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say then? shall we continue in sin, that grace may abound?" which he answers by a strong negative "God forbid." What the apostle designed in this passage is sufficiently evident. He knew in what manner some might be apt to construe his expressions: and he anticipates their mistake. He is beforehand with them, by protesting against any such use being made of his doctrine; which yet, he was aware, might by possibility be made.

By way of showing scripturally the obligation and the necessity of personal endeavours after virtue, all the numerous texts, which exhort to virtue, and admonish us against vice, might be quoted, for they are all directly to the purpose; that is, we might quote every page of the New Testament. "Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven; but he that doeth the will of my Father which is in heaven." “If ye know these things, happy are ye if ye do them." In both these texts the reward attends the doing the promise is annexed to works. Again; "To them, who by patient continuance and well-doing seek for glory and immortality, eternal life: but unto them that are contentious, and obey not the truth, but obey unrighteousness, tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man that doeth evil." Again; "Of the which," namely, certain enumerated vices, "I tell you before, as I have also told you in time past, that they, which do such things, shall not inherit the kingdom of God." These are a few amongst many texts of the same effect, and they are such as can never be got over. Stronger terms cannot be devised than what are here used. Were the purpose, therefore, simply to prove from Scripture the necessity of virtue, and the danger of vice, so far as salvation is concerned, these texts are decisive. But when an answer is to be given to those, who so interpret certain passages of the apostolic writings, especially the passages which speak of the efficacy of the death of Christ, or draw such inferences from these passages, as amount to a dispensing with the obligations of virtue, then the best method of proving, that theirs cannot be a right interpretation, nor theirs just inferences, is, by showing, which fortunately we are able to do, that it is the very interpretation, and these the very inferences, which the apostles were themselves aware of, which they provided against, and which they protested against. The four texts, quoted from the apostolic writings in this discourse, were quoted with this view; and they may be considered, I think, as showing the minds of the authors upon the point in question more determinately, than any general exhortation to good works, or any general denunciation against sin could do. I assume, therefore, as a proved point, that whatever was said by the apostles concerning the efficacy of the death of Christ, was said by them under an apprehension, that they did not thereby in any manner relax the motives, the obligation, or the necessity of good works. But still there is another important question behind; namely, whether, notwithstanding what the apostles have said, or may have meant to say, there be not, in the nature of things, an invincible inconsistency between the efficacy of the death of Christ and the necessity of a good life; whether those two propositions can, in fair reasoning, stand together; or whether it does not necessarily follow, that if the death of Christ be efficacious, then good works are no longer necessary: and, on the other hand, that if good works be still necessary, then is the death of Christ not efficacious.

Now to give an account of this question, and of the difficulty which it seems to present, we must bear in mind, that in the businesss of salvation there are naturally and properly two things, viz. the cause and the condition; and that these two things are different. We should see better the propriety of this distinction, if we would allow ourselves to consider well what salvation is: what the being saved means. It is nothing less than, after this life is ended, being placed in a state of happiness exceedingly great, both in degree and duration; in a state, concerning which the following things are said: "The sufferings of this present world are not worthy to be compared with the glory that shall be revealed." "God hath in store for us such things as pass man's understanding." So that, you see; it is not simply escaping punishment, simply being excused or forgiven, simply being compensated or repaid for the little good we do, but it is infinitely more, heaven is infinitely greater than mere compensation, which natural religion itself might lead us to expect. What do the Scriptures call it? "Glory, honour, immortality, eternal life." "To them that seek for glory and honour and immortality, eternal life." Will any one then contend, that salvation in this sense, and to this extent; that heaven, eternal life, glory, honour, immortality; that a

