66 Udal did not write the book with which he was charged. If he did, his refusal to avow it after conviction and judgment is unaccountable; for nothing could be gained by the refusal, while an avowal would probably have procured a commutation of his sentence, if not a pardon. On the other hand, if he was not the author, we understand at once why he refused to say that he was. And, although disowning the book under oath before conviction would have sufficed" for his acquittal, yet we find a good and magnanimous reason why he would not disown it while he might have done so with truth. He would not leave others open to suspicion and jeopardy of life, although by denial he could clear himself. So he declared in court.3 Upon the supposition that he was not the author, and upon this supposition only, can we understand why he persisted to the last in neither affirming nor denying the fact. Probably his judges supposed that he was. But this does not explain their course of proceeding; an explanation which we think is sufficiently indicated otherwise. The queen and the prelates had been greatly annoyed by the issue of pungent Puritan tracts, and particularly by those of Martin Mar-prelate, which they fancied to have the sanction of the Puritans generally. It was therefore resolved to demonstrate by example, that such books were published at the risk of the gallows, and at a risk impending over even the most learned and emi nent. For this reason Mr. Udal, supposed to be the ringleader" of such writers, and reported to have written "The Demonstration," was put upon trial for his life. There was no law under which he could be convicted of felony. There was no evidence, on which a felony could be pretentiously based, that he had written the obnoxious book. Of both these facts the judges were perfectly aware. They therefore tried their skill at wresting a statute and browbeating a jury, commanding them to receive as evidence what the Court themselves, the jury, and every ear that heard it or heard of it, knew was no evidence. They held their offices and their emoluments at the will of the Crown. It was the will of the Crown that this prosecution should be sustained either by confession or by verdict. Confession, much as it was urged, could not be obtained. Verdict was forced. That the judges wittingly proceeded only by craft, is evident from the fact that "they delighted themselves in the court held against Mr. Udal." In other words, they chuckled over the successful result of their own legal ingenuity. To suppose that they purposed a judicial murder would be monstrous. To suppose that they thought him guilty of felony under the Statute would be silly. But to suppose that they meant to scare him and the whole Puritan family, by putting about his neck a rope, to be removed seasonably upon certain conditions, accords with their whole proceedings. For this they labored from the very opening of the Strype's Annals, VII. 38. 1 Puckering to Udal; Howell, I. 1294. Hargrave, I. 178. 2 prosecution; and though they rejoiced in their success with the jury, they continued to delay execution, and to invent means to avert it. The moral impression at which they aimed was supposed to be secured by the verdict. Further, they did not wish to go. Otherwise in accordance with the custom of the day in cases of felony Mr. Udal's execution would have followed swiftly upon the heels of his sentence. Yet the judges were guilty of his death; as truly guilty as if he had swung from the gibbet. Dying as he did at their hands in prison, he was as truly executed by them.1 The queen herself seems to have been more directly responsible for the death of this man. Lord Burleigh, the Earl of Essex, Sir Walter Raleigh, the merchants of London, interceded again and again for his pardon. The Lord Keeper Puckering (the very man. who pronounced his sentence) and the Archbishop (who for long time would show him no favor), if they kept their promise, also sued to her Majesty for the same. What, then, was in the way of his liberty and life, but her own resolution to "root out Puritanism"? The cases with which we have occupied this chapter have intrinsic interest. But they are also of no small historical importance; for they give us a clear view of that mockery of justice which then obtained in all prosecutions, civil or criminal, in 1 Is it possible that this is what Fuller intended to say covertly when, after having stated that Mr. Udal died in prison broken-hearted (Book LX. p. 222), he speaks of him after wards (p. 233) as having been executed? Such a sly meaning would certainly be characteristic of the writer. which the prerogative or the policy of the crown might be implicated. Verdicts were pre-determined and coerced. Cases were prejudged. However much the forms of law and a due course of justice may have prevailed in ordinary suits, defeat and disgrace were sure for the Puritan appellant, though the righteousness of his cause were never so clear; and for the Puritan defendant, though neither law nor testimony were against him. CHAPTER XIII. HENRY BARROW. A LONDON RAKE. HIS REFORMATION. THE TENETS OF THE INDEPEN- 1586-1588. THERE was a young man in London, a member of the honorable society of Gray's Inn, a barrister "accomplished with strong parts," and conspicuous for his high spirit and gallantry among those who frequented the royal Court. He was of a good family, the son of a gentleman of Norfolk, and had proceeded Bachelor of Arts at Cambridge in the year 1569,-probably at about twenty years of age. Soon after his initiation at Gray's Inn, he became noted among his fellows for his dashing, reckless spirit, and for the fiery zeal and boldness with which he entered upon any enterprise, whether of study, prowess, or amusement, which took his fancy, 1 Harleian Miscellany, IV. 329, 334. |