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forbear from offering violence to himself, whilst a doubt remains upon his mind concerning the lawfulness of suicide.

It is prudent, you allow, to take the safe side. But our observation means something more. We assert that the action concerning which we doubt, whatever it may be in itself, or to another, would, in us, whilst this doubt remains upon our minds, be certainly sinful. The case is expressly so adjudged by St. Paul, with whose authority we will for the present rest contented. "I know and am persuaded by the Lord Jesus, that there is nothing unclean of itself; but to him that esteemeth any thing to be unclean, to him it is unclean. Happy is he that condemneth not himself in that thing which he alloweth; and he that doubteth, is damned (condemned) if he eat, for whatsoever is not of faith (i. e. not done with a full persuasion of the lawfulness of it) is sin." (Rom. xiv, 14. 22, 23.)

BOOK II.

MORAL OBLIGATIONS.

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CHAPTER I.

THE QUESTION WHY AM I OBLIGED TO KEEP MY WORD?" CONSIDERED.

WHY am I obliged to keep my word?

Because it is right, says one.-Because it is agreeable to the fitness of things, says another. -Because it is conformable to reason and nature, says a third.-Because it is conformable to truth, says a fourth.-Because it promotes the public good, says a fifth.-Because it is required by the will of God, concludes a sixth.

Upon which different accounts, two things are observable :-
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First, that they all ultimately coincide.

The fitness of things, means their fitness to produce happiness: the nature of things, means that actual constitution of the world, by which some things, as such and such actions, for example, produce happiness, and others misery; reason is the principle, by which we discover or judge of this constitution: truth is this judgment, expressed or drawn out into propositions. So that it necessarily comes to pass, that what promotes the public happiness, or happiness on the whole, is agreeable to the fitness of things, to nature, to reason, and to truth and such (as will appear by and by) is the Divine character, that what promotes the general happiness, is required by the will of God: and what has all the above properties, must needs be right; for right means no more than conformity to the rule we go by, whatever that rule be.

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And this is the reason that moralists, from whatever different principles they set out, commonly meet in their conclusions; that is, they enjoin the same conduct, prescribe the same rules of duty, and, with a few exceptions, deliver upon dubious cases the same determinations.

Secondly, it is to be observed, that these answers all leave the matter short; for the inquirer may turn round upon his teacher with a second question, in which he will expect to be satisfied, namely, Why am I obliged to do what is right; to act agreeably to the fitness of things; to conform to reason, nature, or truth; to promote the public good, or to obey the will of God?

The proper method of conducting the inquiry is, First, to examine what we mean, when we say a man is obliged to do any thing; and THEN to shew why he is obliged to do the thing which we have proposed as an example, namely, "to keep his word*.”

*Writers on ethics differ widely about moral obligation; they disagree even as to its definition. Some say that it is the necessary connection subsisting between the practice of virtue, and the attainment of its end. Paley says, it is being urged by a violent motive (the hope of heaven and the fear of hell), resulting from the command of another (namely, of God). Dr. Pearson denies that obligation and motive can in any way be deemed synonymous. In this opinion several distinguished writers acquiesce; but although it may be granted that not every motive can be said to oblige, yet it may, with equal truth, be main. tained, that every obligation must have an efficient motive. This is maintained by bishops Cumberland and

Law, Puffendorf, and others, who seem to have proved that nothing can be said to oblige us morally that is not in some way necessary to our happiness. To establish this position is the object which Paley has in view when he discusses the nature of obligation, and it is only by a reference to the end of our creation, that a conclusive reply can be given to the enquiry. For example, it may be asked, Why am I obliged to refrain from the commission of fraud? Dr. Cudworth would answer, because the understanding informs us that it is right; if we consulted Hutcheson, his reply would be, because it is the dictate of the moral sense; Hume would allege, because it tends to promote the general welfare of society; and Warbur

CHAPTER II.

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WHAT WE MEAN WHEN WE SAY A MAN IS OBLIGED TO DO A THING.

A MAN is said to be obliged, "when he is urged by a violent motive resulting from the command of another."