happiness such as that there is no way of describing it, but by saying that it surpasses human comprehension, that it casts the sufferings of this life to such a distance, as not to bear any comparison with it; will any one contend, that this is no more than what virtue deserves, what, in its own proper nature, and by its own merit, it is entitled to look forward to, and to receive? The greatest virtue that man ever attained, has no such pretensions. The best good action that man ever performed, has no claim to this extent, or any thing like it. It is out of all calculation, and comparison, and proportion above, and more than any human works can possibly deserve. To what then are we to ascribe it, that endeavours after virtue should procure, and that they will, in fact, procure, to those who sincerely exert them, such immense blessings? To what, but to the voluntary bounty of Almighty God, who in his inexpressible good pleasure hath appointed it so to be? The benignity of God towards man hath made him this inconceivably advantageous offer. But a most kind offer may still be a conditional offer. And this, though an infinitely gracious and beneficial offer, is still a conditional offer, and the performance of the conditions is as necessary, as if it had been an offer of mere retribution. The kindness, the bounty, the generosity of the offer, do not make it less necessary to perform the conditions, but more so. A conditional offer may be infinitely kind on the part of the benefactor, who makes it, may be infinitely beneficial to those, to whom it is made; if it be from a prince or governor, may be infinitely gracious and merciful on his part; and yet, being conditional, the condition is as necessary as if the offer had been no more than that of scanty wages by a hard taskmaster. In considering this matter in general, the whole of it appears to be very plain; yet, when we apply the consideration to religion, there are two mistakes, into which we are very liable to fall. The first is, that when we hear so much of the exceedingly great kindness of the offer, we are apt to infer, that the conditions, upon which it is made, will not be exacted. Does that at all follow? Because the offer, even with these conditions, is represented to be the fruit of love and mercy and kindness, and is in truth so, and is most justly so to be accounted, does it follow that the conditions of the offer are not necessary to be performed? This is one error, into which we slide, against which we ought to guard ourselves most diligently; for it is not simply false in its principle, but most pernicious in its application, its application always being to countenance us in some sin, which we will not relinquish. The second mistake is, that, when we have performed the conditions, or think that we have performed the conditions, or when we endeavour to perform the conditions, upon which the reward is offered, we forthwith attribute our obtaining the reward to this our performance or endeavour, and not to that, which is the beginning and foundation and cause of the whole, the true and proper cause, namely, the kindness and bounty of the original offer. This turn of thought, likewise, as well as the former, it is necessary to warn you against. For it has these consequences: it damps our gratitude to God, it takes off our attention from Him. Some, who allow the necessity of good works to salvation, are not willing that they should be called conditions of salvation. But this, I think, is a distinction too refined for common Christian apprehension. If they be necessary to salvation, they are conditions of salvation, so far as I can see. It is a question, however, not now before us.

But to return to the immediate subject of our discourse. Our observations have carried us thus far, that in the business of human salvation there are two most momentous considerations, the cause and the conditions, and that these considerations are distinct. I now proceed to say, that there is no inconsistency between the efficacy of the death of Christ and the necessity of a holy life (by which I mean sincere en leavours after holiness), because the first, the death of Christ, relates to the cause of salvation; the second, namely, good works, respects the conditions of salvation; and that the cause of salvation is one thing, the conditions another.

The cause of salvation is the free will, the free gift, the love and mercy of God. That alone is the source and fountain, and cause of salvation, the origin from which it springs, from which all our hopes of attaining to it are derived. This cause is not in ourselves, nor in anything we do, or can do, but in God, in his good will and pleasure. It is, as we have before shown, in the graciousness of the original offer. Therefore, whatever shall have moved and excited and conciliated that good will and pleasure, so as to have procured that offer to

be made, or shall have formed any part or portion of the motive, from which it was made, may most truly and properly be said to be efficacious in human salvation.

This efficacy is in Scripture attributed to the death of Christ. It is attributed in a variety of ways of expression, but this is the substance of them all. He is a sacrifice, an offering to God; a propitiation; the precious sacrifice, foreordained, "the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world: the Lamb which taketh away the sin of the world: we are washed in his blood; we are justified by his blood; we are saved from wrath through him; he hath once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God." All these terms, and many more that are used, assert in substance the same thing, namely, the efficacy of the death of Christ in the procuring of human salvation. To give to these expressions their proper moment and import, it is necessary to reflect over and over again, and by reflection to impress our minds with a just idea, what and how great a thing salvation is; for it is by means of that idea alone, that we can ever come to be sensible how unspeakably important, how inestimable in value, any efficacy, which operates upon that event, must be to us all. The highest terms, in which the Scriptures speak of that efficacy, are not too great; cannot be too great because it respects an interest and an event so vast, so momentous, as to make all other interests, and all other events, in comparison contemptible.

