tion.

But if they mean to fay, that they have the fole right of naming the fum of money, and taxing the people of their province to pay that fum which they ought to contribute towards the neceffary expence incurred for the defence and protection, and government of the whole community, of which they are only a part; I will take upon me to answer, That their opinion is neither lawful, conftitutional, juft, nor reafonable. If they have got an act of parliament by which they are vefted with fuch a power, let them how it ; and then we fhall be all fatisfied that the gentlemen of the Maffachufet's-Bay are exempt by that law from the national rule of taxation and that they are permitted to live without paying any taxes at all towards the national expence; or only just as much as they fhall pleafe to afford out of their own Bounty.

There is no principle in our conftitution, neither was it ever the ancient practice (I do not mean the antient practice of the Maffachufet's-Bay), I mean the antient practice of England for thirteen hundred years paft, that any part of the community had a right to tax themfelves to defray the national expence of government. Let them take it at any point of time they pleafe, even as far back as the Saxon period before the conqueft, when the conflitution was in its perfection; when every fhire was a diftinct province as much as they are now; and a complete go

vernment of itself, fo, far as to provide for the civil and military government of the fhire; which they did in their fhiregemots, or fhire-affemblies amongst themselves.

But when any national expence became neceffary for the good of the whole, it was abfolutely neceffary that a power fhould be lodged fome where to tax the whole, and not to fuffer every fhire to tax itfelf; and they very wifely vefted that power in the hands of a felect number of men who were elected for that purpofe; and who were to decide upon that point by a majority of voices, which bound the whole community at once; and this put an end to all conteft about the matter. Whereas, on the contrary, had the fhire of York, for inftance, come to the fame refolution THEN, as the province of the Mafiachufet's-Bay hath Now, it would have been a direct violation of the conftitu tion, and an attempt to diffolve the community as far as in them lay; and had they fucceeded, muft have brought on the deftruction of their old mode of government, which we call the conftitutional law of the land.

However, not to go fo far back as the Saxon period, we have an example in the city of London, which is a town and county of itself, and whofe government is established upon the old conftitutional principle; where the mayor, aldermen, and representative body of men have a power of taxing the inhabitants to defray the expence of both the civil and military government of the city; yet, notwithstanding this, they are taxed in common with the reft of the people for the national expence of the state.

Our conftitution hath divided the country and people into parts; and fo far as concerns the internal police of the country they are independent of one another. But the fame constitution hath united all thefe parts into one whole; and made them all obedient to the acts and laws of one legislative authority. There cannot be a greater abfurdity fuppofed in government, than to admit two legislative authorities in one ftate independent of each other. But upon this North American principle we fhall not only have two, but we may have fifty-two. For, according to them, in every province we are now, or may hereafter become poffeffed of; where we provide for the internal police of the country, upon the English conflitutional principles; there we are to establish a legitive autho rity, independent of the legislative authority of Great-Britain. Such a principle as this, can, in its own nature, produce nothing but diforder and frite; is incompatible with the peace of all fociety, and every principle of our constitution, and not to be admitted with out their deftruction.

The predominant principle in our conftitution in this refpect, is to unite many parts into one whole; but this reverses our conftitutional principle, and divides one whole into

mary

many parts. Our happy conftitution cements and unites the whole together by an equality of rights, and an equality of expence; which together produce ftrength, peace, har mony and order.

Let us now fee how the people in our diftant provinces are fituated, with respect to the exercife of their conftitutional rights of election for members to ferve in parliament. And as this feems to be the ground on which they build their main ftrength, and from whence they draw all their arguments, I will endeavour to give it a particular attention, and defcribe how the conftitution operates with regard to them.

Let it be remembered, that the government of England is founded upon the common rights of mankind; where the elective power of the people forms the most eflential part of the legislative authority. And let us alfo remember, that the king is in the conftant exercife of his executive power, which is creative of wants, which himself cannot fupply; and, therefore, he must always have his parliament within his call, that he may procure their advice and affiftance whenever they are wanted. In the king is placed the feat of all intelligence and information from all quarters of the world, where the British empire is concerned; by which he is enabled to know what dangers and difficulties obftruct the welfare and happincís of his people in general. Therefore he is the only perfon, that can be able to inform his parliament of the truth, and what means are to be taken to remove thefe obftructions, and to estimate the expence that will attend the fame.

