Bain, all unite in saying that consciousness makes no such revelation,—we are landed in a very awkward predicament. Either the deliverances of consciousness vary in different individuals (competent individuals, accredited philosophers), and yet the diverse utterances, even when contradictory, must be accepted as true; or else we must refuse credence to consciousness in this particular instance, and then we seem to hear the Hamiltonian dictum hurled at us with special vehemence, falsus in uno falsus in omnibus. The other disputable solution is this. Consciousness, says Hamilton, is co-extensive with Mind: but at the same time he holds that there are mental activities that never do come within the range of consciousness. This last is the doctrine of Mental Latency,-or, as George Henry Lewes calls it, Subconsciousness,—or, as it has been denominated by Philosophical Physiologists, Unconscious Cerebration. Now we have here, as in the former case, a choice of alternatives. We cannot, clearly, hold both positions; for the two are contradictory. We must either deny the doctrine of Mental Latency, or, holding this doctrine, we must extend the meaning of 'mental' so as to embrace subconscious phenomena. To us, the second seems to be the less evil of the two: but Professor Veitch prefers the first. In this, we hardly think he sees the full effect of such a course on Hamilton's general psychology. If Mental Latency goes, a good many things must go along with it: and, in particular, there must go the view of Memory as bare Retention; for memory as bare retention, or memory proper, is the power of retaining knowledge in the mind, but out of consciousness.'

6

There are several other points that we might take exception to; but fault-finding is a thankless business at the best, and it is not congenial when one has to deal with a work of real merit. We simply add that the biographical chapter is full of interesting matter, and, like the rest of the book, contains much in little compass. We note in it inter alia a fitting tribute to Hamilton's scholarship and vast research; but why no reference to his style? If we except the over-fondness for Latinized words and grandiose expressions, his writing must be pronounced to occupy a high literary place. It is both lucid and energetic; and, certainly, it is in every way characteristic.

A Study of Origins; or, The Problems of Knowledge, of Being and of Duty. By E. DE PRESSENSE, D.D. Translated by A. H. Holmden. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1883. While revising his admirable volumes on the history of the Christian Church during the first three centuries, M. de Pressensé was struck with the increasing vehemence of the attacks which were being made both against Christian theism, and against the foundations of all spiritual religion, and resolved to test the pretensions of materialism, and the new

philosophy as against the doctrines of a more spiritual philosophy. The result is a clear gain to the cause of truth. A philosopher as well as a theologian, thoroughly acquainted with the controversies of the day and unfettered by any narrow or narrowing prejudices, M. de Pressensé, even if he has said little that is entirely new, has done good service by his clear and forcible statement of the various controversies, and by the thoroughly effective criticism to which he has subjected the opinions of those who have set themselves to denounce rather than to refute the principles of Christian theism. His volume is divided into four books. In the first of these he deals with the problem of knowledge, and with the questions-Are causes knowable? Can we know them with certainty, and, if so, what are the conditions of certainty? As might be expected, he here deals with the theories of Auguste Comte, J. S. Mill, Herbert Spencer, M. Taine, and many others. His own theory is that causes are known and that certainty is attained through the co-operation of sensation, reason, and the will. Of reason he remarks-'it raises us higher than itself, to its own source and principle. It recognises that it must find the explanation of itself in something beyond it. It is by its essence inclined to the perfect and the absolute. There is not one of its axioms which is not based on this; there is a reason for everything. Every change has its cause, every quality its substance, every being its end. These are the principles of reason. Its most general function is to conceive the conditions of order, of homogeneity, of harmony between the effect and the cause. It must then find a reason adequate to itself and to the totality of things, a cause proportioned to the effect. This cause should be perfection itself, for thought cannot stop at anything less, and perfection can only be the absolute. Any limited degree of being and of perfection placed at the origin of things is illogical. The absolute being is at the same time perfect, for any imperfection would be a limit. Thus the principle of causation, taken by itself, implies perfect and absolute being, and reason thus lifts our eyes to God.' It need hardly be said that M. de Pressensé is a thorough going Cartesian. In the second book on The Problem of Being the various theories respecting the origin of the universe are discussed. Holding fast the doctrine of design, M. de Pressensé passes in review those of Büchner, Darwin, Herbert Spencer, Haeckel, Schopenhauer, Hartmann, &c., and shows their inconsistencies or their insufficiency to account for things. Of special interest is the discussion of the doctrine of evolution. The Problem of Being forms the subject also of the third book. Here, however, it is dealt with in relation to man. One chapter is devoted to the consideration of language and its influence on knowledge, and another to sociology. The fourth book deals with the Problem of Duty. The chapter on the nature and origin of religion is one of the most satisfactory we have seen. Spencer's notion that religion is a theory of the universe is set aside; as is also that of the author of Ecce Homo that religion is admiration. Religion, M. de Pressensé maintains, is neither metaphysics, nor morals, nor aesthetics, nor mere emotion, but