The sum of our argument is briefly this.-There may appear, and to many there has appeared, to be an inconsistency or incompatibility between the efficacy of the death of Christ, and the necessity of sincere endeavours after obedience. When the subject is properly examined, there turns out to be no such incompatibility. The graciousness of an offer does not diminish the necessity of the condition. Suppose a prince to promise to one of his subjects, upon compliance with certain terms and the performance of certain duties, a reward, in magnitude and value, out of all competition beyond the merit of the compliance, the desert of the performance; to what shall such a subject ascribe the happiness held out to him? He is an ungrateful man, if he attribute it to any cause whatever, but to the bounty and goodness of his prince in making him the offer; or if he suffer any consideration, be it what it will, to interfere with, or diminish, his sense of that bounty and goodness. Still it is true that he will not obtain what is offered, unless he comply with the terms; so far his compliance is a condition of his happiness. But the grand thing is the offer being made at all. That is the ground and origin of the whole. That is the cause. And it is ascribable to favour, grace, and goodness, on the part of the prince, and to nothing else. It would, therefore, be the last degree of ingratitude in such a subject, to forget his prince, whilst he thought of himself; to forget the cause, whilst he thought of the condition: to regard every thing promised as merited. The generosity, the kindness, the voluntariness, the bounty of the original offer, come by this means to be neglected in his mind entirely. This, in my opinion, describes our situation with respect to God. The love, goodness, and grace of God, in making us a tender of salvation, and the effects of the death of Christ, do not diminish the necessity or the obligation of the condition of the tender, which is sincere endeavours after holiness; nor are in any wise inconsistent with such obligation.

SERMON XXI.

PURE RELIGION.

Pure religion and undefiled before God and the Father is this, to visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction, and to keep himself unspotted from the world.-JAMES, i. 27.

NOTHING can be more useful than summary views of our duty, if they be well drawn, and rightly understood. It is a great advantage to have our business laid before us altogether; to see at one comprehensive glance, as it were, what we are to do, and what we are not to do. It would be a great ease and satisfaction to both, if it were possible, for a master to

give his servant directions for his conduct in a single sentence, which he, the servant, had only to apply and draw out into practice, as occasions offered themselves, in order to discharge every thing which was required or expected from him. This, which is not practicable in civil life, is in a good degree so in a religious life; because a religious life proceeds more upon principle, leaving the exercise and manifestation of that principle more to the judgment of the individual, than it can be left where, from the nature of the case, one man is to act precisely according to another man's direction.

But then, as I have said, it is essentially necessary, that these summaries be well drawn up, and rightly understood; because if they profess to state the whole of men's duties, yet, in fact, state it partially and imperfectly, all who read them are misled, and dangerously misled. In religion, as in other things, we are too apt of ourselves to substitute a part for the whole. Substituting a part for the whole is the grand tendency of human corruption in matters both of morality and religion: which propensity, therefore, will be encouraged, when that, which professes to exhibit the whole of religion, does not, in truth, exhibit the whole. What is there omitted, we shall omit, glad of the occasion and excuse: what is not set down as our duty, we shall not think ourselves obliged to perform, not caring to increase the weight of our own burden. This is the case whenever we use summaries of religion, which, in truth, are imperfect or ill drawn. But there is another case more common, and productive of the same effect, and that is when we misconstrue these summary accounts of our duty; principally when we conceive of them as intending to express more than they were really intended to express: for then it comes to pass, that, although they be right and perfect as to what they were intended for, yet they are wrong and imperfect, as to what we construe and conceive them for. This observation is particularly applicable to the text. St. James is here describing religion, not in its principle but in its effects; and these effects are truly and justly and fully displayed. They are by the apostle made to consist in two large articles, in succouring the distress of others, and maintaining our own innocency: and these two articles do comprehend the whole of the effects of true religion: which were exactly what the apostle meant to describe. Had St. James intended to have set forth the motives and principles of religion, as they ought to subsist in the heart of a Christian, I doubt not but he would have mentioned love to God, and faith in Jesus Christ; for from these must spring every thing good and acceptable in our actions. In natural objects it is one thing to describe the root of a plant, and another its fruits and flowers; and if we think a writer is describing the roots and fibres, when, in truth, he is describing the fruit or flowers, we shall mistake his meaning, and our mistake must produce great confusion. So in spiritual affairs, it is one thing to set before us the principle of religion, and another the effects of it. These are not to be confounded. And if we apply a description to one which was intended for the other, we deal unfairly by the writer of the description, and erroneously by ourselves. Therefore, first, let no one suppose the love of God, the thinking of him, the being grateful to him, the fearing to disobey him, not to be necessary parts of true religion, because they are not mentioned in St. James's account of true religion. The answer is, that these compose the principles of true religion; St. James's account relates to the effects. In like manner concerning faith in Jesus Christ. St. James has recorded his opinion upon that subject. His doctrine is, that the tree which bears no fruit cannot be sound at the root; that the faith which is unproductive is not the right faith: but then this is allowing (and not denying), that a right faith is the source and spring of true virtue and had our apostle been asked to state the principle of religion, I am persuaded he would have referred us to a true faith. But that was not the inquiry; on the contrary, having marked strongly the futility of a faith which produced no good effects upon life and action, he proceeds in the text to tell us what the effects are which it ought to produce; and these he disposes into two comprehensive classes (but still meaning to describe the effects of religion, and not its root or principle), positive virtue and personal innocence.