Were it otherwife, no king of England would be able to extend his care, or to execute any plans he may have formed for the mutual benefit of his people. He could not fit out fleets and armies at home for the protection of his diftant provinces, without there were a power at home which he could depend upon, that is both able and willing to fupport him in all his juft measures, and provide for the neceflary expence at all events. This of itself is fufficient to fhew the neceffity of confining the formation of the legislative authority within the immediate call of the king. And hence it is evident, that the formation of the legislative authority, in a ftate that is founded upon a delegated power like that of England, must be in the hands of the people, where the feat of government is placed.

At the restoration of the conftitution, in the reign of Henry the Third, under the fanetion of our great charter, the power of election was vefted in the inhabitants of certain cities, boroughs, towns, ports, and the freeholders of the respective thires, or thofe interested in the land; and no man, that did Det fall under fome one of thefe denomina

tions had any power of election vested in him. From whence it evidently appears, that no Englishman, barely confidered as fuch, hath any power of election, for a reprefentative to ferve in parliament.

And

Upon this principle it is, that the people of our new gieat towns, fuch as Birmingham, Manchester, and many others, have no power of election vefted in them; and confequently have no reprefentatives in parliament of their own clection at all. therefore the people in our distant provinces are precifely and literally in the fame fituation as the people in thefe great towns, and all the villages, and open country, which contain thousands and tens of thousands of people in Great-Britain who have no power of election; and confequently have no reprefentation in parliament, any more than the Americans. Yet all this multitude of people who have no power of election, would receive no damage from not being electors, provided there was a competent number of electors in every place of election, fo as to fecure a conftitutionally free and independent houfe of commons. As long as this is the cafe, it is of no confequence who elects them; for every man that is not an elector may receive the full benefit of our conftitutional mode of government as much as if he was an elector. Yet every Englifhman, as fuch, whether he be born on this, or that fide the Atlantic, hath a right to take up his power of election whenever he pleafeth to connect himself with fome one of thofe towns, or become a fresholder; fo as to fatisfy the customary mode by which every other man obtains the power of elec

tion.

But if this elective power were conftitutionally fo fixed to the perfon of an Englishman, that it must travel with him into any part of the world where ever he should think proper to fettle; and that he should have there the fame conftitutional right as he had in England, to elect reprefentatives to ferve in the parliament of Great-Britain, which is the point contended for; in that cafe we fhould be obliged to collect our legislative authority from the four quarters of the world, whenever Great-Britain fhall think proper to eftablish colonies in Europe, Afia, Africa, and America.

It is the determined law of election, that every man who is vefted with the power of election, fhall excroife that power in perfon upon the fpot from whence he derives that power. For if I he an houfekeeper in the city of Westminster, I am an elector for the city of Westminfter fo long as I continue there. But if I leave the city of Westminfter and never return, I lofe my power of election and never recover it. Or if I be a liveryman of the city of London, and retire from London, though the right of election F 2

will still remain in my perfon, yet I cannot exercife that right, without I return back again to the city of London.

In like manner it is with every man who leaves his native country and lives in our diftant provinces; he willingly and voluntarily relinquishes the exercife of his elective power, in favour of fomething more fubftantial; and can never conftitutionally, fo long as he continues there, exercife that right in the election of any member to ferve in the parliament of Great-Britain. All members of any fociety muft fubmit and fall in with the conftitutional laws of that fociety to which they belong; and not expect that the laws of the conftitution are to give way to them. For, upon that principle, a conftitution would be continually fluctuating, in order to accommodate itself to every change of things that might happen.

