wasted. The duty of those who follow the first speaker or writer is, primarily, to refute the arguments advanced by the other side; and, secondarily, to establish the contrary. This latter is not always considered essential; it depends somewhat on the purpose of the discussion and the form in which the question is stated.

As to the form of the so-called "question," it is usually a declarative proposition and not an interrogation. This makes it easier to distinguish clearly between the affirmative and negative sides, the one affirming the truth of the proposition, the other denying it. The burden of proof lies with the affirmative. Three courses are open to the negative. The simplest one is merely to attempt to refute all the arguments offered in support and so leave the statement unproved. Or one may attack the statement itself, and, if possible, show it to be false, thus disproving it. The third course is to maintain the truth of some contrary proposition. This last is practically opening a new question and arguing on the affirmative side of it, a question however which, proved, disproves the first. All three of these courses may be adopted in the same argument, though there is always more or less danger in attempting to prove too much.

The question is not only usually declarative in form, it should be put positively, that is, it should not

contain a negative, for this is apt to lead to comparison between the terms "affirmative side" and "negative side." Thus, instead of saying Resolved, That Prohibition does not Prohibit, or Resolved, That Prohibition is a Failure, cast it in some such form as this, Resolved, That Prohibitory Laws can be and are Enforced.

The questions offered for debate in this exercise are questions of fact. They must be argued by references to observation and experience, by appeals to historical records, to statistics, and the like. The writers on the negative side should be furnished, if not with the entire paper, at least with an outline of the arguments of the affirmative side. Merely as practice in dialectics and as a help toward attaining the philosophical attitude of fairness and tolerance, it will be found profitable occa sionally to defend a side which you do not really believe in. But the most effective work will always be done in defense of the cause you cherish.

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Here again select questions of local and present interest if possible.

EXERCISE LIV.

DEBATE (CONTINUED).

Questions of Opinion:

Resolved, That Benedict Arnold's Action at West Point was Excusable.

That More Restrictive Immigration Laws would be to

the Best Interest of the United States.

That Beauty is Its Own Excuse for Being.

That Vivisection is Justifiable.

That the Prosperity of Our Government is Threatened more by Centralization than by Disintegration.

Vast numbers of questions of fact remain unsettled, -historical, geographical, astronomical, biological. So long as they are admittedly unsettled they are subjects for investigation and not for argumentation. It is only

when they have been considered settled by some while others dissent, or by all until something is discovered which reopens the question, that there is occasion for debating them. For then there will be strong arguments to meet and prejudices to overcome. The Swiss, for example, are loth to let the story of William Tell's heroism be relegated from the authenticity of history to the obscurity of myth and legend. And Kopernik and his followers had need to argue, and to argue persistently, before they could hope that the world would give up the Ptolemaic theory of the universe.

But after all, the great majority of debates center about matters of opinion, questions not of what things are but of what they ought to be, questions of good or bad, of right or wrong, of prudence and expediency. Shall a college student be allowed to elect his studies? Shall a public man be judged by his private life? Is democracy a sound political principle? Is a lie ever justifiable? Is there any absolute standard of morality? These are the questions that continually exercise us and call forth all our resources for attack and defense. There is nothing so provocative of debate as the knowledge that some one holds an opinion at variance with our own. We even dispute about tastes in spite of the old inhibition, which has a grain of sound sense back of it.

Let us admit that debate on matters of opinion is all right. Uniformity, among all individuals, of capabilities, acquirements, and tastes, would be no more desirable than uniformity in facial features and expression. But harmony of sentiment in such matters as we have alluded to above is in the main desirable. To bring

about this harmony should be the praiseworthy object of all debate.

Debaters must be particularly on their guard here against a danger which has already been pointed out (Exercise XLVII.) — that of beginning with a misunderstanding of terms. In questions of fact or of the relations between facts this danger hardly exists; but in questions of the relations that do or should exist between concepts we have to deal with terms of a much more indefinite character and therefore much less likely to be clearly understood. It is of the utmost importance that any obscurities on this point be first removed.

Besides this danger there is a difficulty often met with on the very threshold of these discussions - due to what may be styled the personal equation. It consists, not in a misunderstanding of the terms involved, but in a difference of understanding or even a radical disagreement in regard to their meaning. The same word may mean one thing to you and another to me, or what you may call by one name I may prefer to call by a very different name. This is due to many things, different training, different standards, different beliefs. If such a disagreement exists at the very starting-point and is not recognized, the discussion is bound to be unfruitful. It would manifestly be useless for two persons to debate upon the question of Cæsar's patriotism unless they had practically the same idea as to what patriotism consists in. In short, one question of opinion may depend upon another; that other then must be settled first. Suppose we consider the question as to the morality of Queen Elizabeth's principles. Now we are told that to Queen Elizabeth a falsehood

was "simply an intellectual means of meeting a difficulty." Our question cannot be settled until we settle the question whether lying is justifiable or consistent with morality. And that may depend on our answer to the still more fundamental question, Is there any absolute standard of morality? Beware of discussing any question of opinion until you are sure there is a unity of sentiment on all questions underlying it.

We have said that the real object of discussions of this class should be to bring about a final harmony of opinion. This being the purpose it almost goes without saying that debates should be conducted with the utmost candor, courtesy, and liberality. Nothing is to be gained by any other course, while everything is to be lost.

We append here the opening of an argument by Prof. Andrew F. West in the North American Review for February, 1884

MUST THE CLASSICS GO?

Is classical training necessary in liberal education? To appreciate this question we must first know what education means. Every man is born into this world ignorant both of himself and his surroundings, but to act his part so as to reach success and happiness needs to understand them both. Therefore, he must learn; and, having to learn, must be educated. This will involve two processes : —

1. The development of man's power to master himself and circumstances by training every capacity to its highest energy discipline.

2. Communication of the most valuable knowledge tion.

informa

Both are necessary. Discipline precedes information, because power precedes acquisition. Information completes discipline by