Now, I say, that, for the purpose for which it was intended, the account given by St. James is full and complete: and it carries with it this peculiar advantage, that it very specially guards against an error, natural, I believe, and common in all ages of the world; which is, the making beneficence an apology for licentiousness; the thinking that doing good

occasionally may excuse us from strictness in regulating our passions and desires. The text expressly cuts up this excuse, because it expressly asserts both things to be necessary to compose true religion. Where two things are necessary, one cannot excuse the want of the other. Now, what does the text teach? it teaches us what pure and undefiled religion is in its effects and in its practice: and what is it? "to visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction, and to keep himself unspotted from the world:" not simply to visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction: that is not all: that is not sufficient: but likewise "to keep himself unspotted from the world."

To visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction, is describing a class, or species, or kind of virtue, by singling out one eminent example of it. I consider the apostle as meaning to represent the value, and to enforce the obligation, of active charity, of positive beneficence, and that he has done it by mentioning a particular instance. A stronger or properer instance could not have been selected: but still it is to be regarded as an instance, not as exclusive of other and similar instances, but as a specimen of these exertions. The case before us, as an instance, is heightened by every circumstance which could give to it weight and priority. The apostle exhibits the most forlorn and destitute of the human species, suffering under the severest of human losses: helpless children deprived of a parent: a wife bereaved of her husband, both sunk in affliction, under the sharpest anguish of their misfortunes. To visit, by which is meant to console, to comfort, to succour, to relieve, to assist such as these, is undoubtedly a high exercise of religion and benevolence, and well selected: but still it is to be regarded as an example, and the whole class of beneficent virtues as intended to be included. This is not only a just and fair, but a necessary construction: because, although the exercise of beneficence be a duty upon every man, yet the kind, the examples of it must be guided in a great degree by each man's faculties, opportunities, and by the occasions, which present themselves. If such an occasion, as that which the text describes, present itself, it cannot be overlooked without an abandonment of religion; but if other and different occasions of doing good present themselves, they also, according to the spirit of our apostle's declaration, must be attended to, or we are wanting in the fruit of the same faith. The second principal expression of the text, "to keep himself unspotted from the world," signifies. the being clean and clear from the licentious practices to which the world is addicted. So that "pure religion and undefiled before God and the Father," consists in two things; beneficence and purity: doing good and keeping clear from sin; not in one thing, but in two things; not in one without the other, but in both; and this, in my opinion, is a great lesson and a most important doctrine.

I shall not, at present, consider the case of those who are anxious, and effectually so, to maintain their personal innocency without endeavouring to do good to others; because I really believe it is not a common case. I think that the religious principle which is able to make men confine their passions and desires within the bounds of virtue, is, with very few exceptions, strong enough at the same time to prompt and put them upon active exertions. Therefore, I would rather apply myself to that part of the case which is more common, active exertions of benevolence, accompanied with looseness of private morals. It is a very common character: but I say, in the first place, it is an inconsistent character: it is doing and undoing: killing and curing: doing good by our charity, and mischief by our licentiousness: voluntarily relieving misery with one hand, and voluntarily producing and spreading it with the other. No real advance is made in human happiness by this contradiction; no real betterness or improvement promoted.

But then, may not the harm a man does by his personal vices, be much less than the good he does by his active virtues? This is a point in which there is large room for delusion and mistake. Positive charity and acts of humanity are often of a conspicuous nature, naturally and deservedly engaging the praises of mankind, which are followed by our own. No one does, no one ought to speak against them, or attempt to disparage them; but the effect of vice and licentiousness, not only in their immediate consequences, but in their remote and ultimate tendencies, which ought all to be included in the account, the mischief which is done by the example, as well as by the act, is seldom honestly computed by the sinner himself; but I do not dwell farther upon this comparison, because I insist, that no man has a right to make

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