I. "The motive must be violent." If a person, who has done me some little service, or has a small place at his disposal, ask me upon some occasion for my vote, I may possibly give it him, from a motive of gratitude or expectation: but I should hardly say that I was obliged to give it him; because the inducement does not rise high enough. Whereas if a father or a master, any great benefactor, or one on whom my fortune depends, require my vote, I give it him of course*: and my answer to all who ask me why I voted so and so, is, that my father or my master obliged me; that I had received so many favours from, or had so great a dependence upon, such a one, that I was obliged to vote as he directed me.

Secondly, "It must result from the command of another." Offer a man a gratuity for doing any thing, for seizing, for example, an offender, he is not obliged by your offer to do it; nor would he say he is; though he may be induced, persuaded, prevailed upon, tempted. If a magistrate or the man's immediate superior command it, he considers himself as obliged to comply, though possibly he would lose less by a refusal in this case, than in the former.

I will not undertake to say that the words obligation and obliged are used uniformly in this sense, or always with this distinction: nor is it possible to tie down popular phrases to any constant signification: but wherever the motive is violent enough, and coupled with the idea of command, authority, law, or the will of a superior, there, I take it, we always reckon ourselves to be obliged.

And from this account of obligation it follows, that we can be obliged to nothing, but what we ourselves are to gain or lose something by: for nothing else can be a "violent motive" to us. As we should not be obliged to obey the laws, or the magistrate, unless rewards or punishments, pleasure or pain, somehow or other, depended upon our obedience; so neither should we, without the same reason, be obliged to do what is right, to practise virtue, or to obey the commands of God.

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CHAPTER III.

THE QUESTION WHY AM I OBLIGED TO KEEP MY WORD?" RESUMED.

LET it be remembered, that to be obliged, is " to be urged by a violent motive, resulting from the command of another."

And then let it be asked, Why am I obliged to keep my word? and the answer will be, Because I am" urged to do so by a violent motive" (namely, the expectation of being

ton, because it is the will of God. But why should I act in conformity with what moralists have termed rectitude? Why attend to the suggestions of conscience? Why consult the general welfare of mankind? Why obey the commands of God? There is no absolute incon

gruity, no contradiction in proposing any of these questions; and the only satisfactory answer which can be given is, that by so acting we shall secure our greatest possible happiness.Wainewright's Vindication of Paley, 96. Not if against my conscience. See p. 509.-ED.

after this life rewarded, if I do, or punished for it, if I do not), "resulting from the command of another" (namely, of God).

This solution goes to the bottom of the subject, as no farther question can reasonably be asked. Therefore, private happiness is our motive, and the will of God our rule.

When I first turned my thoughts to moral speculations, an air of mystery seemed to hang over the whole subject; which arose, I believe, from hence,-that I supposed, with many authors whom I had read, that to be obliged to do a thing, was very different from being induced only to do it: and that the obligation to practise virtue, to do what is right, just, &c. was quite another thing, and of another kind, than the obligation which a soldier is under to obey his officer, a servant his master: or any of the civil and ordinary obligations of human life. Whereas, from what has been said it appears, that moral obligation is like all other obligations; and that obligation is nothing more than an inducement of sufficient strength, and resulting, in some way, from the command of another.

There is always understood to be a difference between an act of prudence and an act of duty. Thus if I distrusted a man who owed me a sum of money, I should reckon it an act of prudence to get another person bound with him; but I should hardly call it an act of duty. On the other hand, it would be thought a very unusual and loose kind of language, to say, that, as I had made such a promise, it was prudent to perform it or that, as my friend, when he went abroad, placed a box of jewels in my hands, it would be prudent in me to preserve it for him till he returned.

Now, in what, you will ask, does the difference consist? inasmuch, as, according to our account of the matter, both in the one case and the other, in acts of duty as well as acts of prudence, we consider solely what we ourselves shall gain or lose by the act.

The difference, and the only difference, is this; that, in the one case, we consider what we shall gain or lose in the present world; in the other case, we consider also what we shall gain or lose in the world to come.

