in our own country, on the one hand, and the new Oxford, Broad Church School in England, on the other, are conspicuous concrete examples.

Indeed, all forms of rationalism, which have a tincture of pantheistic thinking, either as born of, or begetting it, or which in any way confound and vacate the essential dualism of body and spirit, tend to condense into ritualism, unless they first evaporate into utter scepticism. In whatever way this be done, the identification of body and spirit makes the exercises of the one exercises of the other. So "bodily exercise," a sensuous ceremonial, sacerdotal manipulations, affect the spirit per se by an opus operatum efficacy, because body and spirit are one, and the exercises of either are exercises of both.

The impugners of this dualism between body and spirit in man, are reducible to three principal classes. First, the materialists, who hold that the soul is the product of the body, its "blossom and fragrance." So such materialists as Condillac and Helvetius maintained that thought was but "transformed sensation," however sublimed and etherialized it might be. Opposite to this view, which makes the soul an "efflorescence of the body," is the ideal theory, which makes the body a product, a development of the soul, or a frame-work built by it for a temporary habitation-the chrysalis in which it envelopes itself preparatory to emerging into its perfect state. This idealizes the body. A third theory may be called the transcendental, because it is logically allied with modern transcendental thinking, in connection with which it is chiefly found. It does not directly materialize the spirit, or spiritualize the body, but makes them both products of one principle, properties of one substance, which is neither the one nor the other exclusively, but developes both separately and simultaneously. "It would be erring," says an advocate of this theory, "to say that man consists of two essentially different substances— of earth and soul; but he is soul only, and cannot be anything else. This soul, however, unfolds itself externally in the life of the body, and internally in the life of the mind. Two-fold in its development, it is one in its origin, and the centre of this union is one personality. . . . We admit, therefore, of a difference between soul and body, but one that proceeds from,

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and terminates in, a union."* It is very obvious that, if body and spirit are but one substance, the exercises of the one are the exercises of the other. Ritualism is the logical result.

While this sort of rationalism meets, and ossifies itself into ritualism, which exaggerates the position and office of the body in sanctification, another species, to which we have already adverted, goes to the opposite extreme. It inclines unduly to attenuate the relation of the body to religion and irreligion, sin and grace, the fall and redemption; indeed, to rule out not only the body, but all the powers, states, and exercises of the soul, except the volitional, from the sphere of morality and responsibility-from all share in corruption by the fall, and sanctification by the Spirit. The truth is, all parts of our nature, though in degrees varying in proportion to the intimacy of their connection with the rational and voluntary self, the inmost seat and centre of responsibility, partake of its corruption and sanctity. That which is in vital union with the person, and is so pervaded by our personality that whatever befalls that befalls the person, is liable to be implicated with, or to sustain intimate and important relations to the moral states of that person. These relations are, indeed, subordinate, not paramount. Still they are none the less real and important.

In this view Scripture and sound philosophy coincide, not only with each other, but with our Confession of Faith, which declares: "This sanctification is throughout the whole man, yet imperfect in this life; there abideth still some remnants of corruption in every part, whence ariseth a continual and irreconcileable war, the flesh lusting against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh." In proof and explanation of this article, its framers quote 1 Thess. v. 23: "And the very God of peace sanctify you wholly: and I pray God your whole spirit, and soul, and body, be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ." The apostle's prayer obviously calls for a complete sanctification. This completeness, too, has reference to the several parts or elements of our nature, rather than to perfect sinlessness on earth. Such per

Rauch's Psychology, pp. 185, 186.

† See Confession of Faith, Chap. xiii. Art. 2.

fection in holiness as is implied in the sanctification of all the elements of our nature, and in possessing some measure, at least, of all the Christian graces, is required in the word of God, and has ever been recognised by the church, as of the essence of Christian piety.

Here, however, various questions arise. What precisely is meant by soul and spirit? How do they differ from each other? In what sense can the body be the subject of sin, or holiness, or sanctification? It is to this last that we shall now direct our especial consideration. We will first, however, say a word, in the hope of clearing the perplexities which are sometimes quite annoying, in regard to the former.

We can discover no better analysis of the ascending grades of being, than that given by the soundest philosophers, physical and metaphysical, which accords so well with the language and meaning of Scripture, the doctrine of the church, and the unperverted judgment of mankind. We have, 1. Inorganic matter, endued only with mechanical and chemical energiesvky-as stones. 2. Organic matter endued with a power to unfold, according to a certain law, from a germ within, by taking and assimilating matter from without—υλη οι σωμα + quois plants. 3. Matter having not only organization, but consciousness or sensibility—σωμα + φυσίς + ψυχη = animals. 4. Matter having not only organization and sensation, but all this conjoined with reason, or a rational spirit superinduced upon it-σωμα + φυσις + ψυχη + πνευμα = men, moral and accountable. 5. Pure spirit unembodied, as in God, who is a spirit, and the spirits of the just made perfect, prior to the resurrection. So plants are distinguished from lifeless things by the quois; animals from plants by the yon; and men from animals by the πνευμα.

