augured, from the countenance of their usual supporters, the danger of a defeat. The great object now then was to procure fuch a decided majority in that affembly as were willing to go with them in all cafes whatever, and would thereby enable them to proceed to fuch extremities against the ftadtholder as they wifhed and intended.

The first attempt, tending to this purpose, was to obtain addreffes from the towns of the province to the affembly, which they had themfelves dictated, in order to induce the prefent members to depart entirely from that fyftem of moderation which had hitherto proved fo troublesome a reftraint to their proceedings, and to adopt all thofe measures of violence which they were ready to bring forward, as foon as the occafion fhould offer a profpect of fuccefs. The general fcope of thefe addreffes was returning thanks to the ftates for the efforts they had already made in oppofing the alarming progrefs of defpotifm, a ftrong recommendation to proceed with vigour in their exertions to its final extermination, and a promife to fupport them with their lives and fortunes in the purfuit of all fuch farther measures as they fhould judge neceffary for the accomplishment of that purpose.

Though thefe addreffes were triumphantly carried in Dort, Harlem, and fome other towns diftinguished for their republican fpirit and prefent oppofition, yet the attempt failed in fo many others, that the party had no caufe to boast of their fuccefs. In Amsterdam they procured 16,722 fignatures to the addrefs, which they pretended not only to be a majority of the inhabitants, but to include the names of ተ

the principal citizens and burgh. ers; and would therefore have it confidered as the genuine and unequivocal fenfe of the capital. But the contrary to these affertions being then known to be the real state of things, and indeed foon after incontrovertibly established, this attempt at deception added no reputation to the caufe, and leffened the opinion of its ftrength.

Yet thefe addreffes feem to have encouraged the republican party to bring forward a bold and decifive meature, which, though a favourite in contemplation, had not yet been ventured upon. This was the fufpenfion of the prince of Orange from his offices of fladtholder and admiral general, in the fame manner they had already fucceeded in fufpending him from that of captain general. This queftion was brought forward on the 10th of January 1787, and occafioned the warmeft and moft violent debates, for two fucceeding days, that had been known in that affembly The propofers, however, found the oppofition fo formidable, and the afpect of the independent members fo doubtful, that they did not choose to hazard the decifion of a vote on the queftion.

Thus defeated, the only resource feemingly left for procuring a fure majority in the affembly of the ftates, was that of increafing the number of voters. For the better underftanding of this bufinefs, we are to obferve, that feveral towns, which were only villages, or perhaps not in existence, at the time of the union, have fince rifen to wealth and confequence, as others which were then confiderable, have fince declined in perhaps a fimilar progreffion. The former confequently

have

have no reprefentatives in the affembly of the provincial ftates, while the latter, like the decayed boroughs in England, ftill retain their reprefentation; and, however infignificant as to population or property, preferve their rank, tho' not entirely their confequence, as members of the original confede racy and union.

The republican party, in order, as we have feen, to increafe the number of votes in the affembly of the ftates, procured or introduced petitions from Heusden, Woerden, and other new towns which were grown into confideration, requiring a fhare in the general reprefentation. This attempt was fo little likely to fucceed, that it feemed rather the offspring of paffion and a premature confidence and eagernefs, than the result of a cool judgment and any well-founded hope. It was accordingly fo ill received by the ftates, that the towns foon withdrew their petitions, and the party found themfelves again foiled, without their being able to bring the question to an abfolute decifion.

We have heretofore ftated, that the two great parties for and against the houfe of Orange, into which the inhabitants of the United Provinces were divided, were so nearly balanced in point of number, that, if tried by the test of a poll or a general vote, it would be a matter of doubt on which fide the majority would appear. Our opinion was neceffarily founded on fuch informa. tion as we could then obtain. This, however, was fo defective as to lead us, in that refpect, into an error. It now appears from the most indubitable authority, that although the prince of Orange had, through

various caufes and much mifmanagement, loft, within a few years, a very confiderable and alarming fhare of his popularity and influence, yet, that he poffeffed still so fast a hold of the affections or opinion of the great bulk of the people throughout the republic, that, were any decifion by numbers to take place, the majority in his favour would be fo vaft, that the adverse party would appear only a mere handful in the comparison. The peafantry or yeomanry, including in that defcription all the inhabitants of the open country, were, almoft to a man, not only warm, but, it might be faid, violent in their attachments to him. The inhabitants of the inferior towns, and many of their magiftracies, were little lefs fo. And even in the great cities, where it was probably but little expected even by his friends, it appeared, as foon as the teft was applied, that a majority of the inhabitants was on his fide.

