nothing may be the real mystery; but because we cannot fathom that, we are not going to sit down in contented ignorance of God. We have seen that the question, whether living forms have been created? has nothing whatever to do with the creation of matter and energy, and of the laws which govern them. These are the materials without which the work would be impossible; but it is only of the work itself that we affirm design. It seems to be assumed that the proper work of Deity is to create matter out of nothing, impose certain laws. upon it, and then leave it to find its balance; whereas the fact seems to be that the very existence of matter implies certain properties in it, and its bare motion in space carries with it "law" as a necessary correlate.

If this fact were recognised, viz., that the so-called laws of matter and motion are as necessary as the laws of mathematics—not purposely imposed, not admitting of abrogation so long as matter exists, and that all intelligent action in the universe is concerned with composing, decomposing, recomposing, throwing matter into new arrangements, giving energy new distributions-a great deal of misconception would be got rid of, and the character of the Deity would be freed from the appearance of harshness. Misled by the term "law," writers on the one side appear to think that free action in the universe is impossible, and writers on the other speak of the Lawgiver who can suspend the laws He has imposed. The word law is used in different senses-in at least five different senses, says the Duke of Argyll—and "in its primary signification is the authoritative expression of human will enforced by power."1 Using the word in 1 Reign of Law, p. 64.

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this primary and only proper sense, law implies a lawgiver; but in all cases as applied in science it is a metaphor, so that its use does not imply that God orders matter to move as it does, and compels it to obey through fear of the penalties His power could enforce. Since therefore in the two phases, "a law of the British Legislature," and "a law of nature," the idea is not the same, it should not in the second case be expressed by the same term as in the first. If we would say methods of nature with Mr G. H. Lewes,1 we should be less likely to deceive ourselves with words. It is common to say that the regularity of natural law is an expression of the unchanging Divine will; that the laws of the Deity are inflexible; that if you take oxalic acid in mistake for Epsom salts (the crystals are very similar), you must die because you have broken His law. Of Hugh Miller, whose long-continued disregard of the conditions of health induced a diseased brain, which led him to commit suicide, the Spectator, of 3d January 1867, said " Miller broke down because he was disobeying the laws of the creation in which he lived. . . . Whether understood or not in the critical sense, the law goes on relentless, and all who stand across its path are mowed. down." The Spectator's theory had not altered in the course of ten years following, for in its issue of December 12th, 1868, it says, concerning the execution of Monti and Tognetti-who blew up some Zouaves by a device very similar to that employed to shatter Clerkenwell prison-"The sentence was either just or unjust. If just-and nobody disputes their guilt-surely a Pope is of all men most bound to see justice done. He is the vicegerent of Heaven, say the Italians. Well, and the

1 Comte's Philosophy of the Sciences. By G. H. Lewes.

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laws of Heaven are, of all laws, those which pay least respect to motive. If a saint puts his finger into the fire, the fire burns the finger." If this is a true viewthat Heaven pays no respect to motive, that the child who eats hemlock in mistake for wild celery must be punished with death-it is difficult to see that God is either loving or just. The difficulty disappears on the view we are maintaining, which may be again briefly stated as follows:-Matter is non-intelligent, dead, and cannot obey law (primary and only true sense of “law ;") for obedience, equally with legislation, implies intelligence. Matter exists in space, and its parts are related to one another by position; it admits of being moved, and, when in motion, may strike against other matter in its path, and set that in motion, in this direction or that, and swiftly or slowly, according to its mass and the direction of the blow. As soon as the first matter is set agoing, and its mass, velocity, and line of motion are observed, all results may be mathematically deduced, for they are as necessary as that the three angles of a triangle should be equal to two right angles. These results are natural phenomena, and our philosophers are showing us that all the phenomena of the physical world result from the motion of matter. The so-called "laws" are neither of man nor of God; but matter exists, and motion is possible, and the consequents are necessarily the same for the same antecedent motions. The "laws" are necessarily coeval with the existence of moving matter, and therefore cannot in their nature be abrogated, suspended, or altered for a single moment; at least the only conceivable case of their suspensionand that would be seeming rather than real-would be in the absolute stillness of all matter everywhere-a

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universe of death. The volition of man, however, has power to originate motion in matter-or, more strictly, since probably every particle of matter is always in motion-has power to accelerate, retard, or rather to change the direction of moving matter, and so occasion other phenomena than those which would have fallen out, while yet the newly-educed motions are as "natural" as any other, and depend entirely on the character and strength of the motion-producing effort, in conjunction with the previously existing motion-states and space-relations of the parts of matter affected. Man effects his purposes, matter and motion and "law" being his means; he works on to his results, using motion and "law" as his tools, and matter, of course, as his material. An artificer possessing a good knowledge of the capabilities of his tools and material can effect more than the workman who is ignorant. The man of science is a better artificer than others, as a visit to the Royal Institution or any laboratory would convince us. Power over matter is proportionate to knowledge. The Creator must be supposed to have all knowledge of matter's capabilities, and of the phenomena possible as results of various complicated motions; and by His marvellous science (omni-science) He fashions worlds and trees and human bodies. On this view the forces of nature may tend relentlessly to mow us down; but God is on our side; fire is fitted to burn, not of His arrangement, but naturally, and He spreads the nerves of feeling over the surface of the body to give us warning pain; oxalic acid is fitted to kill, but by no law of His imposing, and He is not cruelly inflexible.

On this view also, it becomes evident that every work of creation must have incidental results, which may or

may not be desirable as the sculptor who chisels a statue must put up with the chippings on the floorand that thus what looks like imperfection, or blundering, or maleficence, may perhaps be accounted for, partial evil being general good, the positive pole in the battery having a negative as its necessary correlate. Sir Benjamin Brodie remarks,-"In a machine of human invention effects arise which are truly incidental; that is, which were never contemplated or intended by the inventor. For instance, it was casually discovered that an abundance of electricity may be obtained from the steam supplied by the boiler of a steam-engine. But such a result had never been anticipated by those to whom we are indebted for this great invention. Does anything like this happen with regard to the machinery of the universe? Is it not more probable that everything that occurs has been anticipated, and has its definite and appointed purpose?"1 On this it seems necessary to remark, that effects may be incidental although they are anticipated, may be clearly foreseen as sure to arise if a certain course is taken, and yet that course may be taken as being the best on the whole. An occasional eclipse of the sun may be either a good thing or a bad, but it scarcely has the appearance of being designed: it is an incidental result of the relation given to the moon's orbit with respect to the earth's orbit; a relation which, if it were purposely altered, might involve other effects not directly aimed at, though clearly foreseen. The different distance of each planet from the sun entails difference in the amount of light and heat received, and in the time it akes for the rays to reach them; besides a difference in

1 Psychological Inquiries, first part, p. 157.