=

While the quoic is not a substance separate from the bodies to which it belongs, but an energy, principle, or law working in and shaping those bodies after a certain method; the ʊ and лεμа form a substance distinct from the owpa, but brought into mysterious and vital union with it, in order to bear imperial sway over it; yet separable, and from death to the resurrection actually separated from it, as then disorganized and dissolved; the spirit meanwhile living, awaiting its reorganiza

tion and reunion at the Lord's second advent. And this, we apprehend, not only because in the custody of the Lord, but because being simple, without parts, and therefore incapable of dissolution, it, in the words of the poet,

"Cannot but by annihilating die."

It is by virtue of this πνευμα, νους, λογος, imbreathed into man when he "became a living soul," that he is made in the image of God, and, although he has defaced it, capable of being renewed therein in "knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness," Eph. iv. 2, 3, 4; Col. iii. 10; and by this withal, that he is for ever distinguished from the brutes, as a rational, moral, accountable, and progressive being. With due allowance for poetic freedom of expression, and a consequent avoidance of a too literal interpretation of certain phrases, as if higher grades of being were developed from the lower, propriis viribus, the substance of the foregoing analysis of the ascending orders of existence is exquisitely given in some lines of the sublimest of poets, who, like so many others, had

"A vision and a faculty divine,"

for philosophy as well as poetry; some of whose highest poetic flights are but sublimated metaphysics, and whose finest prose is but magnificent poetic reasoning. He puts the following address into the mouth of the angel, "winged hierarch," whom he represents as in converse with our first parents.

“O Adam, One Almighty is, from whom
All things proceed, and up to him return,
If not depraved from good, created all
Such to perfection, one first matter all,
Endued with various forms, various degrees
Of substance, and, in things that live, of life:
But more refined, more spirituous, and pure,
As nearer to him placed, or nearer tending,
Each in their several active spheres assigned,
Till body up to spirit work, in bounds
Proportioned to each kind. So from the root
Springs lighter the great stalk, from thence the leaves
More aery, last the bright consummate flower
Spirits odorous breathes:, flowers and their fruit,
Man's nourishment, by gradual scale sublimed,
To vital spirits aspire, to animal,

The foregoing distinctions will help to indicate what is meant by body, owμa; the soul, vn; the spirit, veʊμa, in 1 Thess. v. 23, to which we have already adverted. A slight comparison of scriptural passages will show, we think, that while un and лμ are each sometimes used for the whole interior conscious principle, of which they severally constitute a part, yet that the general usage of Scripture makes the former the principle of animal life and consciousness, including the animal appetites and desires, while the latter indicates the rational spirit, which is not only above all the powers of brutes, but imparts somewhat of its own dignity and rationality to the lower sensations, perceptions, and desires of the yux, with which it inter-works, and is, in our present earthly state, interfused. Calvin interprets the veμa and 77, as denoting respectively, reason and will, including under will, according to the old terminology, desires, affections, &c.† This, however, differs less from our exegesis in sound than in fact. For the principles of animal consciousness, sensibility and intelligence, scarcely go beyond feeling, appetite, and action, and such instinctive insight as is requisite to guide, however blindly, their action within the sphere assigned them. The intelligence of the brute is but a faint element in his consciousness, and is wholly secondary to, and comparatively lost in its feelings, impulses, and determinations to action. Superinduce upon this that reason whereby we are capable of knowing God.

* Milton-Paradise Lost, Book V., vs. 469-490.

"Notanda est autem hæc hominis partitio: nam aliquando homo simpliciter corpore et anima constare dicitur, ac tunc anima spiritum immortalem significat, qui in corpore habitat tanquam in domicilio. Quoniam autem duæ præcipuæ sunt animæ facultates, intellectus et voluntas, Scriptura interdum distincte hæc duo ponere solet, quum exprimere vult animæ vim ac naturam: sed tunc anima pro sede affectuum capitur, ut sit pars spiritui opposita. Ergo quum hic audimus nomen spiritus, sciamus notari rationem, vel intelligentiam: sicut animæ nomine designatur voluntas et omnes affectus." Calvin's Commentary on 1 Thess. v. 23.