This was fully fhewn in the city of Amfterdam, the great and original fource of all the oppofition he had encountered, and of all the mortification which he had endured. We have seen that the adverse party had procured near 17,000 fignatures to an addrefs inimical to the interefts of the stadtholder, which they reprefented as being a majority of the inhabitants, and as conveying the unquestionable sense of that great city; but an affociation having been foon after entered into there for fupporting the rights of that prince, the fubfcribers in three days more than doubled the number of the addreffers, and amounted to above 35,000. In Rotterdam, it was well known that his friends would have been found ftill

more

more numerous in proportion to the general number of the inhabitants.

We have heretofore rightly obferved, that the nobility, (or, in the language of the country, the equeftrian order) together with the army and the navy, were generally ftrongly attached to the house of Orange. To thefe orders of men we shall now add the clergy of the established church, a body whofe opinions and example muft carry great weight and influence in all countries where religion is not nearly extinct; and who, in this, exclufive of all other motives of attachment, had, ever fince the days of Arminius, confidered that family as their principal fhield of protection and defence, against the heterodox doctrines which they imputed to that vifionary innovator. Now as many of the republican leaders had early adopted and still held thefe opinions, and the party were generally difpofed to them, it was no very difficult nor unusual matter, that fome confiderable fhare of that abhorrence which was conceived against doctrines that were regarded as abominable, fhould be transferred to the perfons and party who adopted them; while party zeal, being thus quickened and embittered by religious contefts and prejudices, the enthufiafm excited by the combination could not fail to place the clergy among the foremost fupporters of the Orange caufe and interefts.

With fuch fupports, added to that of the bulk of the people, and fortified with fuch ftrong mounds of defence as great legal and official powers, with a long-established authority, it may appear almoft paradoxical how the fabric could have been fhaken as we have seen by a comparatively small party. To ac.

count for this, it is to be obferved, that the defect in point of number was compenfated, on the fide of the party in oppofition, by a great fuperiority with refpect to wealth, of which they poffeffed not only more than a proportionate fhare, but, it is probable, confiderably more than a moiety of what was contained in the whole republic; and every body will allow, that the more wealth is concentrated, by being lodged in fuch a moderate number of hands as will not be much more than fufficient for its due application to any given purpofe, the more powerful its effects will prove. The fame apparent defect will account, even independent of feveral other caufes which may be eafily pointed out, for the clofe union, the eafy management, and the effective concert, in all cafes, of that party, which appearing like the discipline of a wellregulated army, afforded frequent and great advantages over their loofe and disjointed antagonists. They were likewife in poffeffion of moft of the offices of magiftracy, and in many provinces of the authority and name of the conftitutional government; a circumstance of no fmall weight in the estimate of political ftrength. The fpringing up of the democratical fpirit, however ruinous to the ariftocracies in the iffue, was for the present a wonderful acceffion of ftrength to the adverse party, by throwing that great body of the burghers on whom it operated directly into their arms. To all thefe may with juftice be added, and certainly will not be confidered as an inefficient caufe, that feveral of the leaders of the republican party were men of very confiderable parts and abilities; while it must be acknowledged by

all

all who attend to the course of the conteft, that these qualities were in no degree counterbalanced on the other fide. A great fuperiority in policy, and all party manoeuvres, was the neceffary consequence.

The affairs of Utrecht had long been a fource of great embarraff ment to the ftates of Holland. It was effential to the views of the dominant party to fupport that city; but the doing of it by open force was fo flagrant a violation of the union, and would appear fo daring an inroad upon the rights of another ftate, which was in all refpects their equal, and whofe powers of jurifdiction and government were as completely and firmly eftablished as their own, was fo alarming and hazardous a meafure, that it could not without much difficulty be adopted.

