For the purpose specified, the right was conceded to commissioned officers of the respective navies, who should be furnished with instructions for executing the laws against the slave trade, of "visiting, capturing, and delivering over for trial, the merchant vessels of the other, engaged in the traffic of slaves."

This convention was ratified by the Senate, with an amendment restricting its provisions to "commanders and commissioned officers duly authorized, under the regulations and instructions of their respective governments, to cruise on the coasts of Africa and of the West Indies, for the suppression of the slave trade." The coast of America was excepted from the concessions of the treaty. "The exception of the coast of America from the seas upon which the mutual power of capturing the vessels under the flag of either party may be exercised, had reference, in the views of the Senate, doubtless, to the coast of the United States. On no part of that coast, unless in the Gulf of Mexico, is there any probability that slave trading vessels will ever be found."* The United States had too recently experienced the aggressions of the British navy, exercised under pretence of the right of search, to expose herself, by treaty, to the unrestricted exercise of that right on the line of her coast, under the pretext of suppressing the trade where a slaver was never seen. Another consideration may have had weight with the Senate. By the local and restricted application of the provisions of the treaty, it was rendered impossible that the concessions therein made should ever be drawn to support a general claim of the right of search under the law of nations.

That the caution of the Senate was well-founded, we have recent demonstration. It is but four years since, the vexations and obstructions to American commerce in the Gulf of Mexico, arising from the assumption of the right of search by British cruisers, upon professed suspicion of slave-trading, seriously threatened the peace of the two countries, and led to a peremptory correspondence, in which the English government was at length brought formally to renounce any claim to visit or

* Adams's despatch to Mr. Rush, in Appendix to Gales and Seaton's Register of Debates; eighteenth Congress, second session, p. 23.

detain American vessels in time of peace, as a right conferred by the law of nations.

The amended treaty was rejected by the British ministry; although it was not pretended that its efficiency, as against the slave trade, was diminished by the amendment of the Senate. The rejection was based on the ground that the alteration supposed less reason on the one side than the other to apprehend abuse of the conceded right. "The right of visiting vessels suspected of slave-trading," said the British Secretary, “when extended alike to the West Indies and to the coast of America, implied an equality of vigilance, and did not necessarily imply the existence of ground of suspicion on either side. The removal of this right, as to the coast of America, and its continuance to the West Indies, cannot but appear to imply the existence on one side and not on the other of a just ground either of suspicion of misconduct, or of apprehension of an abuse of authority."*

Thus terminated the negotiations at that time. Although, occasionally afterward, the subject led to renewed discussions, no harmonious result was attained until, in the Ashburton treaty, in 1842, it was stipulated that each of the contracting parties "should prepare, equip, and maintain in service on the coast of Africa, a sufficient and adequate squadron, or naval force of vessels, of suitable numbers and descriptions, to carry, in all, not less than eighty guns, to enforce separately and respectively, the laws, rights, and obligations of each of the two countries for the suppression of the slave trade."

The history of American relations to the slave trade is crowned with the treaty ratified by the Senate, April 23, 1862, providing-in precise accordance with the American project of 1824, as rejected by the British ministry-for the grant of a mutual qualified right of search, founded on the piratical character which both powers recognise in the trade-to be exercised by none but commissioned officers, in command of vessels of the respective navies, to whom express instructions shall have been given for its suppression-restricted to specific limits on the African coast, and the waters surrounding Cuba-and

* Register of Debates, p. 25.

guarded by the admission at length made in 1858, by the government of Great Britain, that the law of nations confers no right of search in time of peace.

Such is the history of American connection with slaverya history which runs parallel with the existence of her communities, and which is clearly defined, consistent throughout, and worthy of a free and enlightened people. From the first hour when these communities were mature enough to originate a public sentiment which was anything more than a mere reflex of that of Britain-a sentiment which could be called American-it has been opposed to the whole system. From the first opportunity when that sentiment could express itself in legislation, expression has been given in acts too numerous to be referred to casual influences, too widely traceable over the continent to be attributed to local feeling, and too definite as to their terms, and consistent in all periods of the history, to admit of question as to their intent and significance.

The war of Independence, waged in defence of the sovereignty of the several colonies over their own domestic affairs, installed the general government in a national supremacy, which was restricted by the principle thus at issue in the war, and triumphant in its result. The general government, therefore, never had a right to interpose for the emancipation of the slaves; and the southern states, where was accumulated the great mass of negro population, found themselves the victims. of a foreign and hostile policy, too late superseded by the war of Independence, and embarrassed with questions as to the expediency, the safety, and the humanity of indiscriminate emancipation, which it is more easy for noisy fanaticism to scorn, than for intelligence and patriotism wisely to decide. The public sentiment of the nation has, however, been none the less clearly expressed by the acts of emancipation adopted by the states whose slave population was more sparse, by the numerous manumissions that have occurred in the others, by the national policy respecting the slave trade; and, let it be added, by the melioration of the slaves of the south, the condition of whom, physically, socially, and morally, after every adverse allowance which may justly be claimed, is probably on

the whole superior to that of any other negro population in the world, that of Liberia only excepted.

The proper attitude of the general government is not, and in practice it has never been, that of a mere passive indifference on the subject of slavery. It is bound, indeed, not only to avoid all encroachments on the prerogatives of the states with reference to the subject, but to respect the delicacy and difficulty of the questions to them, which are connected with it. But, in perfect consistency with these obligations, its position, normally, historically, and in the Constitution itself, is in moral opposition to slavery, and to every attempt to increase it, and in sympathy with every movement which originates in enlarged wisdom and justice, and tends to the enfranchisement of the slave.

SHORT NOTICES.

Sermons by Jabez Bunting, D. D. Vol. I. New York: Published by Carlton & Porter. 1862.

This large octavo, of nearly five hundred full and compact pages, appears to be the first of we know not how many; the residue of which are yet to appear. The author, Dr. Bunting, was among the foremost of the Wesleyan preachers of England. The public will be glad to have access to these specimens of his preaching. So far as we have been able to observe, his sermons are characterized by devout and evangelical sentiment, with an occasional tinge of methodistical peculiarities; by great simplicity and force of thought and diction; by fervour and earnestness, which infuse an impassioned glow into his arguments and appeals; in short, by several elements of "power in the pulpit," which account for his high rank and influence as a preacher.

The Testimony of Christ to Christianity. By Peter Bayne, A. M., author of "The Christian Life," etc. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1862.

Mr. Bayne has already acquired distinction as a writer on topics of religion and literature, in his "Christian Life," and "Essays on Biography and Criticism." His characteristic traits as a writer appear in the present volume, which presents a refutation of the sceptical objections of Hume and others to the reality, and the convictive weight of miracles, while it exhibits the positive argument in their favour, and in behalf of the divine inspiration and authority of the Book, of which they are the God-sent vouchers. The novel feature of the argument is, as its title indicates, the manner in which he arrays the testimony of Christ in support of his own miracles, showing this testimony to be conclusive from the character of the witness, and proving the divine excellence of the witness from the internal evidence of his recorded words and deeds. Of course, the originality lies rather in the manner of putting these things, than in the substance of the things themselves. And here we find that freshness of thought, style, and imagery, which have already won for him a high place among living authors. We know not how far a rigid scrutiny might detect questionable propositions. It strikes us, however, that the following for