the upward pressure of the soul to God; and belongs not to any one particular faculty, but to the whole being. As for its origin, this is not in nature, nor in man, but in God, and is everywhere caused, whatever form it may assume, by the direct action of the Spirit of God upon the human soul. In the last chapter we have a slight but interesting sketch of the origin and early history of man. The questions with which this volume deals are of surpassing and indeed vital importance, and to those who wish to understand the various theories which are now advanced respecting them, and to see what can be said for or against them, we strongly recommend the perusal of M. de Pressensé's book as at once able, eloquent and fair.

Études Morales sur L'Antiquité par Constant Martha. Paris:

M. Martha does not often favour the public with the productions of his pen; but whenever he does, to those who are acquainted with his writings they are always acceptable. Few who have read his Moralistes sous L'Empire Romain will readily forget the wonderfully vivid pictures which he there gives of the intellectual and moral life of antiquity during the earlier years of the Roman Empire. In the work before us we have a series of six studies on the same subject of equal interest and merit with the Moralistes, but ranging over a wider period. In 'l' Eloge funèbre chez les Romain,' we are shown the sentiments which animated the great funeral ceremonies at a time when Rome though still retaining its austere simplicity and but little versed in literature, was nevertheless conscious of its future greatness. 'Le philosophe Carnéade à Rome' deals with the beginnings of Roman philosophy and gives a graphic account of the awakenings of curiosity respecting moral and philosophical questions among a people previously engrossed in politics and war. Next follow chapters on 'les consolations dans l'antiquité,' and 'l'examen de conscience.' In the last two chapters we have admirable sketches of Julian and Synesius. The work is one of rare interest and is written with all M. Martha's grace of style.

Epicuro e l'Epicurismo. Milan: G. Trezza Hoepli, 1883.

This is a second and enlarged edition, in the preface to which the author says that after five years, he does not repent of the ideas developed in the first edition, and describes Epicurism in the following words :-'It is without doubt one of the greatest and most efficacious systems of the ancient world, and extends its relations to the modern world; its conception of the universe is so true, that contemporaneous science continues it in its discoveries. With the scientific conception of things, there corresponds a healthy conception of life, separated for ever from ascetic terrors of what is beyond the tomb. We all, more or less, live by this system; the physical and historical sciences resolve themselves into laws of molecular

mechanics; modern morality is no longer founded on an imperative which is beyond actual phenomena, nor seeks there the basis of social idealities; for us, the phenomenon is the whole being; outside of the phenomena can be placed no divine reality that contains the immutable and eternal laws of life. The unity of cosmic life from the minutest protozoa to the highest vertebrate; the evolution of its forms which rise to vaster states; the naturality of the moral as well as of the physical; of sentiment as of thought; the rejection of every ascetic conception, and an educational joy in ethics which are not opposed to nature itself, but correct and complete it-this is Epicurism.' On these lines, the author enters into the history of Epicurus and Epicurism, and discusses the Platonic transcendentalism, the renaissance of Epicurism, gods, atoms, the senses, the Epicurean sentiment of nature, the unity of life, Roman Epicurism, the intermittence of ascetism, the modern renaissance and the Epicurean future, in a small volume of 196 pages. Many notes refer to a number of French and German scientific and philosophical works.

La Scienza delle Religioni. Dal Prof. MICHELE KERBAKER. Napoli, 1882.