Pretty early in the fummer of the year 1786, the republican party finding or thinking themfelves fufficiently strong, brought this fubject forward in the affembly of the tates of Holland, by moving a refolution, that they fhould by force of arms refift all attempts of coercion that were made against the city of Utrecht. This queftion produced long and vehement debates, which were maintained with great perfeverance, and no fmall degree of animofity on both fides. The parties, however, appeared fo nearly equal in ftrength, that neither fide feemed much difpofed to bring the queftion to an abfolute decifion, and it feemed to be dropped by a fort of mutual tacit confent.

But in the following September, when the capture of Elbourg and Hattem had blown up the flame of difcontent to the highest pitch, against the stadtholder in the pro

vince of Holland, the ftates, on the 6th of that month, iffued a fudden order, that all their troops fhould be in readiness to march at á moment's warning. On the following day they granted permiffion to feveral bodies of armed burghers, whò had addreffed them for the purpofe, to march directly to the affiftance or relief of their brethren in Utrecht; at the fame time opening their military magazine at Woerden for the ufe of that city.

The day after, being the 8th of the fame month, in order partly to give the greater weight and appearance of folemnity to their proceedings, partly to explain the caufes of thefe extraordinary meafures to the reprefentative of the whole republic, and thereby reconcile them to thofe which they intended farther to purfue, they exhibited to the people the unufual fpectacle of their repairing in a body, to the amount of about fifty perfons, to the affembly of the states general, where they reprefented them as indifpenfably neceffary in the prefent critical ftate of affairs, in order to withstand the hoftile proceedings and dangerous defigns of the ftadtholder. It may be neceffary here to observe, that altho' no town has more than one vote, and that these amount in all only to nineteen, in the ftates of Holland, yet that there is no limitation as to the number of deputies which any town may fend, who are all equally members of that affembly, and have an equal right to fit and to debate in it; fo that ability, with the powers of argument and perfuafion, may be branched out into feveral parts, although the vote is fingle.

It was not confonant to the proceedings of the ftates general, to

give any present answer to, or to make any immediate obfervation on these representations.

The ftates of Holland followed up thefe proceedings with an order to the troops of the province to march immediately to the frontiers on the fide of Utrecht; and, to render them the more ftedfaft in the intended fervice, voted an augmentation of twelve fous per week to their pay. They likewife took into their fervice a corps of light troops, which, under the ill-founded denomination of a legion, had been raised by a Rhingrave of Salm, during the late conteft with the emperor, for the fervice of the republic in that feafon of apparent danger. The fuppreffion of this corps, which had been intended along with other military reductions of the fame nature, had long been prevented through the influence of the republican leaders, on account of the violent part which their commander took, or affected to take, in behalf of that party. The ftates general having, however, at length difcharged them from the fervice of the republic, thofe of Holland took them into the immediate pay of that province, in order to their being employed in the war of Utrecht.

We have, in our hiftory of the year 1786, taken notice of the fubfequent meafures pursued by the ftates of Holland against the stadtholder previous to Monf. de Rayneval's negociation; particularly his fufpenfion fom the office of captain-general, the difcharging the troops from their military oath to him, and their forbidding that title to be applied to him in the public prayers of the churches. We likewife took notice of the strong proteft made by the prince against these proceedings.

The defection of the fenate of Amfterdam from their party, feemed to be little lefs than a mortal fhock to the republican leaders; and the failure of their late attempts of ftripping the ftadtholder of his remaining great offices in the province of Holland, and of increafing the number of voters in the affembly of the states, could not but increase their confternation and defpondence. The effect produced by this ftate of things was vifible for fome time after the commencement of the year 1787, by that unusual fpirit of moderation which apparently prevailed in their conduct. But they were foon to experience a more fenfible fhock than even the lofs of Amfterdam.

This was no lefs than a revolution of fentiment and conduct in the affembly of the ftates of Holland. Indeed the change which had taken. place in the fenate of Amfterdam, confidering the lead which that city had always taken in public affairs, and the almoft unbounded influence which fhe had ever maintained in the affembly of the provincial ftates, afforded alarming indications of the confequences which were likely to enfue. From that period the flates had visibly grown more indecifive in their conduct; the republican zeal feemed much flackened, and the numbers ran clofer on every divifion.

It seemed to be a capital error in the republican party, to admit the appointment of the celebrated Van Berkel, the firft penfionary of Amfterdam, to the office of reprefenting the republic as minifter to the new ftates of America. This man had long been the leader, oracle, and it may be faid, the foul of that party; and no man was ever

better