It is the conftitution itself (which muft operate upon the fpot where the feat of government is placed) that refufes our diftant provinces to exercise their elective rights for the election of reprefentatives to ferve in parliament. For as they have placed themfelves at fuch a distance, they have put it out of their own power to be electors; but, in every other refpect they may receive the full benefit of the conftitution, as much as any man at home. But to fay that no Englishman is to be taxed without his confent either in perfon or by his reprefentatives, is merely found without fenfe, and not true in fact; but must be limited by the conftitutional mode of taxation, which only requires, that no Englishman fhall be taxed without the confent of a reprefentative body of men in parliament. Were it otherwife, as I have faid before, a government founded upon the common rights of mankind, could never advance beyond a certain limited point, or form any advantageous plans by the extention of their territory, for the mutual benefit of the whole community."

III. A Journey into Siberia, made by Order of the King of France. By M. L'Abbé Chappe d'Auteroche, 4to. Ivol. Jeffries. Continued from our last.

"In the beginning of the reign of Peter I. the Ruffians used to marry without having feen each other. The parents on the man's fide used to fend a kind of matron to the girl's parents: the matron then told them; I know you have goods to difpofe of, and we have purchafers. After fome inquiries, and a few days fpent in negociating the affair, the parents afed to meet. If the lad was agreeable to the girl's parents, the day of the ceremony was fixed. The evening before marriage, the young man was brought to fee his deftined wife, who received him without fpeaking a word : one of her relations was engaged to converfe with him. The next day, the lad ufed to fend a prefent to the lady, confifting of fweetmeats, foap, and other things of the fame

kind. The box was never opened but in prefence of her friends, who were immediately fent for the then ufed to lock herself up with them, continually shedding tears while her friends were finging fongs fuitable to the occafion of her marriage.

There are no traces of thefe laft cuftoms remaining, except among the common people. European manners, which Peter I. endea voured to introduce in his dominions, have abolished fome of the ancient prejudices. From this period, marriages have been upon a different footing. Among the great, parents are influenced by fortune and high rank; and children, as it is the custom every where elfe, are feldom confulted.

European manners, however, have gained very little ground in Ruffia; because they are not conformable to the defpotifm of the government they have nevertheless introduced luxury, and brought on a communication between Ruffians and foreigners; which has only contributed to make the Ruffians more unhappy, by giving them opportunity of comparing their state of flavery with that of a free people.

As I have feen the Ruffians at the distance of eight hundred leagues from court, I have been enabled to acquire a competent knowledge of this people.

Upon the whole, there is very little fociety in Ruffia, especially beyond Mofco: neither is it poffible there fhould be much, under a government where no man enjoys that civil liberty, by which the fafety of the citizen, in other countries, is fecured. A mutual fear prevails among individuals; from hence arifes miftruft, difguife, and deceit. Friendfhip, that sentiment which contributes to the happiness of our lives, has never been known in Ruffia; it fuppofes a fenfibility which makes an abfolute union of the two friends, and effusions of the heart, which divide their pleafures and pains reciprocally. As the men have but little respect for the women beyond Mofco, they are not attended to in company, although company is nothing without them. They are almost always confined to their houses; where they pass their tedious days among their flaves, without authority and without employment; they do not even enjoy the fatisfaction of reading, for most of them know not how to read. The men are as ignorant as the women. They vifit now and then with great ceremony: the governors and chief magiftrates give grand dinners feveral times in a year. Relations alfo meet now and then, to keep the feast of their family faint; but they feldom admit any perfon at thefe feafts, who is not one of the family. At the great entertainments, both men and women are invited together, but they neither fit at the fame table, nor in the fame room. The miftrefs of the houfe does not appear in the mens apartments, till they are juft fitting down to dinner; the brings in

with her a large waiter covered with glaffes full of brandy; which the prefents, in a very fubmiffive manner, to all the guests, who do not even look at her; the glaffes are returned to her, and the withdraws immediately.

There are always a great number of people at these feafts; to which perfons of all ftations are invited. Officers, clergy, magiftrates, and merchants, are all placed at the fame table; but with this difference, that rank is more ftrictly attended to, than in any German court. Military men are placed according to their feveral ranks; and perfons of other profeffions are difpofed in the fame manner: no regard is paid to birth.