They who would establish a system of morality, independent of a future state, must look out for some different idea of moral obligation; unless they can show that virtue conducts the possessor to certain happiness in this life, or to a much greater share of it than he could attain by a different behaviour.

To us there are two great questions:

I. Will there be after this life any distribution of rewards and punishments at all?
II. If there be, what actions will be rewarded, and what will be punished?

The first question comprises the credibility of the Christian religion, together with the presumptive proofs of a future retribution from the light of nature. The second question comprises the province of morality. Both questions are too much for one work. The affirmative therefore of the first, although we confess that it is the foundation upon which the whole fabric rests, must in this treatise be taken for granted.

CHAPTER IV.

THE WILL OF GOD.

As the will of God is our rule; to inquire what is our duty, or what we are obliged to do, in any instance, is, in effect, to inquire what is the will of God in that instance? which consequently becomes the whole business of morality.

Now there are two methods of coming at the will of God on any point:

I. By his express declarations, when they are to be had, and which must be sought for in Scripture.

II. By what we can discover of his designs and disposition from his works; or, as we usually call it, the light of nature.

And here we may observe the absurdity of separating natural and revealed religion from each other. The object of both is the same,-to discover the will of God,—and provided we do but discover it, it matters nothing by what means.

An ambassador, judging by what he knows of his sovereign's disposition, and arguing from what he has observed of his conduct, or is acquainted with of his designs, may take his measure in many cases with safety, and presume with great probability how his master would have him act on most occasions that arise: but if he have his commission and instructions in his pocket, it would be strange not to look into them. He will be directed by both rules; when his instructions are clear and positive, there is an end to all farther deliberation (unless indeed he suspect their authenticity): where his instructions are silent or dubious, he will endeavour to supply or explain them, by what he has been able to collect from other quarters of his master's general inclination or intentions.

Mr. Hume, in his fourth Appendix to his Principles of Morals, has been pleased to complain of the modern scheme of uniting ethics with the Christian theology. They who find themselves disposed to join in this complaint, will do well to observe what Mr. Hume himself has been able to make of morality without this union. And for that purpose, let them read the second part of the ninth section of the above essay; which part contains the practical application of the whole treatise,-a treatise which Mr. Hume declares to be "incomparably the best he ever wrote." When they have read it over, let them consider, whether any motives there proposed are likely to be found sufficient to withhold men from the gratification of lust, revenge, envy, ambition, avarice; or to prevent the existence of these passions. Unless they rise up from this celebrated essay with stronger impressions upon their minds than it ever left upon mine, they will acknowledge the necessity of additional sanctions. But the necessity of these sanctions is not now the question. If they be in fact established, if the rewards and punishments held forth in the gospel will actually come to pass, they must be considered. Such as reject the Christian religion, are to make the best shift they can to build up a system, and lay the foundation of morality, without it. But it appears to me a great inconsistency in those who receive Christianity, and expect something to come of it, to endeavour to keep all such expectations out of sight in their reasonings concerning human duty.

The method of coming at the will of God, concerning any action, by the light of nature, is to inquire into "the tendency of the action to promote or diminish the general happiness." This rule proceeds upon the presumption, that God Almighty wills and wishes the happiness of his creatures; and, consequently, that those actions, which promote that will and wish, must be agreeable to him; and the contrary.

As this presumption is the foundation of our whole system, it becomes necessary to explain the reasons upon which it rests.

CHAPTER V.

THE DIVINE BENEVOLENCE.

WHEN God created the human species, either he wished their happiness, or he wished their misery, or he was indifferent and unconcerned about both.

If he had wished our misery, he might have made sure of his purpose, by forming our senses to be so many sores and pains to us, as they are now instruments of gratification and enjoyment: or by placing us amidst objects so ill suited to our perceptions, as to have continually offended us, instead of ministering to our refreshment and delight. He might have made, for example, every thing we tasted, bitter; every thing we saw, loathsome; every thing we touched, a sting; every smell a stench; and every sound a discord.

If he had been indifferent about our happiness or misery, we must impute to our good

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