As showing some portion of advanced Italian thought regarding one of the most important questions of the day, some passages from this Inaugural Discourse pronounced at the opening of the present session, at the Royal University of Naples, by the professor of Sanskrit and Comparative Philology, Michele Kerbaker, may not be unwelcome. The Science of Religions, (in the plural), contains two distinct parts, one of which is an abridgement of the history of the new science, and the other a demonstration of its importance and application. After remarks on the new field opened up by the late rapid progress in oriental philology, that is, the field of the comparative history of religions, and explaining the reasons of the opposition made to the scientific pretensions of philologists by psychologists and theologians; and after showing what connection the comparative history of religions has with the so-called theological rationalism applied by a famous German school to biblical exegesis, and the historical study of Christianity, Professor Kerbaker goes on to say that—

The European conscience is at present divided between the two worlds of Hebraism and Hinduism, the most ideally opposed that can be imagined. On the one hand the world is conceived according to the aspirations of individual consciousness, with belief in a personal God, the vindicator of the conscience, superior to all cosmic laws, and with the enchanting moral of hope. On the other hand it is conceived of as revealed by Nature, with a God identified with the Universe, and with the severe and stoical ethics of resignation under the law of necessity by which cosmic life is governed. On the one hand there is the continual appeal to Eternal Justice in the name of the personal consciousness that revolts against the reality of historic laws; and on the other, an absolute acquiescence of the intellect in the laws of universal nature, a deadening of the personal sentiment by the contemplation of cosmic immensity, a persistent sense of phenomenal illusions and of the vanity of all things, a constant mortifica

tion of self, an unlimited submission to the evils of existence, and a tranquillizing of the spirit in a conscious apathy, a refining and etherializing of all the affections into profound pity towards the whole of living humanity. It seems that the Aryan idea, which operates on the general conscience as philosophical activity, supplies the motive force; while the Semitic idea, full of the sentiment of personal well-being, serves as a curb on the said conscience, and, in the form of a passing dogmatic shadow, prevents it from plunging precipitously into the ultimate logical moral consequences of the purely scientific conception of the universe. Thus is explained, for example, the possibility of Darwinism and the Bible, each holding its own in the conscience of an Englishman or an American. Ought we not to consider the contemporary existence of the two ideas, Aryan and Semitic, as a law of indestructible polarity?' 'It is needful to believe that a new era is about to commence, just as the present crisis, that intervenes between two great epochs of humanity, the one religious, the other irreligious, will soon be overcome. But rather than sing novus ab integro seclorum nascitur orbis over the fact of the general irreligiousness, it seems that it would be better to remember the saying, "that which has been is that which shall be, and there is nothing new under the sun,” to be accepted, however, discreetly and cum grano salis.'

Professor Kerbaker then remarks that the science of religions touches on the most vital and agitating questions of modern society.

Historically speaking, religion is the patrimony of general judgments, comprising a determinate explanation of the mysteries of existence, which stands as the rule of conscience and the foundation of public and private education. One cannot conceive of the moral and civil life of a nation,' Professor Kerbaker goes on, without this aliment of intuitive and, I would even say, of impersonal wisdom, which passes almost unchanged from generation to generation, amid the rise and fall of many doctrines, and the growth and changes of arts, customs, and institutions. Hence the inevitable conflict between religion and culture, born of the reception by the latter of a mass of newly acquired experiences that disturb the old conception of the universe that has passed into a common inherited doctrine; which conflict, becoming disordered, assumes the form of social discord, dividing the cultured from the vulgar, doctrinal sceptics from believers, and the schools from the temples. On the different ways in which this ideal schism is resolved, depends the course of civilization among different nations. The traditional doctrine may dictate laws to, and impose its yoke on culture; or culture may so confine traditional doctrine with trammels and chains, as to render it altogether vain and useless. In either case the two

are opposed and the results of their opposition is pernicious.' 'As the traditional, or let us say revealed cognition, cannot be conciliated with the conclusions of scientific culture, it being impossible that a group of anterior revelation already formed into a system can admit the results of new experiences, there remains no other mode of putting an end to the conflict than by adjudging the religious doctrine to scientific culture, as material for the lat ter's competence; all the more as culture does actually constantly influence that doctrine so as gradually to transform it, and, as much as possible, to adapt it to the scientific and rational comprehension of the universe. Those, however, who call the mystic sentiment a pathological and morbid state, a partial madness, an intermittence of the reasoning faculties, do not resolve but break the problem, caring little for the social facts implicated.'

'Now-a-days,' says Professor Kerbaker in another place, natural philosophy destroys, with inexorable criticism, the magnificent illusions that lead individuals to hope for an equal participation in the banquet of life, in the idea that a new political and civil legislation, better than the last, will suffice to produce the realization of that hope. But Nature, who is the real mistress of the house, and as the prime dispenser of social benefits, will have her laws of exclusion and selection executed at any cost, and sometimes makes those who rebel against her laws their pitiless executors. The only way to temper the