All the dishes are ferved up at once. Their Loup is made by cutting the meat into small pieces in the broth. They have fome ragouts, which nobody who is not used to can eat of. The table is generally covered with feveral pyramids of roast meat; most of them compofed of different kinds of game, the rest of butchers meat. Chinese fweetmeats are ferved up at the fame time, and fome made of the fruits of the country.

Their manner of fitting at table, and their customs, feem to be very fimilar to thofe which prevail in fome diftricts of Germany; but they have adopted only the ridiculous parts of them, which they have even rendered ftill more ridiculous. A profound filence is obferved during dinner; which is interrupted enly at times by the healths that are drunk.

As foon as they fit down to table, each man pours into his glafs fome of the made-wine I have mentioned before; and then all rife to drink each others health. Each guest is drunk to by his chriftian and furname; and a drop of wine is swallowed to each perfon's health.

I have been at fore of thofe dinners, where there were more than fixty people, all drinking to each other at the fame time. Their attitudes, and the confufion of different founds had a very fingular effect. Peter not being able to make James hear him, was ftretching himself over the table, and bawling cut as loud as he could; at the fame inftant, he was interrupted by Francis, who was bowing to him, er by a knock of the head from Philip, who was turning about from right to left without perceiving the pofture Peter was in. Philip's turn came next: as he was lifting his glafs to his mouth, his neighbour gave him a jog of the elbow, and fpilling part of his wine, interrupted him at the moft interesting moment. Such scenes as thefe, varied in different ways, were repeated almoft at every part of the table; and the pleafantry of them was enhanced, by obferving the impatience of fome of the people. As to myfelf, I could never find an opportunity of drinking any one's health; but kept my head in conftant motion, to the right and left, and forwards. It is reckoned a qualification to catch an opportunity fe feasonably as to drink to every per

fon's health, witho ut defcending from one's dignity, or meeting with any accident.

The first health being over, every body fits down, and is at liberty to eat for a few moments. Glafs tumblers of a cylindrical form, fix inche shigh, and four wide, are placed in different parts of the table. Every guest within reach of one of thefe tumblers, takes it up and drinks out of it: it would be thought very unpolite, if he was to take a glafs, in order to avoid drinking out of the fame tumbler as his neighbour. This cuftom is not only difagreeable, but at the fame time very dangerous, on account of the fcurvy, which is extremely frequent in Ruffia.

When the company has cat for a few minutes, the emperor's health goes round. This toaft is given in a different manner. A large glafs bottle, to which there is alfo a glass top, is placed on the table before the perfon of the highest rank. This perfon rifes from his feat, as well as his right-hand neighbour, to whom he gives the head of the bottle, and pouring fome wine into the cup, gives out the emperor's health, bowing to the whole company. As foon as he has drunk, he gives the bottle to his neighbour, who paffes the top to the perfon fitting next to him. All the company drinks the emperor's health in the fame manner, while a band of muficians is employed in finging fongs adapted to the ceremony.

The healths of the princes and princeffes of the royal family are then drunk in the fame order, and eating goes on for a little time longer.

The healths of all the guests are then carried round, with another glafs bottle, which is not fo beautiful as the first, and is covered with a cruft of bread.

This toaft goes round nearly in the fame way as the former, except that when the lid of the bottle is given to one's neighbour, it is ufual at the fame time to tell him the chriftian and furname of the perion whofe health is going round: and this must be repeated, making a bow to him: this custom is very troublefome to ftrangers, as the Ruffians have generally three or four chriftian names. This seremony is carried on with the utmost gravity, and one must be very exact in the whole detail, which extends all round the table, However defirous I was of being exact, yet I was always puzzled when the toaft came to me. I used to forget the number of faints named to me, moft of which were never enrolled in our lift. I was, however, very much mortified at this. Befides, I had ufually for my neighbour a Ruffian, who was a very strie obferver of rules; he had acquired by his exactness a right of prefiding over the police of the table, and was very much out of temper, whenever any one was deficient in this point. This gentleman was fo obliging as to fet me right frequently; but on one occafion he was as much puzzled as myfelf, when two

crufts