according to perfect wisdom in the creation of the worlds, or whether rational beings can trace the signatures of his wisdom in his works. Those who read the vindications of Dr. Hickok's philosophy now under review, can judge whether there is not abundant occasion for this remark, and whether much is not advanced in some of them, as if he were especially commis